Wage stagnation fuels rising inequality – the aff doesn’t solve
Cooper and Mishel 23 (David Cooper is a senior researcher at the Economic Policy Institute and director of the Economic Analysis and Research Network (EARN). Lawrence Mishel is the former president of the Economic Policy Institute (2002–17) and retired as a distinguished fellow. He has a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Wisconsin–Madison. “America's Vast Pay Inequality Is a Story of Unequal Power.” American Bar Association. 1/06/23. https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/wealth-disparities-in-civil-rights/americas-vast-pay-inequality-is-a-story-of-unequal-power/)
Over the past five decades, growing wage inequality has been one of the defining features of the American economy. Since the late 1970s, inflation-adjusted pay for most U.S. workers has largely stagnated, while pay for the country’s highest earners has skyrocketed. This sluggish wage growth for middle-income Americans has been widely acknowledged and recognized by economists and politicians across the political spectrum. Yet, the root causes of these trends have frequently been wrongly attributed as an unfortunate result of apolitical market forces that one neither can nor would want to alter, such as automation and globalization. In fact, disappointing wage growth for most workers in the U.S. economy was not an unintended consequence—it was the intentional outcome of legislative, regulatory, and corporate policies deliberately implemented to constrain labor costs, decisions made on behalf of the rich and corporations and validated by many economists. Bargaining power is the central though often unspoken determinant of wage outcomes. Generations of economics students have been taught that markets efficiently set wages through supply and demand and that an individual worker’s pay reflects their productivity. This naive textbook model assumes that employees and employers have equal bargaining power, that any worker being underpaid relative to the value they produce for a firm can simply quit and find a better-paying option. But this perfect textbook market is the exception, not the rule. Employers almost always have disproportionate bargaining power, and for much of the last half-century, public policy has been shaped to ensure that outcome. The simplest illustration of this unequal bargaining power is shown in the divergence between labor productivity and typical worker compensation. Between 1979 and 2019, economy-wide productivity (the amount of income generated in an average hour of work, net of depreciation) grew by 59.7 percent, while the compensation (wages plus benefits) of the median U.S. worker rose by only 13.7 percent—a 46 percentage point divergence between the growth in value of what American workers produced and what the typical worker was paid. During this time, the bottom 90 percent of U.S. workers experienced wage growth slower than the economy-wide average, while top wage earners (mostly in finance and corporate management) and owners of capital reaped large rewards made possible only by this anemic wage growth for the bottom 90 percent. Three wage gaps aptly describe how pay has diverged over the last four decades: the gap between low- and middle-wage workers, the gap between middle-wage and highly paid workers, and the gap between the very highest-paid earners and everyone else. From 1979 to 2019, wages for the lowest wage workers—measured by the tenth percentile wage—barely budged over a 40-year stretch, rising just 3 percent after inflation. Remarkably, the bulk of this minuscule growth occurred only in the more recent past. Wages for low-wage workers fell drastically during the 1980s when the federal minimum wage was frozen amid high inflation. Since 1988, the gap between low-wage workers and middle-wage workers has shrunk somewhat but remains larger today than it was in 1979. As already noted, wage growth in the middle has been sluggish, with median pay rising just 13.7 percent from 1979 to 2019. In contrast, annual pay for high earners, measured as those in the 90th to 95th percentiles, rose by 51.8 percent over this same period. Still, this pales in comparison to pay growth for those at the top. From 1979 to 2019, the wages of the top 1 percent rose by 160 percent after inflation, while wages rose 345 percent for the highest 0.1 percent of earners. A major factor driving these changes was the astronomical growth in CEO compensation at large firms, which rose nearly 1,200 percent from 1978 to 2019. As a result of this astronomical growth, these workers’ share of the pie has doubled: the top 0.1 percent went from receiving 1.6 percent of overall earnings in 1979 to 5 percent by 2019, while the top 1 percent share rose from 7.3 percent to 13.2 percent. In summary, wage growth for the vast majority—those in the bottom 90 percent—has been relatively weak, while those in the top 10 percent, especially those in the top 1 percent, have done exceedingly well.