Fiscal redistribution excludes job guarantees funded via deficit-spending or from cutting other programs
Harvey ‘6 [Phillip; 2006; Associate Professor of Law and Economics at Rutgers School of Law – Camden, PhD in economics from the New School for Social Research, and JD from Yale; Int. J. Environment, Workplace and Employment, “Funding a Job Guarantee,” Vol. 2, No. 1]
5 The redistributive cost of a job guarantee programme Most social welfare benefits redistribute real income, and although opponents of social welfare initiatives rarely focus on this fact, there is little doubt that it contributes to opposition to social welfare spending in market societies. For this reason it is important for discussions of the cost of social welfare initiatives to consider not only the question of how the proposed benefit could be funded but also how much redistribution of income that funding mechanism would entail. Viewed from this perspective, the appropriate question to ask is not where the funds necessary to pay for a JG programme would come from but how much income redistribution would be required to achieve the programme's social welfare goals. The implications of both my own and the Post Keynesian analysis of JG programme funding is that such a programme could be established in developed market economies without any additional redistribution of income. The Post Keynesian analysis supports this conclusion provided the JG initiative is funded with additional deficit spending since in that case the programme's real cost would be totally covered by the programme's contribution to increased aggregate demand and, hence, to increased aggregate real income. Neither present nor future tax payers would suffer any reduction in their real income to pay for the programme. My own analysis supports the same conclusion even if the JG programme is funded without engaging in additional deficit spending, because of the savings in existing government expenditures the programme would permit and the additional government revenue it could generate. This does not mean that any interest-based opposition to the JG idea would be irrational. As explained above, a JG programme would strengthen the bargaining power of wage earners by reducing the in terrorem effect of unemployment. This would likely tilt the wage/profit tradeoff more in favor of wage-earners over the long run, and in this way, a JG programme probably would cause some redistribution of income over time, even if the funding mechanism used to pay for the programme had no such effect in the short-run. This long-term redistributive effect would be likely to fuel employer opposition to the idea even if they were satisfied that a JG programme could be funded without any additional redistribution in the short run, but it would be hard for employers to mobilise opposition to the JG idea among tax payers in general if the idea could be promoted without relying on additional income redistribution to pay for it.