US not key—EU fills in
Biedenkopf, Dupont, and Torney 22
Katja, Associate Professor of Sustainability Politics and the team leader of the Sustainable Futures research group at the University of Leuven, Belgium; Claire, Assistant Professor of European Governance at the Department of Public Governance and Management at Ghent University, Belgium; Diarmuid, Associate Professor in the School of Law and Government at Dublin City University.“The European Union: A Green Great Power?” Great Powers, Climate Change, and Global Environmental Responsibilities. Pg 110-111. LJS
Despite its neglect by the great powers literature, the EU should be regarded as a green great power. Our analysis of two diverse domains of GEP, climate change and chemicals, shows that the EU possesses significant power, both negative and positive, and has deployed this power in different ways. Moreover, the EU has increasingly been recognized as a great power in GEP. Our discussion of global climate governance highlighted that the EU is a central actor. While its role has developed, it has accepted its responsibility for causing the climate problem and recognized its obligation to act. It has demonstrated its ability to take action both internally, by adopting a suite of policy measures and targets, and externally, by adapting its climate diplomacy efforts to respond to new contexts of turbulent global governance and its own diminishing negative power. It is a recognized actor and its recognition as a key player in global climate governance has increased, although gaps remain in terms of gaining followers. Given these characteristics, the EU can be regarded as a climate great power, even though it does not possess usual power sources assigned to nation states. In global chemicals governance, although the policy is more fragmented and of lower political profile, our analysis shows a similar pattern. The EU has increasingly developed internal regulations and shaped global chemicals governance, building particularly on its negative power of responsibility, along with positive power stemming from its economic clout. It is also recognized as a great power in this domain. There are also differences between the cases. Climate change has become a high politics issue, which figures much more prominently in the EU’s diplomacy. The EU projects its power through diplomatic means and on the basis of successive climate diplomacy action plans, including a strong diplomacy pillar under the European Green Deal. Much less strategic and high-level diplomacy is dedicated to the rather low-politics issue of chemicals. The EU’s external power projection relies to a larger extent in this case on the leverage of the internal market and the EU’s share of global chemicals trade. While there was some initial resistance, the EU’s role has been recognized externally. Using the leverage of the internal market has proven more challenging in climate change, which is a more complex issue affecting almost every economic sector and consumer. For example, the EU adopted a provision that included all flights departing and arriving in Europe in the ETS as from January 2012. This triggered substantial resistance by major players, including the US and China, which threatened to cancel an order of Airbus airplanes. In response, the EU backed down and only included EU-internal flights in the ETS. Under the 2019 European Green Deal, the European Commission has proposed revisiting the idea of a carbon border adjustment mechanism. Using market power in a high-politics area such as climate change has so far proven challenging for the EU, but it continues to try to innovate in this area. Expansive diplomacy and outreach in preparation for the use of market power to generate external support and recognition of the legitimacy of the action therefore seems crucial. However, both cases also highlighted a long-term trend of declining EU negative power, by virtue of the fact that the EU’s contribution to the issues of climate change and chemicals management, while historically significant, are declining and being overtaken by China in particular. This is partly the result of more successful and earlier action in the EU on climate and chemicals management, compared to other powers, and demonstrates the paradox of the EU’s role in GEP generally. Against this backdrop, the EU relies increasingly on its positive power and its ability to persuade, incentivize, and assist other partners through environmental diplomacy tools that may reap new rewards. It has had some success in making this shift in emphasis, and its future power and influence relies on a strengthening of its diplomatic efforts in this regard. As the chemicals case illustrates, diplomacy is not yet extensively used across all environmental policy areas. With the European Green Deal agenda, which also plays a significant role in the EU’s recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic (Dupont et al., 2020), we may see renewed attempts to increase the EU’s level of ambition on climate change and environmental regulation that go hand in hand with the external diplomacy efforts.