No US climate leadership—leadership requires attracting followers and working towards collective goals—the US does neither in the environmental arena
Eckersley 22
Robyn, Redmond Barry Distinguished Professor in the Discipline of Political Science, School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne, and a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia. “Great Expectations: The United States and the Global Environment.” Great Powers, Climate Change, and Global Environmental Responsibilities. Pg 55-56. LJS
Here we can add one more source of variation for special responsibilities, namely, the degree to which they challenge the existing international order, including the hierarchy of states and the political and economic norms of the order. Historically, special responsibilities have been restricted to great powers and the purpose has been to maintain the peace and stability of the existing order, which entails preserving the status quo. In contrast, special environmental responsibilities seek to promote equitable sustainable development and environmental justice, which entails a degree of redistribution of capabilities and/or entitlements in favour of developing countries. In the climate regime, this is reflected in the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (hereafter CBDR-RC). Although these responsibilities are conferred on developed countries, the US has nonetheless been widely singled out politically by the G77/China and many environmental NGOs as having ‘extra-special responsibilities’ given its significant environmental capacity, its oversized ecological footprint, and especially its historical/cumulative emissions. This offends the US’s free market philosophy of a ‘level playing field’ and places more onerous duties on the US, relative to other developed countries, to take domestic action and assist other countries, which puts it at a relative economic disadvantage to rising powers such as China and India. Throughout the climate negotiations, the US has worked hard to uphold a more restrictive understanding of CBDR-RC by focusing on differences in capacity rather than historical responsibility, drawing attention to where future growth in emissions lies (rising powers, not the US), and generally encouraging a greater diffusion of responsibility that blurs the North–South divide. While the US executive (as distinct from the Senate) has more often than not accepted that developed countries should do more than poorer countries, it has baulked at the idea that they should also go first. Special Responsibilities and Environmental Leadership Distinguished Special Responsibilities did not provide a systematic analysis of the relationship between leadership and special responsibilities. Rather, we simply argued that they are conceptually distinct but may nonetheless sometimes be conjoined (Bukovansky et al., 2012: 60–61). But if special responsibilities and leadership both entail asymmetric roles and responsibilities vis-à-vis larger communities, how then might they be conceptually distinguished? This is no easy task given the wide variety of meanings attached to leadership, but necessary if we are to determine to what extent the US has played an international leadership role as a great power, or merely as developed state. Here I distinguish between two different types of leadership that are most relevant to global environmental governance (Eckersley, 2020). The first is the popular understanding of environmental leaders as those in the vanguard of a performance field. This includes national front runners that go first and/or do more in terms of their environmental ambition, advocacy, policy performance, and/or contributions to multilateral funds. This type of national environmental leadership is positional, judged in terms of the performance standards of the relevant MEA. It includes cooperative front runners who are seeking to induce international cooperation by setting a national example irrespective of whether they succeed in attracting followers. It also includes competitive front runners (such the pioneers in a green technology race) who seek to win at the expense of others but may nonetheless sometimes attract followers. However, as Liefferink and Wurzel have argued (2017: 953), pioneers of this kind are not leaders if they do not intend to attract followers. The second understanding of leadership is substantive rather than positional; it entails a relationship between leaders and followers, based on asymmetric roles and responsibilities, in the pursuit of a collective and shared purpose. It may be conceptualized as a process of interaction whereby one or more actors (the leaders) exercise asymmetric influence in attracting or negotiating the consent or acquiescence of other parties (the followers), either directly or indirectly, in ways that facilitate collective action towards the achievement of a common purpose in a given community. (Eckersley, 2020: 1179–1180) On this account, leadership may be understood as a form of legitimated authority that is marked off from domination or mere success in bargaining because it serves to facilitate and/or expand collective agency in the pursuit of collective goals. What counts as legitimate influence by the leaders and what counts as consent or acquiescence by followers depends on the social and institutional context. To establish leadership in the field of international diplomacy and multilateral negotiations it is necessary to find evidence of asymmetric influence, the building of support by others, the successful negotiation of agreement through recognized channels and a commitment to the collective purpose. This does not necessarily mean that leaders must be purely altruistic (they may fold their own goals into the collective goals), but nor can they be purely self-serving; rather, they must be recognized as committed to the negotiating community’s collective goals (Parker, Karlsson, and Hjerpe, 2015: 449). It should be clear that this account of leadership is agential, not structural; that is, it is understood as an artful practice by the political executive of a state rather than a pre-given attribute of states based on superior capabilities relative to other states in a system or international society (Eckersley, 2020: 1180). While the possession of superior capabilities by a state, and environmental capacities in particular, certainly confers an advantage on their diplomats—and indeed, they raise expectations of diplomatic leadership—this only translates into leadership when the negotiating team is seen as genuinely committed to bringing all parties to an agreement to enable the pursuit of a collective purpose (Parker, Karlsson, and Hjerpe, 2015).