Their authors don’t even understand what environmental leadership is—prefer our historical analysis
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Robyn, Redmond Barry Distinguished Professor in the Discipline of Political Science, School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne, and a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia. “Great Expectations: The United States and the Global Environment” Great Powers, Climate Change, and Global Environmental Responsibilities. Pg 51-52. LJS
Most analyses of US environmental foreign policy and diplomacy have been organized around the frame of leadership rather than great power responsibility. These analyses generally converge around an overarching narrative of declining leadership, despite variation along the way (Buzan and Falkner, Chapter 2, this volume). Yet there is surprisingly little debate about what exactly constitutes leadership and how the US’s shifting leadership aspirations relate to shifting international expectations of the US’s environmental responsibilities as a great power. This chapter seeks to clarify these conceptual linkages and then revisit the history of US environmental diplomacy since 1970 through this new conceptual framework. Falkner and Buzan (2019: 132) have argued that environmental stewardship has evolved to the point where it is has become a primary institution of global international society (GIS), reflected in ‘a vast network of international environmental regimes and in state-level behavioural and constitutive changes’. However, most of these regimes provide a set of general environmental responsibilities for all states, and only a very small subset of regimes and instruments include special environmental responsibilities for certain states, and these fall along a North–South axis rather than the division between great powers and ‘the rest’ (e.g. Montreal Protocol; Kyoto Protocol; Paris Agreement; Rio Declaration, Principle 7; Sustainable Development Goals, Goal 3; Convention on Biological Diversity). Nonetheless, the US has played a pivotal role in the negotiations of the two most significant regimes that include special environmental responsibilities for developed countries: the ozone regime and the climate regime. These cases provide striking contrasts in the US’s approach, but this chapter argues that they are nonetheless consistent with the more general patterns that have emerged in the US’s relationship to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). One key pattern is that the US has shown considerable reluctance to lead and/or embrace special environmental responsibilities if the MEA obligations challenge the US’s relative economic advantage under the existing international order. Connecting the US’s role as a great power in global environmental governance with US grand strategy and its role in managing the (declining) liberal international order is therefore crucial to understanding the US’s approach to great power management (GPM) in the environmental domain.