US not key—China fills in
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Robyn, Redmond Barry Distinguished Professor in the Discipline of Political Science, School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne, and a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia. “Great Expectations: The United States and the Global Environment.” Great Powers, Climate Change, and Global Environmental Responsibilities. Pg 80-81. LJS
The financing and transfer of green technology are the most obvious examples of positive environmental power in the climate change arena, in terms of diffusing innovative policy ideas and providing technological and economic aid in support of environmental policies. At every COP, Beijing has maintained that the responsibility for climate finance and capacity-building lies primarily with the developed countries. But apart from acting as a staunch advocate, China has also become more proactive over time as a provider of green financing and technology transfers to the developing world—an emerging trend that is congruent with China’s rapid transformation into the world’s largest market for green finance. While China’s stated commitment to these issues can be traced back to at least 2007 (Ministry of Science and Technology (China) et al., 2007), it was arguably from 2015 that the scale and scope of its commitment expanded significantly. In that year, as part of China’s broader climate commitments, Beijing announced the creation of a US$3-billion South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund (SSCAF) and an additional US$3.1-billion fund to support other developing countries in climate change mitigation. The latter, popularly referred to as the ‘10-100-1000 Initiative’, commits Beijing to implementing in developing countries ‘ten low-carbon development demonstration projects, one hundred climate mitigation and adaptation projects, and climate training programmes for one thousand representatives from developing countries’ (Ma, 2017). Until now, the initiative’s shorter-term objectives have reportedly been actioned mainly through equipment donations and the organization of training modules, whereas the impacts of those components that require longer-term policy formulation (i.e. the low-carbon development demonstration projects) have yet to be implemented fully (Ma, 2017). According to China’s ‘White Paper on China and the World in the New Era’, by 2018, the country had launched over 200 SSCAF programmes in over 30 industrializing countries in a range of issue-areas, including environmental protection (State Council Information Office (China), 2019). And notably, in addition to cooperative initiatives at the interstate level, Chinese government agencies have become more embedded in public-private partnerships, working with philanthropic foundations and billionaires—foreign and home-grown—such as Bill Gates and Niu Gensheng to fund, inter alia, clean energy research, conservation, and environmental restoration initiatives (Glowezewska, 2018; see also Geewax, 2015). Some observers, including the vice-minister of China’s National Development and Reform Commission, posit that ‘China has its own methods’ when it comes to its South–South cooperation on climate change mitigation (Liu, 2014; Urban, 2018). Whilst reflecting the ‘unique Chinese characteristics’ of China’s ‘responsible great power’ intentions (see Liu, 2014) that have the positive potential to further catalyze Chinese overseas financing in this space, there are some noteworthy limitations. Even though there are reportedly more successful examples of local skills and knowledge-sharing, such as HydroChina’s expertise transfer to local engineers and university academics during the construction of Ethiopia’s Adama wind farm (Chen, 2018), questions remain as to the extent to which localized learning and institutional capacity-building are facilitated by Chinese financiers in different developing-country contexts (Chen and Landry, 2018).