US not key—other environmental great powers and regional powers fill in
Buzan & Falkner 22
Barry, Professor Emeritus at the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, and a Senior Fellow at LSE IDEAS; Robert, Associate Professor of International Relations and Research Director of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment at the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK. “Great Powers and Environmental Responsibilities: A Conceptual Framework.” Great Powers, Climate Change, and Global Environmental Responsibilities. Pg 28-31. LJS
Some cases are fairly straightforward. The world’s most powerful nation, the US, is both a superpower in conventional terms and one of the world’s leading environmental powers. As the largest economy with a high per capita ecological footprint, the US is both deeply implicated in many global environmental problems and plays a critical role in most multilateral environmental negotiations. In the early days of modern environmental politics, it pioneered new forms of environmental regulation, which were widely copied around the world, and promoted the creation and expansion of the international environmental agenda from the 1970s onwards. The US continues to lead on environmental issues where it has a strong domestic policy mandate, though the administrations of George W. Bush (2001–2009) and Donald Trump (2017–2021) are noted for their assertive anti-regulatory stance. Over time, the US has thus moved away from its early role as international environmental leader and has, more often than not, come to exercise negative power by rejecting a special responsibility for the global environment (Falkner, 2005). The EU, initially a laggard on environmental issues in the 1970s and 1980s, has more recently pushed for international action on a wide range of environmental issues, most notably climate change (Wurzel and Connelly, 2010). Much like the US, the EU possesses considerable environmental power with global significance. Its economy, although more energy efficient and with a lower per capita ecological footprint than that of the US, is a major source of global environmental degradation. The EU’s claim to be an environmental leader has been widely noted, both as a demandeur in international negotiations and a ‘market power’ (Damro, 2015) that has the ability to raise global regulatory standards (Selin and VanDeveer, 2006), though questions persist about its ‘actorness’ (Vogler, 1999) and coherence (Barnes, 2010) as a power in international forums.3 Russia, once considered a superpower alongside the US, but merely an ‘honorary power’ during the 1990s, now falls more into the category of a declining great power in international affairs but is punching above its weight under President Putin. It is perhaps best thought of as a second-rank great power with mainly regional power resources but with some global aspirations remaining. Both its military and industrial strength have declined sharply since the end of the Cold War, with post-1991 deindustrialization also leading to a notable reduction in its global ecological footprint. Still, its considerable draw on natural resources, its substantial role as a fossil fuel producer, and its inefficient industrial system give it significant negative environmental power. What sets Russia apart from the US and EU is its relative weakness as a positive force in GEP. Having initially rejected the global environmental agenda as a Western, capitalist issue at the 1972 Stockholm Conference, the Soviet Union and later Russia has mostly taken a backseat role in international environmental negotiations, including in the climate negotiations. It rarely, if ever, aspires to play a positive, leading role in GEP. Given its large economic size, Japan surely ranks as a leading environmental power with a considerable ecological footprint. Foreign investment by Japanese multinationals and the need to import vast amounts of natural resources (energy, timber) have been noted in the past as the source of the country’s considerable ‘environmental shadow’ (Dauvergne, 1997; Hall, 2009). At the same time, Japan has at times taken on the role of a global environmental leader, promoting international cooperation on environmental management issues and exporting environmental technologies to developing countries (Maddock, 1994; Schreurs, 2004), even though this international role has come under growing domestic strain as the country’s economic woes have increased (Tiberghien and Schreurs, 2007). The rise of non-Western powers, most notably China and India, but also Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia, has attracted growing attention in international affairs generally as well as in GEP. As mentioned above, questions can be raised about categorizing developing countries as great powers. However, there can be little doubt that most rising powers have become formidable environmental powers, mainly because their combination of rapidly rising economic fortunes and large populations has led to a dramatic expansion of their ecological footprint. China is the standout case in this regard. Having grown at around 10% per annum for the last three decades, the Chinese economy, expected to become the world’s largest within a few years, has one of the highest consumption rates for many global resources. It is the world’s biggest importer of oil and largest consumer of coal, aluminium, nickel, zinc, copper, iron ore, and lead, among others (Armbrecht, 2015). China’s overall ecological footprint is said to have surpassed that of the US in the early 2000s (Global Footprint Network, n.d.), and in 2006 it overtook the US as the world’s largest emitter of GHGs. Other emerging economies, such as India, Brazil, and Indonesia, still lag behind China’s dramatic economic growth, but their ecological footprints are expanding rapidly as their large populations are joining the global middle class and are ramping up consumption of the world’s commodities. In many global environmental issue-areas, from climate change to air, water, and marine pollution, emerging economies have joined the leading great powers as major sources of global environmental degradation. Many of the larger developing countries also possess significant environmental power because they control environmental goods that are of vital importance to the health of the planet. Brazil holds c. one-third of the world’s rainforests and is the most biodiverse country on the planet, being home to at least 103,870 animal species and 43,020 plant species. Indonesia, one of the 17 ‘mega-diverse’ countries with large forested areas, contains 2 of the world’s 25 biodiversity ‘hotspots’ and ranks second in the world as the home to 12% of the world’s mammals. India, also a mega-diverse country, harbours an estimated 7–8% of the recorded species and contains a vast range of globally significant ecosystems and habitats, such as forests, grasslands, wetlands, deserts, and coastal as well as marine environments (Convention on Biological Diversity, n.d.). While emerging powers’ rising economic profile and control over environmentally sensitive ecosystems has given them significant veto power in international negotiations, they are only slowly beginning to match this with corresponding positive power, that is the desire and capability to positively shape the international environmental agenda and promote global environmental solutions. In the past, emerging powers were viewed primarily as reluctant partners in GEP, at best, and as veto powers exercising negative power over issues such as deforestation and global warming, at worst. The long-standing framing of global environmental politics around the North–South divide, with industrialized countries cast as the main environmental culprits yet also leading demandeurs for international environmental action, has reinforced a defensive posture by developing countries and a strategic focus on regulatory differentiation and financial compensation. More recently, some emerging powers have begun to be more serious about addressing the worst environmental excesses at home and are also playing a more nuanced and constructive role internationally. Brazil has received widespread international praise for its efforts to tackle Amazonian deforestation, though these achievements are now threatened by the environmental policy shifts introduced under the presidency of Jair Bolsonaro (2019– ). China has adopted a more proactive approach in the climate negotiations after having stepped up its efforts to curb rising GHG emissions at home (Green and Stern, 2017). Furthermore, the creation of the BASIC group in the UNFCCC negotiations, consisting of Brazil, China, India, and South Africa, signalled greater willingness among emerging powers with a large emissions profile to accept some regulatory differentiation from the rest of the developing countries (Hochstetler and Milkoreit, 2014).