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Fiscal redistribution requires progressive taxes and transfers

Lindert ’17 [Peter; July 1; Distinguished Professor Emiritus at UC Berkeley whose core focus is the study of the causes and effects of modern fiscal redistribution, Ph.D., Cornell University and research associate with the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); ECINEQ, “The Rise and Future of Progressive Redistribution,” http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/Lindert2017.pdf]

(B.) Definitions This essay follows the difference between pre-fisc and post-fisc income inequality - that is, between original income (or market income or gross income) on the one hand and final income (or net income) on the other. While other studies have tried to give separate treatment to such intermediate inequalities as that of post-tax pre-transfer income, or a disposable income concept that ignores the distribution of aid in kind, this study sets those aside, and focuses on the full set of fiscal effects. The overall inequality measure that is used most here, as in most recent studies, is the gini coefficient, a putative measure of the share of national income that would have to be redistributed to achieve full income equality, in the absence of any behavior responses to such a massive transfer. Fiscal redistribution is simply the difference in the pre-fisc and post-fisc gini's, following a practice that has been handed down since that path-breaking study by Reynolds and Smolensky (1977). Progressivity obtains if the post-fisc inequality (gini) is less than the pre-fisc inequality, and regressivity obtains in the opposite case. Where possible, I shall take care to note cases involving very different effects on upper and middle groups' fortunes versus the effects on middle versus poor. Progressive or regressive relative to what? Let us define fiscal neutrality as the counterfactual policy setting both taxes and transfers at the same shares of income up and down the income spectrum. In such a case the gini coefficients of inequality would be the same both before and after individual incomes are affected by the government budget, and the net redistribution would be zero, neither progressive nor regressive. More specifically, let this counterfactual policy be one of the same aggregate budget size. Agreeing on these definitions will not dispel all the problems with the comparisons, and we must first review some obvious ways in which the measures fall short of capturing the overall impacts on the distribution of income. (C.) Caveats The limitations of conventional incidence calculations like those cited here are so strict that the fiscal incidence calculations are useful only as plausible suggestions about the direction of effect and the general orders of magnitude. As public finance textbooks warn their readers repeatedly, one should never imagine that all the possible effects of a particular set of budgetary flows have been worked out. Let us confront the traditionally cited dangers here – and then proceed with the traditional calculations anyway, while taking care to flag cases in which our knowledge of the underlying history warns that the measures mislead seriously. Time horizons: For one thing, the conventional annual measures of fiscal incidence are too short-run, failing to match either the duration of the effects of that year’s budgetary changes or the lifetimes of the affected individuals. The effects of this year’s budgetary policies can continue for generations – think of the enduring effects of this year’s wealth tax, or this year’s spending on public health or education, for example. We’ll return to this in Part III. Ultimately we care about the inequality of resources that people have over their entire lifetimes. This year’s fiscal effects may mislead, by missing effects on the length of life, or by missing correlations between effects on incomes in different years of the same lifetime.10 [Footnote 10]I re-emphasize that the “full set of fiscal effects” must include benefits in kind, and not just cash benefits. Studies have found that in-kind benefits such as health and education greatly reduce inequality even within the same year (see, for example, Paulus et al. (2010) and Aaberge et al. (2010)). Fortunately, some of our main sources have taken care to include the distributive effects of in-kind benefits. (1) The CEQ project (Lustig and Higgins 2016) has included in-kind benefits of health, education, and other public programs. (2) The DINA project’s paper on the United States (PSZ 2016) has included the in-kind benefits from two major health-care programs (Medicare and Medicaid). It covers public education by assuming that past, not current, public education spending accounts for a fixed share of current labor earnings. (3) The OECD’s calculations generally omit payments in kind from their estimates of how redistribution changes over time, though they have discussed the relevance of in-kind transfers for their most up-to-date estimates (OECD 2011, p. 39; OECD forthcoming). (4) The study of Sweden to which we turn shortly (Bengtssen, Holmlund, and Waldenström 2016) also omits transfers in kind.[End Footnote 10] Behavioral responses are assumed away by such measures. That is, they assume that the tax or benefit sticks, like flies to flypaper, exactly where it is imposed or paid out. People are supposedly taxed on their incomes without deciding to engage in less or more of the income-generating behavior. People in need are assumed to go on working or not working the same amount regardless of any social assistance they receive. Beyond peoples’ failures to change their income-generating behavior in the first round, the traditional calculations further assume no subsequent effects on prices and factor rewards, which fits uneasily with the calculations’ implying that spending is affected. As an extreme variant of this behavioral-response issue, other effects missed by the magnitudes of tax revenues and expenditures arise in the cases where a fiscal exaction is prohibitively expensive. If a tax makes people avoid an activity altogether, this can have great effects on the income distribution even though there are no tax collections to distribute between rich and middle and poor. In a later section, I’ll use the Corn Law example to underline the point that in some cases a strong impact is hidden in prices and quantities of overall behavior, with no visible reflection in taxes or expenditures. In addition, most of this paper sets aside the broader set of non-fiscal redistributive institutions, such as labor laws, human bondage, laws governing business competition, and policies favoring or harming certain output sectors.

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