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Indirect emissions controls mean states solve – experimentation, modeling, tech innovation, local adaptability, and influencing industry behavior – federal preemption threatens it.

Carol Rose, 08. Lohse Chair in Water and Natural Resources at the University of Arizona College of Law, J.D. from UChicago. “FEDERALISM AND CLIMATE CHANGE: THE ROLE OF THE STATES IN A FUTURE FEDERAL REGIME-AN INTRODUCTION,” Arizona Law Review 50, 01/01/08, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2769&context=fss_papers

Climate change seems far too vast a subject to engage state and local actors in any significant way. Global warming and greenhouse gas control, sea level alterations and polar ice melts-as a practical matter, all these climate-related issues have international repercussions on a scale that state and local actors seldom address. As a legal matter, there are other impediments: the Constitution charges the federal government, rather than the states and localities, with managing our relations with other countries. No doubt this pattern exists because in international matters, the federal government is expected to present a unified national position, unimpeded by the fragmentation that would arise from provincial state and local interference. Nevertheless, in the current absence of the federal government's participation in international climate change efforts, states and local governments have begun to fill the void. The pieces in this Symposium examine these efforts by states and local actors. While the authors address diverse issues and take widely differing approaches, many touch on three common themes, and it is upon those themes that I wish to dwell briefly in this Introduction. The first theme asks whether state and local actors-the entities that Richard Stewart calls "sub-national actors," or SNAs-will actually have any impact on global climate change. The answers given here are mixed. The consensus among the authors is that SNA efforts are unlikely to have any major direct impact on climate change, particularly on emissions reductions. The largest and most active of the state actors is California, with an economy that would be eighth in the world if California were an independent nation.2 Yet, as Kirsten Engel and David Adelman point out, California's proposed emission standards would reduce global carbon dioxide production less than 1%.3 If even big, powerful California could make only a paltry contribution to greenhouse gas cutbacks, it might seem that other SNAs would be equally ineffective in reducing global warming through direct emission controls, even in the aggregate. On the other hand, SNA measures may well have a substantial impact when it comes to indirect measures to control climate change. Several articles take up these indirect measures. Holly Doremus and Michael Hanemann argue that SNA regulations are particularly adept at influencing behavior, and through such behavioral effects the states and localities can indirectly bring about greenhouse gas reduction.4 Just as important, as Richard Stewart's contribution observes, in the absence of federal action, the states can exhibit leadership and set a good example. State and local actors can nudge the laggards, including not only other SNAs but also the federal government itself.5 Even the much-decried "patchwork" of SNA regulation can have an impact on moving emission controls forward. Uneven regulatory patterns may induce industry to lobby for a more comprehensive approach, as occurred over a century ago when differing state railroad regulations drove the industry to demand a single federal Interstate Commerce Commission.6 Closely related to the first theme of effectiveness vel non, a second major theme is the issue of practical constraints that might limit SNA effectiveness in dealing with climate change. In this Symposium, however, controversy swirls around the issues of constraints, and several of the pieces dispute the arguments that SNA activity is necessarily hemmed in by purported practical limitations. David Adelman and Kirsten Engel discuss one such supposedly constraining factor, the pattern that has acquired the unlovely name of "leakage" among the countries currently attempting to curtail greenhouse gas emissions. "Leakage" emerges from competition among the large number of governmental entities that are implicated in an issue of common concern. Internationally, the leakage phenomenon occurs when Country A limits greenhouse gas emissions, but then the producing factories move or "leak" over into unregulated Country B, thereby undercutting the global effectiveness of Country A's regulations as well as putting Country A at a competitive disadvantage. If leakage is already a problem on the international front, one could certainly imagine that it would equally be a problem, if on a smaller scale, as between Arizona and Nevada, Vermont and New Hampshire, or Kansas City and Omaha. Nevertheless, Adelman and Engel argue that leakage takes many forms and may ultimately be less significant than others think.7 Stewart joins them, arguing that a variety of factors may induce SNAs to continue their activities even in the face of the interstate competition underlying the leakage phenomenon. 8 Another potential practical constraint on SNAs could be their limited technical capacity for dealing with the enormous complexity of climate change. In earlier debates about federalism and environmental law, some commentators argued that the federal level might be the most efficient locus for scientific inquiry into environmental concerns, because national agencies could take advantage of scale economies in research and could act as central clearing houses for information.9 One might certainly expect to hear this same argument with respect to climate change, a subject that involves vast areas of scientific uncertainty. Nevertheless, the Symposium authors are remarkably sanguine about the possibilities for SNAs to contribute relevant and useful knowledge. Lisa Heinzerling stresses the very considerable air pollution control expertise that already exists in California's environmental agencies.10 Doremus and Hanemann extend Heinzerling's argument to other states, while also noting the ability of the states to adapt general policies to specific local and regional circumstances." Barry Rabe thinks that SNA initiatives can generate substantial advances in knowledge, and that their decentralized activities might even have an advantage over centralized control, insofar as states and localities can experiment with different approaches. 2 Adelman and Engel focus on the ways in which SNAs can foster technological innovation to cope with climate change. But like the scaleeconomy argument that favors federal control, all these points add up to a classic counterargument in federalism debates: together, they defend the states and even localities as "experimental laboratories" for various kinds of regulatory agendas. The third major theme of the Symposium revolves around normative and legal limitations to SNA climate change initiatives. The prospect of federal preemption looms like a dark cloud over SNA activities. With respect to any particular legal problem, the underlying rationale for federal preemption is that state and local interventions can confuse and complicate issues that require a unified national approach. The preemption argument frequently surfaces in the area of foreign policy. As Dan Farber notes, foreign relations are often thought to require a single national policy, and for that reason, the preemption issue could have serious negative consequences for SNA programs relating to climate change.

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