Empirics confirm this – talk is cheap
Carter 19 [Erin Baggott Carter, Assistant Professor at the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California, “Diversionary cheap talk: economic conditions and US foreign policy rhetoric, 1945-2010,” 2019, International Interactions, Vol. 46, Issue 2, pp. 163-198, https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2020.1688319, EA]
This study argues that when economic conditions deteriorate, Democratic presidents use hostile foreign policy rhetoric to build domestic support. By cueing national identity, they elicit an ingroup rally that boosts their popularity. The quantitative evidence is consistent with the theory. Poll data show that citizens evaluate leaders more highly after they engage in hostile foreign policy rhetoric. The effect is strongest for Democratic presidents among Independent and Republican voters. Economic data suggest that leaders are more likely to engage in hostile foreign policy rhetoric when unemployment and inflation are higher. Further strengthening the notion that this behavior is strategic, rallies only materialize when leaders target traditional rivals, since threatening outgroups render intergroup distinctions most stark. I find no evidence for diversion in the form of material conflict initiation. For leaders choosing between hostile rhetoric, economic reform, and international conflict to increase domestic popularity, hostile rhetoric is the least costly and risky option, even though it is a short term solution because sustained rhetorical belligerence may invite criticism from party elites. For Democratic presidents, cheap talk pays.