No US climate leadership—spotty record, prioritizing profits—their authors don’t understand how environmental leadership works
Eckersley 22
Robyn, Redmond Barry Distinguished Professor in the Discipline of Political Science, School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne, and a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia. “Great Expectations: The United States and the Global Environment.” Great Powers, Climate Change, and Global Environmental Responsibilities. Pg 58-64. LJS
Clearly, the US has appeared to be much more willing to contribute to collective efforts to protect the global environment during the Cold War period than the post-Cold War period. This is consistent with the US’s greater relative commitment to multilateralism with its Western allies during the Cold War than the post-Cold War period. However, treaty ratification signals willingness to cooperate but is does not suffice as evidence of diplomatic leadership. Before assessing the evidence of US leadership in environmental diplomacy, a closer examination of the subject matter of MEAs reveals certain general patterns of enthusiasm and disinclination that are consistent across both periods, and which provide important clues to the US environmental proclivities and more general foreign policy priorities. First, the ratification record shows that the US has generally been an enthusiastic participant in MEAs dealing with biodiversity and habitat protection, especially in the marine environment. The US is a party to the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands (1971), the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species (1972), London Convention on Ocean Dumping (1972), World Heritage Convention (1972), Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (1980), and the Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (1991). Moreover, at the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, the US was an enthusiastic supporter of the proposal for a moratorium on whaling under the International Conventions for the Regulation of Whaling (1946). The US’s concern for marine mammals is also reflected in US trade policy, where it has imposed a unilateral ban on the importation of tuna that is caught with driftnets due to the high incidental kill of dolphins, as well as a unilateral ban on the importation of shrimp caught with a high incidental kill of sea turtles. Both of these bans were the subject of a World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute as unjustified restrictions on trade. Yet, unlike the European Union, the US has not otherwise been a major green demandeur in the environmental negotiations under the stalled Doha Development round of negotiations, although it has insisted on environmental clauses in its negotiation of preferential trade agreements. However, the US’s enthusiasm for the protection of biodiversity has noticeably waned when the treaties are not ‘pure and simple’ cases of species or habitat protection but rather entangled with rights of economic exploitation. This applies to the two most significant ‘omnibus treaties’ that seek to protect marine and terrestrial biodiversity: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD; 1992). In both cases the US has not participated because the treaties were argued to be inconsistent with US commercial interests. The Reagan administration refused to sign UNCLOS III on the ground that the provision on the mining of deep seabed resources would require US corporations to share their seabed mining technology with other nations (Malone, 1983). The US preferred a regime that enabled the private commercial exploration and development of deep seabed minerals. The Bush senior administration welcomed the biodiversity protection provisions of the CBD but rejected the provisions relating to the sharing of biotechnology and the benefits gained from developing genetic resources because they were not seen to provide sufficient protection of the intellectual property rights of the US biotechnology industry (Downes, 1993; Blomquist, 2002). The US was also critical of the provisions on finance to developing countries, particularly Article 20(4), which makes the extent of implementation by developing countries dependent on receiving financial resources and the transfer of technologies. A concern to protect the commercial interests of the US biotechnology industry was also central to the US’s role as a leading member of the ‘Miami group’ of countries that opposed the ‘prior informed consent’ restrictions on the transboundary movement of ‘Living Modified Organisms’ (i.e. genetically modified (GM) organisms) under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (2000), negotiated under the under the CBD (Falkner, 2001). The US also succeeded in an action brought under the WTO’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement against the EU for its moratorium on the importation of GM products pending revision of the relevant EU directives (Eckersley, 2007). The WTO rules provided a less demanding standard than the precautionary principle embodied in the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol, which, as a party to the Protocol, had formed part of the basis of the EU’s defence before the WTO’s dispute settlement body. The WTO panel ruled in favour of the US, rejecting the relevance of the Biosafety Protocol in interpreting WTO rules, as the US was a party of the latter, but not the former. In the area of pesticides and hazardous pollution/waste management, the US has also been an outlier largely due to a reluctance to bring its domestic regulations into line with international standards, some of which could not be clearly known in advance. These concerns underpin its refusal to ratify the Basel Convention on Control of the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste and their Disposal (1989), the Rotterdam Convention on Pesticides and Industrial Chemicals (1998), and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (2001). Turning to climate change, the Byrd–Hagel resolution of the US Senate, issued in June 1997, six months prior to the final negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol, is emblematic of this general concern to protect domestic commercial interests. This resolution declared that the Senate would not ratify the protocol if it did not require developing countries to undertake commitments in the same time period as industrialized countries or would result in serious harm to the US economy. This was the basis of the second Bush administration’s repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, and it has also formed a plank in the Trump administration’s rejection of the Paris Agreement. Looking for United States Leadership In Part One, it was argued that to establish environmental leadership (in the substantive rather than positional sense) in international diplomacy and multilateral negotiations it is necessary to find evidence of asymmetric influence by the leader in generating the terms of cooperation, building support and negotiating consent in accordance with recognized multilateral processes, and a commitment by the leader to the collective environmental purpose. Looking back over the period from 1970 to 1991, the US’s ozone diplomacy during the 1980s represents the greatest shining moment of US environmental leadership, not the early 1970s. To be sure, the US was certainly a national front runner in the early 1970s, most notably in establishing a national Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which many other states more or less copied, along with the Council for Environmental Quality (CEQ). But as Flippen (2008: 614) has argued, ‘the Nixon administration witnessed the birth of modern American environmental diplomacy’, but ‘it was a breech birth’. This was because the administration used the environment opportunistically as a means to other ends—to win approval and dampen opposition to the Vietnam War, at home and abroad, and as an avenue for GPM. It was no secret that President Nixon cared little for environmental issues, but he found himself presiding over an environmentally active and bipartisan Congress and a period of rising public support for environmental initiatives which he pragmatically recognized would earn him political capital (Soden and Steel, 1999: 347–348). Henry Kissinger, and Russel Train (chair of the CEQ and Nixon’s environmental envoy), saw environmental diplomacy as providing a potential avenue for détente with the Soviet Union, given strong public environmental concern in the US and serious environmental degradation in the Soviet Union (Flippen, 2008: 626). This resulted in the signing of the US–USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection in May 1972, which covered areas such as air and water pollution, animal conservation, and forestry (Flippen, 2008: 626). The Nixon administration also seized on the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment as an opportunity to win favour, and it took steps to ensure the participation of the People’s Republic of China, even though it was not then officially recognized (Flippen, 2008: 626). The primary evidence that is usually cited for US international leadership in the early 1970s is its support for the establishment of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) with a pledge to provide 40% of a $100 million fund to support the fledgling programme. Yet it is noteworthy that the US also objected to the idea of additional funding to support developing countries (Hopgood, 1998: 79), which represented an incipient form of special responsibilities. Moreover, the US’s environmental reputation was tarnished at Stockholm when the host, Olaf Palme, prime minister of Sweden, referred to the US’s use of the defoliant Agent Orange in the Vietnam War as ‘ecocide’ (Flippen, 2008: 631). The US’s strong support for the resolution recommending a ten-year moratorium on commercial whaling is also treated as evidence of US leadership, but this resolution subsequently failed to muster a two-thirds majority in the International Whaling Commission. This does not constitute leadership because the US failed to attract the necessary followship. In all, the Nixon administration had the domestic support to do much more on the international stage but it lacked the commitment and it was soon overwhelmed by the Watergate scandal and the energy crisis. In contrast, the US’s ozone diplomacy stands out as the most successful case of diplomatic leadership in relation to the most successful MEA in the post-Second World War period. This was also a case where the US EPA was a clear cooperative front runner at the domestic level in the regulation of ozone-depleting substances and where the US chemical industry was a clear competitive front runner in developing technological substitutes for chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). These two developments provided the impetus for the US’s energetic diplomatic leadership, which succeed in building support for the CFC phase-out while also preserving the competitive advantage of the US chemical industry. This treaty also pioneered the use of a multilateral fund to assist developing countries while also affording them a longer time period in which to conform to the phase-out, which provided an emergent form of special responsibilities for developed countries. But, unlike the climate negotiations, these responsibilities were uncontroversial since the vast bulk of ozone-depleting substances were manufactured by developed countries. Under the Clean Air Act, the EPA had phased out non-essential CFC aerosols in 1978, making the US a cooperative front runner in protecting the ozone later. Although US CFC producers had initially opposed the EPA’s unilateral domestic phase-out, they changed position once they had devised a technological substitute for CFCs, making the US industry a competitive front runner in the technological race to find alternatives to CFCs. These twin developments provided a strong domestic basis for the US executive to build international support for a phase-out, which would also enable the international ‘export’ or internationalization of its domestic ozone regulations (DeSombre, 2000: 93–94). As Benedick (1991: 55–67) notes, the US campaign utilized its embassies around the world to explain the US negotiating position and build support, beginning with like-minded countries and then reaching out to non-like-minded countries (Benedick, 1991: 55–67). It is no small irony that this leadership occurred under a president who was not known for his environmental sympathies. Indeed, President Reagan presided over a major rollback in domestic environmental regulation and expenditure. However, following the discovery of the ‘hole over Antarctica’ the US State Department, working closely with major CFC producers, such as Dupont and Allied Chemical, as well as the US EPA, mounted a concerted and successful diplomatic campaign to build international consensus for a complete phase out in the production and trade of ozone depleting under the Montreal Protocol 1987 (Benedick, 1991: 55–67; DeSombre, 2000: 93–94). The Reagan administration’s ozone diplomacy clearly qualifies as international environmental leadership because it intentionally and actively built an agreement to further a collective goal (ozone protection). However, when we turn to the US’s role in the development of the climate regime, which contains much more substantial and consequential special responsibilities than the ozone regime, we see significant oscillation. Over the period 1992–2020, the US’s involvement has swung from mere cooperation based on significant concessions (under President Bush senior), to frustrated leadership (under President Clinton), to defection (under President Bush junior), pragmatic leadership (under President Obama), spectacular defection (under President Trump), and, finally, a renewed and strengthened commitment to climate leadership (under President Biden). The Obama administration’s role in the negotiation of the Paris Agreement, which entailed the reinterpretation of CBDR-RC as part of a process of GPM, stands out as a much stronger example of leadership than the Nixon administration’s role at Stockholm and was much more significant and consequential than the diplomacy of the Clinton administration at Kyoto. However, unlike the Reagan administration, this was not a great shining moment, since the Obama administration faced significant domestic opposition and intense international disagreement, so its diplomacy was more constrained and pragmatic. But it clearly qualifies as leadership on the basis of the Obama administration’s expressed commitment to lead, clear evidence of asymmetric influence in shaping the mitigation architecture of the Paris Agreement, and success in building support in ways that were consistent with multilateral practices (unlike the Copenhagen negotiations). Climate change was a legacy issue for President Obama and his secretary of state, John Kerry, and the US provided the largest single contribution to the Green Climate Fund. The idea of nationally determined contributions and a hybrid treaty came from the US (US, 2013: 2), and these ideas were also central to the US’s bilateral diplomacy with China. This diplomacy yielded the crucial joint US–China statement in Beijing in November 2014, which declared both parties’ nationally determined contributions and their commitment to a successful treaty. Indeed, the formula ‘in light of national circumstances’ in the joint statement represented a significant rapprochement on the interpretation of CBDR-RC and found its way into the Paris treaty text. This was followed up with a second joint statement prior to the Paris meeting. The Obama administration’s diplomacy was pragmatic in improvising around domestic and international deadlock by promoting a new agreement that would provide considerable national flexibility to draw in the major emitters, especially China and India, while also including provisions for the deepening of commitment over time. This also required making concessions on the long-term temperature targets (including 1.5 degrees) to the High Ambition Coalition to win the support of the vulnerable states at Paris. However, unlike the ozone negotiations, the US was not a clear cooperative or competitive national front runner in climate performance (although some subnational jurisdictions such as California arguably qualify). Although the Obama administration’s Clean Power Plan represented a significant step up from all previous national initiatives, the US’s targets were modest when set against the US’s environmental capabilities and carbon footprint (historical, aggregate, and per capita). Moreover, this plan bypassed a deeply polarized Congress and relied on the president’s existing executive powers to regulate CO2 emissions as a dangerous pollutant under the US Clean Air Act. This had the advantage of avoiding the need for the advice and consent of the Senate, but the strategy also rested on the hope that a future Senate might find the national flexibility of the Paris Agreement acceptable (Wirth, 2016). Finally, an understanding of the US’s climate diplomacy would be incomplete without a critical examination of US energy policy, which has been central to both the economic and security dimensions of US grand strategy. In the same year that the US repudiated the Kyoto Protocol, the Bush–Cheney National Energy Policy responded to shortages in oil and gas by stepping up domestic and international supply (rather than reducing domestic demand), by allowing drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and taking steps to enhance access to overseas supplies, including in the Persian Gulf, to keep oil prices low. Despite the Obama administration’s commitment to action on climate change, it supported an ‘all of the above’ energy strategy, which put no brakes on the steady climb in the domestic production of gas and oil enabled by the technological revolution in hydraulic fracturing. The Trump administration sought to accelerate domestic fossil fuel production, including attempts to revive coal production, which has been in general decline due to the falling price of gas. According to the US Energy Information Administration, the US overtook Russia as the world’s biggest producer of gas in 2011, and in 2018 it overtook Saudi Arabia as the world’s largest petroleum producer. The increase in production in 2018 was declared to be ‘one of the largest absolute petroleum and natural gas production increases from a single country in history’ (EIA, 2019). These developments are deeply inconsistent with the fundamental objective of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992) and the temperature targets and long-term goals of the Paris Agreement.