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The aff isn’t enough – deterring bioterror requires securing US labs, building stockpiles of PPE, and collaborating internationally

Pavel and Venkatram ‘21

Barry Pavel and Vikram Venkatram, 2021, Barry senior vice president and director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, Vikram senior vice president and director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, “Facing the future of bioterrorism.”, Atlantic Council, July 13th 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/article/facing-the-future-of-bioterrorism/

Given the broad scope and scale of this growing threat, the United States should take a series of actions to mitigate the risks, without unduly stunting the growth of the biotechnology field. To date, bioterrorist attacks have been low-risk, high-impact events. While they have been extremely rare, their frequency will only increase as will their ramifications. However, overregulating the spread of biotechnological tools could stunt innovation and the profound potential of this increasingly important sector. Furthermore, existing methods of preventing bioterrorism may no longer be effective. The government could previously monitor the purchase of expensive and dangerous biotechnology tools and the laboratories that owned them in large quantities. This is no longer possible to the same degree when such tools are increasingly cheap, widespread, and usable in a garage. The FBI is currently attempting to address this risk by building relationships with the iGEM community and with life scientists so that they can report suspicious behavior. These efforts should continue, but are wildly insufficient, since some bioterrorists may have minimal contact with the larger community of biologists and biology hobbyists.

The release of a bioweapon by a terrorist, if left unchecked, could spread throughout the globe, just as a naturally occurring pandemic would. Thus, one major step that the United States should take is to establish improved responses to disease outbreaks, particularly learning from COVID-19. This should include building a larger stockpile of PPE and establishing a set of clear step-by-step actions to be taken in the event of an attack. Building resilience in this fashion will not prevent bioterrorism, but it will mitigate its effects, and may slightly disincentivize utilizing bioweapons to cause terror. Beyond this, the United States should secure its laboratories and the data within, as terrorists could leverage that knowledge to build bioweapons. For example, new technology allows pathogens to be synthesized from the data describing their genetic sequences. In a recent controversial study, scientists published a methodology that would allow horsepox virus, a virus very similar to one that causes smallpox, to be synthesized. This research was conducted with a noble goal: understanding how the horsepox virus could be used as a potential treatment for cancer. However, it had significant dual-use implications. Research like this should not be banned outright, but the United States should establish norms to evaluate whether it is worth the risk before such research is conducted, and then ensure that it is conducted and the results published in the most secure ways. Replicability is an important part of science, but the general public should not be able to replicate the most dangerous experiments. Where building resilience would reduce the impact of a bioterror incident, restricting access to dual-use methodologies will reduce the likelihood of one occurring in the first place.

Finally, enforcing domestic standards is not enough. Pathogens spread across borders, and the spillover effects of even a targeted bioterrorist attack could kill many unintended victims. Thus, the United States must work with other countries to protect against the bioterrorist threat, monitor the emergence of new viruses and bacteria that could be leveraged for a bioweapon, limit access to the most dangerous pathogens (and data associated with those), and build global response networks in the event of an attack. Importantly, this collaboration should emphasize working with allies, but should also include adversaries: if China or Russia remain unregulated, an attack within their borders would still affect the United States and its allies.

Emerging biotechnology will result in new medicines and medical techniques, a greater understanding of how pathogens function and spread (and thus a better understanding of how to combat them), a healthier populace, innovative new capabilities that could transform daily life, and greater engagement with the biological sciences. While ensuring that these benefits are maintained, the United States and its allies and partners must take logical steps to protect themselves from the worst-case scenarios. The risk of bioterrorism is growing, and the United States must be prepared to face the future.

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