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LNG exports to Europe require regulatory certainty and strong domestic production to be successful

U.S. LNG cleanest in the world – helps Europe meet climate goals

Baker, 22 (March 28, 2022, Andrew, “Plan to Send More U.S. LNG to Europe Met With Optimism by Natural Gas Industry,” https://www.naturalgasintel.com/plan-to-send-more-u-s-lng-to-europe-met-with-optimism-by-natural-gas-industry/, JMP)

The oil and natural gas industry praised the Biden administration’s announcement last week of a joint U.S.-European Union (EU) task force to increase liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply to Europe.

The White House said it would seek to expedite approvals of pending LNG export projects, a move long advocated by the industry, in order to help the EU end its reliance on Russian fossil fuels as soon as possible.

“Over the past few months, American producers have significantly expanded LNG shipments to our allies, establishing Europe as the top US LNG export destination,” said the American Petroleum Institute’s (API) CEO Mike Sommers.

He added, “We stand ready to work with the administration to follow this announcement with meaningful policy actions to support global energy security, including further addressing the backlog of LNG permits, reforming the permitting process, and advancing more natural gas pipeline infrastructure.”

The Center for Liquefied Natural Gas’ (CLNG) Charlie Riedl, executive director, praised the administration’s “commitment to supporting our European allies and its recognition of the importance of U.S. LNG to global energy security and climate leadership. We look forward to working with the administration in its effort to streamline the regulatory process for U.S. LNG, enabling us to establish a virtual LNG pipeline to Europe that accelerates our ability to help our allies and the clean energy transition.”

Riedl added, “We are fortunate to have an abundant supply of natural gas in the United States, which has enabled us to become Europe’s largest supplier of LNG throughout its energy crisis, as well as the world’s largest exporter of LNG.”

Industry groups this week noted that 17 applications for additional LNG capacity were awaiting approval by the Department of Energy (DOE).

“To move forward and meet the stated goals of 15 billion cubic meters (Bcm) this year and 50 Bcm by 2030, we will need regulatory certainty and FERC and DOE’s assistance,” Riedl continued. “The LNG industry can build, but regulators must do their part to help expedite the essential infrastructure that is needed here and in Europe to meet these ambitious goals and help our European allies.”

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission this week also walked back the rollout of controversial updates to its policies for reviewing natural gas infrastructure, which had drawn criticism from the industry and lawmakers.

The American Exploration and Production Council’s CEO Anne Bradbury welcomed the U.S-EU task force, highlighting the energy security and environmental benefits of natural gas.

“When it comes to climate, the benefits of American energy are unparalleled,” said Bradbury. “U.S. oil and natural gas operations adhere to the highest level of environmental regulations in the world.”

She added that U.S. LNG “is the cleanest, most reliable LNG in the world. By exporting this low-emitting fuel to our friends in Europe, we provide a reliable energy source that supports the net-zero by 2050 goals that many European nations have set.”

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Marty Durbin, president of the chamber’s Global Energy Institute, called the announcement “an important signal that must be followed up with policy and actions to encourage domestic oil and natural gas production and associated pipeline and export infrastructure.”

“A broader long-term strategy built around energy security and accelerating the clean energy transition is also required to face global threats.”

Plan causes stranded asset risk for fossil fuels and kills demand and investment into the industry --- bolt out of the blue policies magnify the link

Sen and von Schickfus 20 — Suphi Sen is an assistant professor at the Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group at Wageningen University. His areas of research include environmental and resource economics, energy economies, and economies of climate change. Marie-Theres von Schickfus is an economist for the ifo Institute, Center for Energy, Climate, and Resources. (“Climate policy, stranded assets, and investors’ expectations” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Volume 100, March 2020. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618307083#!)//JLPark

1. Introduction

As early as 2012, global financial services companies drew attention to the risk of coal investments becoming stranded as a consequence of the 2°C “carbon budget.“1 This carbon budget specifies the maximal amount of cumulative carbon emissions that can be emitted without surpassing a 2°C temperature increase above preindustrial levels (Meinshausen et al., 2009; Allen et al., 2009). Therefore, climate policies might render fossil-fuel assets worthless prior to the end of their economic life time. We study whether the current market valuation of companies owning fossil fuel assets reflects this risk of stranding assets.2 A failure to price in this risk can lead to costly consequences for the whole economy. First, the resulting misallocation of capital due to delayed divestment could render the transition to clean capital more expensive (IPCC, 2014; IRENA, 2017a). Second, a sudden and unexpected tightening of carbon emission policies (Batten et al., 2016) or sudden changes in expectations in the presence of tipping points (Krugman, 1991) can lead to abrupt repricing of fossil fuel assets. This situation can result in a negative supply shock through changes in energy use and second-round effects in financial markets.3 Financial institutions such as the Bank of England, the Dutch Central Bank (DNB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) have identified the mispricing of stranded asset risk as a potential systemic risk and threat to financial stability.4

Therefore, we analyze the interaction between investors’ expectations and the development of climate policies. Investors’ reactions to new policies depend on their prior expectations, which, in turn, are shaped by previous policies. This interaction is central to the current paper: What are investors’ priors regarding stranded asset risk, and (how) do these priors change when climate policy proposals are announced? In particular, we analyze (i) whether investors have already priced in expected losses due to the carbon budget, (ii) whether they only respond to concrete policies, and (iii) whether they expect firms to be financially compensated for stranded assets. To answer these questions, we exploit the gradual development of a climate policy proposal in Germany targeting lignite assets and investigate how adjustments of this proposal have affected the market valuation of firms active in electricity production. We find that investors did not react to announcements of the initial “climate levy” proposal, which was directed at stranding lignite assets by charging an extra fee on carbon emissions (Stage 1). Investors also did not respond when the proposal transformed into a compensation mechanism (Stage 2), paying plant owners for not running their units. Only announcements that the compensation mechanism may not go through due to violating state aid rules (Stage 3) resulted in a significant and negative reaction. Our findings show that investors do care about the stranded asset risk, but with an expectation of a compensation mechanism.

Our analysis starts from the notion that the evolution of climate policies and the expectations of investors are interrelated. First, climate policies and policy proposals provide signals that shape how the investors perceive the stranded asset risk. For instance, setting a price on CO2 emissions or imposing a cost on fossil resource extraction5 can reduce demand, slow down investment in fossil infrastructure, and cause asset stranding. Alternatively, policies addressing fossil-fuel reductions may compensate fossil-fuel owners for leaving their reserves unburned. For example, Harstad (2012) proposed that, in the absence of a global climate agreement, “the coalition’s best policy is to simply buy foreign deposits and conserve them”.6 Second, investors' reactions to policy signals depend on their prior expectations regarding the likelihood of asset stranding and the credibility of climate policy announcements. For example, they may have already devalued assets following information on the carbon budget implied by the Paris Agreement, or they may find it difficult to translate the concept of a carbon budget into stranded asset risk.7 In the latter case, they would wait for further information on climate policies with clear asset stranding implications. Even the announcement of climate policies does not necessarily lead investors to reassess the likeliness of asset stranding, if they expect a compensation mechanism. The policy proposal we investigate provides the opportunity to disentangle the effects of these policy signals and expectations. By tracking the stock market response to different stages of the proposal, we can draw conclusions about investors' prior expectations and how they evolved in the course of the policy's development.

Our baseline estimation strategy is a short-run event study analysis. We investigate whether there are abnormal returns to the assets of three publicly listed energy companies that can be associated with the three stages of the policy proposal.8 The pattern in the reactions to the different stages of the proposal helps us to identify whether an individual event surprised the investors. Furthermore, we test for effects in the power futures market to establish surprise empirically. Finally, we provide anectodal evidence for our empirical findings on the presence of surprise. We provide an extensive robustness analysis related to the identification of the event effects. First, we conduct placebo tests for the nonevent days just prior to the event days to verify the model's performance in predicting the counterfactual returns. Second, as an alternative to using a market price index to control for average market conditions, we estimate a synthetic portfolio aiming to produce a counterfactual control unit.9 These estimations show that our results are not driven by the endogeneity of the market price index to the event shocks. Third, in order to control for industry-wide shocks, we use an energy utility company without any lignite-related assets as the control unit, leading to a difference-in-differences estimation of abnormal returns. Finally, by using a news search engine, we identify a small number of potentially confounding events and verify that our results are not driven by these events.

Our paper contributes to the literature on empirical assessments of market reactions to emission reduction policies, often in the form of event studies. Lemoine (2017) and Di Maria et al. (2014) find that market players do act in anticipation of demand-side policies. Ramiah et al. (2013) and Linn (2010) show that stock investors react to announcements of national carbon emission pledges or the introduction of emission trading programs, respectively. Koch et al. (2016) find evidence that regulatory events drove EU ETS allowance prices. In the German power market context, Oberndorfer et al. (2013) investigate the stock market effects of voluntary actions such as the inclusion of firms in a sustainability stock index. However, to date, investor expectations with regard to specific policies directed at stranding assets or to compensation mechanisms have not been studied.

There are few papers investigating empirically how investors price in unburnable carbon risk.  conclude that the announcement of the Paris Agreement in December 2015 had a positive effect on the valuation of renewable energy companies, but no significant effect on fossil fuel companies. Mukanjari and Sterner (2018) report similar results both for the Paris Agreement and the U.S. presidential election in 2016. Griffin et al. (2015) find that the publication of the Meinshausen et al. (2009) article in Nature led to a statistically significant, yet fairly small, reduction in the stock returns of oil and gas firms. They mention several reasons why this effect might be so small. One reason is investors’ expectations with respect to technological developments: this is what Byrd and Cooperman (2016) examine, concluding that investors are aware of the relevance of carbon capture and storage (CCS) in allowing continued carbon use, but that they have already priced in stranded asset risk. A second potential reason is that investors are more concerned with specific energy policies, which is what this article examines in detail.

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