States implementing fiscal redistribution links to the federalism net benefit
Roy Bahl et al, 02. *Roy Bahl is the Dean of the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies at Georgia State University and a Professor of Economics. *Jorge Martinez-Vazquez is Professor of Economics and Director of the International Studies Program for the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies at Georgia State University. *Sally Wallace is Associate Professor of Economics and Associate Director of the Fiscal Research Program of the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies at Georgia State University. “State and Local Government Choices in Fiscal Redistribution.” National Tax Journal 55.4 (December 2002): 723–42. https://doi.org/10.17310/ntj.2002.4.04.
A well-traveled normative principle of fiscal federalism is that state and local governments should not pursue income redistribution as a budgetary objective. The conventional theory (Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972; Ladd and Doolittle, 1982; and Brown and Oates, 1987) holds that redistribution should be a central government responsibility for two main reasons: first, the benefits of redistribution spill-over beyond state and local boundaries; second, redistribution policies of subnational government jurisdictions will be compromised by the in-migration of poor families who are attracted by higher benefits and the out-migration of rich families who move to escape redistributive taxes. Economists seem to accept this view, though some have challenged it on efficiency grounds.1