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Leadership not key—environmental powers are diffused amongst too many actors

Buzan & Falkner 22

Barry, Professor Emeritus at the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, and a Senior Fellow at LSE IDEAS; Robert, Associate Professor of International Relations and Research Director of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment at the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK. “Great Powers and Environmental Responsibilities: A Conceptual Framework.” Great Powers, Climate Change, and Global Environmental Responsibilities. Pg 31-33. LJS

The question of what counts as a great power in GEP is complicated by two characteristics of the environmental policy field. For one, global environmental policymaking is highly fragmented, with hundreds of international environmental treaties and dozens of international organizations dealing with the wide array of environmental sectors that make up the international environmental agenda: from climate change to ozone layer and transboundary air pollution, and from biodiversity protection to deforestation, desertification, toxic waste, and marine pollution, each environmental issue has its own distinctive problem structure, which in turn results in a range of different power structures and institutional contexts. Despite overarching UN summits with universal participation and the United Nations Environmental Programme’s role as a facilitator of international policymaking, no central forum exists for dealing with all, or even most, environmental issues that are of global concern. With environmental power being so fragmented, it is unlikely that a fixed set of environmental great powers exists that are in a dominant position across all environmental subfields. The US, EU, and now China, appear to be major powers across a wide range of environmental issue-areas, while other countries are powerful only in specific subsets of the international environmental agenda. We can thus distinguish great powers in GEP according to whether they possess wide or narrow environmental power, which exists either across a wide range of sectors or is concentrated in just a small set of sectors. In this sense, GEP is an extreme case of the diffusion of capabilities and responsibilities that has marked great powers generally. Probably, any country with wide environmental power will be a candidate for great power status, but it seems doubtful that the label ‘great power’ should be applied to those with narrow power in just one or two environmental sectors. They would seem to fall more comfortably into the framing of Bukovansky et al.’s (2012) argument about the diffusion of special responsibilities. A further complicating characteristic of GEP is that the issues that make up the international environmental agenda exist at different scales of international politics and involve different constellations of countries. Only some, such as climate change and ozone layer depletion, are truly global political problems that require a global approach. Others are of a more regional nature, from desertification to transboundary air pollution and water management, while yet others require only bilateral or plurilateral cooperation beneath the regional level, such as the management of rivers and riparian zones. Yet other environmental issues are highly localized phenomena (e.g. deforestation, whaling) but have regional or even global implications (e.g. local forests acting as carbon sinks for the global climate; local whaling leading to global species loss). For this reason, environmental power, both in its negative and positive use, has distinctive spatial dimensions that affect our understanding of what counts as a great power in GEP. As noted above, great power interest and responsibility can exist at different spatial scales, from global through regional to local. In the environmental sector, great powers may operate at different levels, from the global down to the regional or other sub-global levels. Environmental regionalism has always played an important role, despite the global policy aspirations of the UN environment summits of 1972, 1992, 2002, and 2012. More recently, regional environmental cooperation has further gained in political significance as it offers opportunities for regulatory harmonization that meet both environmental and trade/investment policy objectives (Schreurs, 2013). Regionalism also appeals to environmental leaders as a more congenial forum in which environmental protection policies can be advanced, especially at a time when many multilateral efforts at the UN level appear to be deadlocked. We can thus distinguish between countries whose great power status in GEP is global in nature, while others may only be considered to be environmental great powers in a regional, or even subregional, context. When it comes to negative environmental power, the distinction between different scales of great power status is reflected in the spatial dimensions of the environmental resources that a country controls or of the environmental harm it can cause. Such spatial categorizations are subject to change over time, however, depending on how environmental problems are defined and impacts are understood. Deforestation, for example, was primarily seen as a local problem in the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth century, affecting mainly the country where it was occurring. By the late twentieth century, due to wider recognition of the importance of tropical rainforests for biodiversity and climate stability, deforestation had become a global environmental problem, as is evident from the repeated but failed efforts to create a global forest regime since the early 1990s (Humphreys, 2006). Similarly, positive environmental power comes with distinctive spatial characteristics. The US and the EU both have global policy ambitions in their engagement with the international environmental agenda and have provided international leadership on environmental issues that has had a lasting impact on the institutional and legal structure of GEP. At the same time, the US and EU also play distinctive regional roles in their respective neighbourhoods. The US has sought to shape environmental policies of neighbouring countries through regional initiative such as NAFTA and bilateral agreements with Latin America. The EU has developed a distinctly regional dimension to its external environmental role, using environmental conditionality in its negotiations with countries that want to join the Union (Andanova, 2003; Knill and Tosun, 2009). Of all emerging powers, China comes closest to playing a systematically global environmental role, mainly because of its rapidly growing environmental footprint and increasing global power ambition. China has also started to stake out an emerging (though widely contested) regional environmental leadership role, particularly in the context of regional investment and trading relationships (e.g. the Belt and Road Initiative). Armed with its own concept of sustainable development (‘ecological civilization’—see Goron, 2018), the country is increasingly trying to project an image, if not a reality, of environmental responsibility in these various regional partnerships. Other major environmental powers have seen their global policy ambition reduced in recent years, even if their status as a leading economy ensures that their environmental footprint remains global in nature. Japan, for example, was once assumed to have global environmental leadership ambition (Maddock, 1994; Dauvergne, 1998) but is perhaps better thought of as a regional, not global, environmental power (Graham, 2004), with much of its environmental aid efforts concentrated on the Asian region, and particularly Southeast Asia.

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