No one can or will try to match US hard power—they have the best tech, spend more than everyone else, and have an unrivaled global reach
Montgomery ’14
[Evan Braden Montgomery, PhD in Foreign Affairs from U of Virginia, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (a public policy research institute focusing on national security strategy, defense planning, and military investment options), “Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific: China’s Rise and the Future of U.S. Power Projection,” Spring 2014, International Security, Volume 38, Number 4, project muse, wyo-sc]
What accounts for this consensus? The existing literature identifies two principal barriers to internal balancing against the United States, both of which suggest that its military primacy will endure even if its relative economic strength declines.19 First, prospective balancers are likely to incur significant opportunity costs, because competing with the United States would inhibit their ability to manage more pressing security challenges. As Robert Jervis notes, while the leading power in a unipolar system is “concerned with everything that happens everywhere,” other nations “are primarily concerned with what happens in their neighborhoods.”20 In most cases, therefore, they will prioritize addressing nearby threats over counterbalancing a distant hegemon. Because these objectives ostensibly require very different military capabilities, few nations can afford to pursue them both at the same time.21¶ Second, even if prospective balancers were not distracted by more urgent demands on their attention and resources, they would still incur enormous sunk costs given the magnitude of the United States’ conventional military edge. By nearly any measure, the United States possesses the world’s most advanced ground, amphibious, naval, aerospace, and special operations forces. It also devotes more resources to defense than almost every other nation combined.22 Most important, its “command of the commons” provides an unparalleled ability to deploy, operate, and sustain military units overseas.23 Other nations, by contrast, can conduct large military operations only in close proximity to their own territory, and it is debatable whether any rising powers, including China, will be able to match the United States’ global reach for decades.24 According to [End Page 123] primacy optimists, this gap is so wide that “any effort to compete directly with the United States is futile, so no one tries.”25 Even primacy pessimists acknowledge that nations hoping to constrain the United States and frustrate its objectives must settle for nonmilitary options, including diplomatic, economic, and institutional measures they refer to as “soft balancing.”26