There’s better ways to distract and institutions check.
Liu 19 [Christopher Liu, Political Science PhD, “Information And International Conflict,” 2019, Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations, 3496, https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5282&context=edissertations, EA]
In chapter four, I advance the literature on diversionary war in two ways. First, I argue that diversion is fundamentally the manipulation of foreign policy salience, and that this objective can be achieved by actions short of war. Given the high costs of waging war, diversion is unlikely to be the primary motive for any high-intensity interstate conflict—this is particularly true if diversion can be bought for the cheap. Second, I argue that domestic political institutions constrain the ability of leaders to reap the rewards of diversion in critical ways. In particular, leaders under a free media system face structural barriers in their ability to generate salient, positive news coverage of low-intensity foreign policy actions due to the autonomy of journalists in such systems. On the other hand, leaders who exercise political control over media institutions can mandate high levels of positive coverage for foreign policy when they desire, thus enhancing their ability to benefit from diversionary policy.
I test predictions from this theory using a data set of international conflict, domestic unrest, and media freedom. The results provide tentative support, insofar as media freedom conditions the relationship between unrest and conflict. However, while theory predicts that this conditionality should take the form of not free states exhibiting a stronger diversionary relationship, I find stronger evidence supporting the inverse: that free states are less likely to initiate conflict when unrest increases.