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1---UBI doesn’t increase innovation or entrepreneurship

Robert Seamans 17. Associate Professor at New York University’s Stern School of Business and Director of the Center for the Future of Management, 6-6-2017. "Universal Basic Income Is Not An Innovation Policy," https://www.forbes.com/sites/washingtonbytes/2017/06/06/universal-basic-income-is-not-an-innovation-policy/?sh=6edfcbde2e8f.

UBI Is Unlikely To Stimulate Entrepreneurship And Innovation

In my view, while there may be other benefits to UBI, the argument that UBI might stimulate entrepreneurship and innovation suffers from two key problems. First, the U.S. economy already has multiple safety nets in place for would-be entrepreneurs and innovators, including bankruptcy laws, unemployment insurance, the Affordable Care Act (which allows employees to leave their firms without fear of losing health care), and other programs described below. It is not clear that replacing one set of safety nets with another will stimulate entrepreneurship and innovation.

For UBI to stimulate additional entrepreneurship and innovation, it would need to provide an additional cushion above and beyond what already exists. This is an important point because most advocates of a UBI argue that its costs will largely be covered by replacing existing (but arguably inefficiently-run) programs. But if we want to stimulate more entrepreneurship than we already have, we need to do more than just replace existing programs; we need to provide even more of a cushion, which will increase the costs of implementing a UBI.

The second problem with the argument that UBI will stimulate entrepreneurship is that it neglects the potential response from financiers (lenders, investors, and other providers of capital). If a UBI (or any other policy that shields borrowers from downside risk) increases the propensity for entrepreneurs to take risks because their downside is limited in the case of failure, this means that the capital provided by the financier is at greater risk. Thus, the financier may cut back on the amount of lending provided, or may continue to lend, but at a higher rate than before. Or, if the financier has trouble distinguishing between high- and low-quality risky projects, the financier may stop funding altogether.

The negative response to higher levels of borrower protection by financiers has been documented in a number of settings. For example, Michelle White, a professor at UC San Diego, and coauthors find that higher levels of bankruptcy exemptions (the amount of money that an individual can retain when declaring bankruptcy) are correlated with more loan denials and higher interest rates.

The negative effect on innovation has been documented in other settings as well. Ramana Nanda and Tom Nicholas of Harvard Business School find that credit rationing by banks during the Great Depression led firms to produce fewer, and less novel innovations. A recent paper with my coauthors Geraldo Cerqueiro, Deepak Hegde and Fabiana Penas shows that higher levels of bankruptcy exemptions lead to less innovation—in terms of lower number of patents and lower overall patent quality—by small firms. This is because innovation is a costly undertaking, and when the supply of capital shrinks, these small firms have no choice but to cut back on innovation. We find particularly strong effects in industries with high costs of innovation.

To be clear, a UBI would function differently than bankruptcy exemptions, and it is possible that, even if financiers cut back funding, the net effect of a UBI may still be to increase entrepreneurship and innovation. The point is that these other effects should not be neglected, because instead of stimulating entrepreneurship and innovation, a UBI may perversely lead to a reduction in entrepreneurship and innovation in some cases.

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