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States race to the middle, not the bottom.

William Magnuson, 20. Associate Professor, Texas A&M University School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School; M.A., Universita di Padova; A.B., Princeton University, “The Race to the Middle,” Notre Dame Law Review 95.3 (2020): 1183-1231. Available online: https://ndlawreview.org/publications/archives/volume-95-issue-3/

How does federalism affect the quality of state law? It is a difficult question that scholars have struggled with, and disagreed about, for decades. At its core, though, the question is a simple one. States are free to establish their own laws in a wide variety of areas and thus inevitably face choices about which laws to adopt. In making these choices, states are informed by the laws in place in other states. Their eventual choices will, in turn, inform the choices that other states make about their own laws. Given this dynamic, how should we expect states to act? Scholars that have addressed the question generally fall into one of two camps: those who see federalism as leading to a "race to the bottom"' and those who see it as leading to a "race to the top." 2 The race-to-the-bottom camp views federalism as creating a powerful incentive for states to engage in harmful and inefficient deregulation. According to this line of thought, state legislatures desire to attract corporations to their jurisdictions in order to increase tax revenues, create jobs, and generally improve their economies. But in order to appeal to the corporations and corporate executives that make decisions about where to locate business, states must adopt regulations that are more permissive than the regulations in force in other states. As each state adopts progressively looser regulations in order to outdo their neighbors, the resulting degradation of standards leads to suboptimal levels of regulation, whether it be in shareholder protections, 3 labor laws, 4 tax levels, 5 or environmental standards. 6 The race-to-the-top camp sees things differently. According to this model of federalism, competition between states on regulatory structures in fact leads to better, more efficient levels of regulation. 7 While the precise dynamics of this process differ depending on the issue area, the basic argument is that if the market is functioning correctly, corporations should benefit from better regulation, not from the absence of it. After all, corporations have constituencies as well, and if their shareholders are regularly fleeced by corporate management or their employees live in polluted cities, they will eventually lobby for change (or go elsewhere). As a result, states have incentives to provide regulations that promote overall prosperity, rather than favoring the narrow interests of the few. Over time, then, states should progressively improve the quality and efficiency of their regulatory structures in order to outcompete their neighboring states. Despite their disagreements, however, both the race-to-the-bottom and race-to-the-top theories share one fundamental assumption-that states race to distinguish their laws from the laws of other states. 8 In other words, for there to be a race upward or downward, states must seek to outdo one another, either by steadily loosening their regulations or steadily tightening them. Both theories take for granted that this dynamic will lead to ever more extreme regulatory structures. But the assumption that interstate competition leads inevitably to differentiation overlooks another powerful aspect of interstate competition that in many ways counteracts the races to the top and bottom. This dynamic, which may usefully be called the "race to the middle," pushes states toward regulatory schemes that are similar or identical to the schemes adopted by sufficiently large numbers of other states. The race to the middle encourages states to focus on harmonizing, not differentiating, their regulatory structures. The race to the middle is driven by four interrelated factors, all of which provide benefits to states from adopting well-established regulatory structures already prevailing in other states. First, states that adopt regulatory structures already existing in other states benefit from informational effects about the benefits and risks of the structure. Second, the prevalence of an already established regulatory structure provides greater familiarity and, thus, certainty to corporations and other regulated actors about the effects of the regulation on their activities, thereby increasing the attractiveness of jurisdictions that adopt that structure. Third, states benefit from network effects when they adopt regulatory structures that are interoperable with the regulatory structures in place in other states. And finally, states that adopt well-established regulatory structures that are common across the nation are less likely to face regulatory intervention from federal lawmakers. In many ways, the race to the middle is a reassuring phenomenon. It suggests that regulatory competition does not inevitably lead to ever more extreme forms of regulation. It counteracts countervailing pressures for states to race to the bottom by deregulating at the expense of consumers and citizens or overregulating to the detriment of beneficial corporate activity. And it works to reduce the magnitude and prevalence of conflicting laws that can raise the cost of doing business across borders.

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