Maintaining natural gas exports is key to Russia deterrence and victory in Ukraine.
Collins, et. al, 22 --- Baker Botts Fellow in Energy & Environmental Regulatory Affairs (August 4, 2022, Gabriel Collins, Anna Mikulska - Fellow in Energy Studies & Baker Institutes, Steven R. Miles - Fellow in Global Natural Gas & Baker Institute, “Winning the Long War in Ukraine Requires Gas Geoeconomics,” https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/winning-long-war-ukraine-requires-gas-geoeconomics)
If the United States is serious about facilitating a Ukrainian victory, it needs to help European partners lock down their gas security. Russia had already waged war against Ukraine for 8 years when it took things to a new, bloodier level in February 2022 and the conflict could plausibly endure for multiple winters more. Europe faces an acute gas crisis in the winter of 2022 but absent much larger and faster investment in new gas sourcing and transport infrastructure, continued energy manipulation by Russia will be the Continent’s plight for many winters to come.iii It is a high-order national security issue and one that deserves close attention in the United States as well, given four decades of policy aimed at preventing hostile powers from weaponizing energy resource flows against U.S. allies and partners.iv Europe’s dependence on Russian gas (more than 1/3 of the global pipeline cross-border [?] gas trade) means that Russia’s war in Ukraine is also an energy war against Europe at a scale unseen since the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo. Gazprom’s pre-covid supply levels to Europe suggest it withheld approximately 30 billion cubic meters of gas, equal to about 5% of Europe’s actual gas consumption in 2021 (with the figure of actual gas withheld by Russia in 2022 dramatically higher). While 5% may not sound significant at first glance, it is. The 1973-1974 Arab Oil Embargo reduced crude oil supplies by an amount equal to about 7% of global consumption and caused oil prices to rapidly quadruple—like gas prices in Europe over the past 18 months. v Russia’s gas supply machinations target adversary countries’ leadership to create a sense of despair and promote negotiation on Russian terms.vi As the Kremlin’s armies stall, it increasingly banks on forcing democratically-elected Western governments to confront a high-cost “Long War” that induces crisis fatigue among votersin the EU and US. There is potentially fertile ground for this strategy. Consumer confidence in both places has already dropped to historical lows— exceeding even the depths plumbed during the stagflation of the late 1970s and early 1980s (Figure 1). Gas price spikes and physical shortages are especially pivotal when timed to coincide with decision points that lock in years of subsequent consequences and in some cases, determine the outcome of a war—for instance, “whether or not to concretely act against buildup of an invasion force,” and now, “whether or not to push Ukraine toward territorial concessions” and “whether or not to continue—or expand—supplies of heavy weaponry Kyiv would need to eject Russian invaders and restore its sovereignty.” Policymakers’ visceral aversion to the potential short-term losses caused by a gas supply cutoff or a politically driven price increase expose them to manipulation, undermine their resolve to stand up to Russian revanchism in and near Europe, and, ultimately, divide and weaken the EU and NATO. Gas provides less than 7% of Russia’s federal budget revenue (as compared to more than 35% for oil and refined products) but flows through Russian-fed pipelines account for 1/3 of Europe’s gas supply and nearly 8% of Europe’s primary energy use.2 Its loss creates a cascading energy polycrisis in Europe and beyond, potentially for many quarters to come absent drastic interventions—most of which, like rationing, have major consequences. By manipulating gas deliveries, Russia can thus subject itself to bearable financial pain and in exchange, destabilize Europe in ways that left unabated, could be existential for the current political, economic, and security architecture across the Continent over the next 5 years. This asymmetric interdependence vii invites coercive exploitation; a tactic that Russia has used quite frequently in the post-Soviet realm over the last three decades. They also demand a wartime mindset on the part of policymakers in both the EU and the US, given the Continent’s importance to American national security. To help provide a practical policymaking roadmap forward, this Brief walks readers through (1) how gas insecurity would likely facilitate further Russian territorial conquest in Ukraine, (2) how Europe wound up in the current gas predicament, and (3) how, with sufficient political will, Europe and the United States can leverage Gas Geoeconomics to chart a more secure future.