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1. Maintaining natural gas exports is key to victory in Ukraine and stability in Asia.

- capabilities key to deterrence and upstream key to Asian supplies

Collins, et. al, 22 --- Baker Botts Fellow in Energy & Environmental Regulatory Affairs (August 4, 2022, Gabriel Collins, Anna Mikulska - Fellow in Energy Studies & Baker Institutes, Steven R. Miles - Fellow in Global Natural Gas & Baker Institute, “Winning the Long War in Ukraine Requires Gas Geoeconomics,” https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/winning-long-war-ukraine-requires-gas-geoeconomics)

Gas Geoeconomics in Europe Would Help Contain a Global Axis of Autocracy

Europe has aggregate economic output approximately 10 times larger than Russia’s and should, in theory, be able to generate enough military capacity to thwart Russian attempt to establish hegemony. Yet the macro balance obscure three harsh realities. First, European solidarity is an illusion and those in Eastern Europe with the will to confront Russia lack the industrial heft found further west. Second, the political will to translate economic and industrial heft into hard power and a credible deterrence posture can be compromised by high dependence on Russian gas. Putin now works to exploit this seam and he (or future Russian leaders) will continue doing so if the vulnerability is left unaddressed. Third, Ukraine is the first 21st century test of the West’s capacity and will to defeat violent revisionism by an emerging axis of autocracy whose charter members are Russia and China.

Decisive continued application of economic warfare against Russia plus expanded and sustained arms deliveries to Kyiv over the next 12-18 months can help Ukraine restore its sovereignty and also degrade Russian military capabilities on a longer-term basis. This would make it easier to Ukraine + NATO to deter future aggression, or in a worst case, defeat the attacks much more quickly. But without decisive gas security moves, time will instead work in Russia’s favor faster than sanctions will in Europe’s.

What’s more, gas security is a global issue—especially for the United States. Were conflict to erupt in East Asia (whether China, North Korea, or both), Russia would almost certainly seek to capitalize on the diversion of American strategic focus to the Asian contingency. Indeed, preparing for (and hopefully, deterring war in Asia already increasingly dominates thinking and spending in Washington. This makes sense because China now marshals economic power equal to all of its regional neighbors combined, making U.S. participation irreplaceable to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific.

In fact, Russia has already started to play the same game of gas economic warfare in Asia. On June 30, Russia announced the nationalization of the Sakhalin II LNG liquefaction plant.xliii The plant, which was owned in part by Shell, Mitsui and Mitsubishi, supplied 10% of Japan’s LNG needs, which Russia has now declared to be an “Unfriendly State” due to Japan’s support of sanctions against Russia.xliv Although Japan's Industry Minister Koichi Hagiuda said the decree did not mean that Japan's LNG imports will become “immediately impossible,” he also noted that it would be necessary for Japan “to take all possible measures” to prepare for a possible cutoff of LNG from Russia. Russia’s nationalization of the Sakhalin II LNG plant took place just days after the last cargo finished loading before Shell’s 3.6 mtpa Prelude LNG plant shutdown for an extended labor dispute (after just reopening following a four-month mechanical repair) and days after a fire took the 15.0 mtpa Freeport LNG terminal in the U.S. offline indefinitely. Japan was a significant participant in all three LNG projects, and will likely have to go into the market to compete with Europe to buy LNG (and other fuels) for this winter. Russia’s timing in nationalizing Japan’s interest in the Sakhalin II project and threatening its LNG supply coming days after the shutdown of both Prelude and Freeport can hardly be considered a coincidence.

Yet Europe is also a key security interest and deep U.S. participation is essential to bridge significant divisions between Eastern and Western European countries over how to handle Russian revanchism. Russia’s attack on Ukraine now directly threatens the world’s second-most important economic region as China doubles down its efforts to establish hegemonic control over the single most important economic area. The threat is global and responses must be commensurate. As our Russian counterparts might put it: “Всё переплетено” (it’s all intertwined).

Proactive U.S. efforts to enhance Europe’s gas security and blunt Russia’s ability to use gas for hybrid warfare would directly support its ability to sustain and upgrade its combat credibility in East and Southeast Asia. By incentivizing upstream gas investments globally through the demand call associated with a broader European move to replace Russian gas with LNG, Gas Geoeconomics would over the medium term also help increase global LNG supply to the ultimate benefit of U.S. allies in Asia, foremost among them Japan and South Korea. Meanwhile, the sooner Europe can end purchases of Russian gas, the sooner the Kremlin faces a decision between effectively exiting the global gas market or else spending tens of billions to build more gas pipelines to China—obligating financial resources that would otherwise be used to rebuild Russia’s military. Gas geoeconomics is an essential prerequisite for victory in Ukraine, U.S. credibility in Asia, and should be one of Washington’s top national security priorities.

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