China’s attempts at hegemony have failed, there is no reason to worry
Mueller, ‘22 (John Mueller, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, member of the political science department and senior research scientist with the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at the Ohio State University, Cato Institute, January 11, 2022, “China Has Been a Failure at Hegemony, So Let’s Just Chill” https://www.cato.org/commentary/china-has-been-failure-hegemony-so-lets-just-chill - Emery)
Many in the U.S. foreign policy establishment and elsewhere are sounding an alarm over concerns that, as China develops, it will become the dominant power in its region, a “hegemon” that will have too much “influence” there and do damage to U.S. security interests. For example, in 2017 the National Intelligence Council opined that “geopolitical competition” was on the rise and the Chinese sought “to exert more sway over their neighboring regions and promote an order in which U.S. influence does not dominate.” Accordingly, as it is often suggested, military hardware must be deployed to somehow keep that from happening. However, to a degree, we already know what Chinese “hegemony” looks like. Over the last decade, China has established a major military and especially economic presence, and it has tried to convert this condition into influence. These experiments in hegemony — China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which has stressed construction loans to countries across Eurasia, and its rather belligerent “wolf diplomacy” antics — have substantially foundered and have, if anything, proved to be counterproductive. The experience does not bode well for future efforts, and it does not justify alarm. From the foundering Belt & Road Initiative to its so‐called ‘wolf warrior’ strategy, Beijing is just not the threat we make it out to be. Its much‐hyped Belt and Road Initiative was once deemed by some to be a key element of a plot by the Chinese to “rule the world.” However, from the beginning there were warnings from Chinese scholars and business leaders questioning the economic rationale for many of the investments. In addition, economist Barry Naughton of the University of California at San Diego notes that the idea was in part economically misguided, and Tufts University’s Michael Beckley has estimated that the scheme would “probably exacerbate China’s woes” by funding “hundreds of financially dubious projects in unstable countries, more than half of which have credit ratings below investment‐grade.” These suggestions have proved to be justified. Expenditures of hundreds of billions on the project have failed to deliver either returns for investors (including state‐run banks) or political returns for China, notes Taiwan‐based analyst Tanner Green. The project was there, he says, “only because it is the favored brainchild of an authoritarian leader living in an echo chamber” — for other Chinese to attack BRI is “to attack the legitimacy of the party itself.” By 2019, BRI lending by China had fallen from a peak of $75 billion in 2016 (at a time when its promulgating author, Chinese President Xi Jinping, was touting BRI as “a project of the century”) to just $4 billion. Although some of these projects will likely succeed, there were reports by the end of 2020, like this one by James Kynge and Jonathan Wheatley at the Financial Times, that the money had often been doled out “with a combination of hubris, ambition, and naivete.” Descriptors like “unravelling,” “fallen off a cliff,” and “ill‐conceived” were being applied by experts, including Matt Ferchen at Merics, a Berlin‐based think‐tank, who wrote that China was now “mired in debt renegotiations with a host of countries.