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Experimentation tests varied policies and produces the best model

Althouse 04- American law professor and blogger (Ann, “VANGUARD STATES, LAGGARD STATES: FEDERALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 152, No.6, June 2004, Accessed Online at https://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/lawreview/articles/volume152/issue6/Althouse152U.Pa.L.Rev.1745(2004).pdf, Accessed Online on 6-28-20, LASA-DG)

Consider the statement Justice Brandeis made about state experimentation in his dissenting opinion in New State Ice. Referring to the problems of the Great Depression, he wrote: Some people assert that our present plight is due, in part, to the limitations set by courts upon experimentation in the fields of social and economic science; and to the discouragement to which proposals for betterment there have been subjected otherwise. There must be power in the States and the Nation to remould, through experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic needs. I cannot believe that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, or the States which ratified it, intended to deprive us of the power to correct the evils of technological unemployment and excess productive capacity which have attended progress in the useful arts. To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. This Court has the power to prevent an experiment. We may strike down the statute which embodies it on the ground that, in our opinion, the measure is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. We have power to do this, because the due process clause has been held by the Court applicable to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure. But in the exercise of this high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles. If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold.25 Justice Brandeis does not appear to view “experimentation” as a metaphor. His government policymakers operate “in the fields of social and economic science.”26 Justice Brandeis sought to unleash not only the state government scientists, but also the federal ones. He favored experimentation not only in matters of commerce, but also “in things social and economic.”27 He cautioned courts to resist interfering with the process of experimentation: Judges have a “grave responsibility” when they exercise the power they have “to prevent an experiment.”28 That Justice Brandeis urges both restraint and boldness should not be seen as an inconsistency. For Brandeis, boldness comes in the form of trusting government experimenters with their “novel” ideas and refraining from serving mere “prejudices”—as opposed to true “principles”—which the “high power” of review judges have designed for themselves. Substantive due process rights were a powerful tool, capable of “stay[ing] experimentation,” but according to Brandeis, because of the benefits that might come from innovative policymakers, especially in dire times, the courts needed to be careful not to fall into the lazy practice of seeing their own preconceptions as fundamental liberties. He repeats the idea of bravery: Judges should be bold enough to allow the “single courageous State” to design new programs and policies.29 Judicial bravery manifests itself as the restraint that permits activism on the part of the brave policy scientists. There is “risk,” for sure, but at least in a system of federalism, where the bold experiment comes from the state, the risk is confined to one state.30 Of course, Brandeis saw the national government as conducting experiments that ought to inspire judicial restraint as well, but readers are left to make their own inferences about how much restraint Brandeis expected from judges when the experiment is not confined to one state. The Supreme Court Justices have cited the New State Ice dissent many times over the years. It has been mobilized not only to justify interpreting constitutional rights narrowly and permitting a state law to stand, as in the original case, but also to justify avoiding the creation of new rights. The theory is that the state democratic processes might operate upon the same field and produce similar solutions, policies that function as better-crafted versions of the rights the courts might otherwise have designed. For example, in a concurring opinion in Washington v. Glucksberg, 31 Justice O’Connor referred to New State Ice as she rejected the idea of a due process right to physician assisted suicide: that the states were in fact “undertaking extensive and serious evaluation”32 in this area inspired her to refrain from attempting to clutter experimentation with a judicially designed solution.33 The New State Ice dissent has been used by the Supreme Court to justify self-restraint to make room for other courts to play a role in the process of articulating constitutional law. In Johnson v. Louisiana, 34 Justice Powell, concurring in an opinion that accepted nonunanimous jury verdicts in state criminal cases, acknowledged that “the Civil War Amendments altered substantially the balance of federalism,” but rejected the notion that “they were intended to deprive the States of all freedom to experiment with variations in jury-trial procedure.”35 Noting the importance of “empirical study . . . as a foundation for decisionmaking,” he invoked New State Ice: One of the more obvious merits of our federal system is the opportunity it affords each State, if its people so choose, to become a “laboratory” and to experiment with a range of trial and procedural alternatives. Although the need for the innovations that grow out of diversity has always been great, imagination unimpeded by unwarranted demands for national uniformity is of special importance at a time when serious doubt exists as to the adequacy of our criminal justice system. The same diversity of local legislative responsiveness that marked the development of economic and social reforms in this country, if not barred by an unduly restrictive application of the Due Process Clause, might well lead to valuable innovations with respect to determining—fairly and more expeditiously—the guilt or innocence of the accused.36 Doubt about the criminal justice system could have been provided as a reason to expand the requirements of constitutional law, but Justice Powell uses doubt as a reason to keep the experimentation going, in order to generate evidence about what the best answer is. Powell thought the Court should refrain from “drawing [the] difficult lines” needed to define constitutional rights and for now approve of one state’s approach to nonunanimous verdicts. Later, in “a different context” and with the aid of information produced through state experimentation, the Court would be in a better position to “find[] the required balance” needed to perform the difficult task of defining the scope of constitutional due process.37 Similarly, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 38 Chief Justice Burger, joined by then-Justice Rehnquist, wrote about the importance of empowering state courts to experiment with ways to protect young victim-witnesses in rape trials. The Chief Justice criticized the majority for requiring empirical proof that the state’s mandatory closure rule would lead to increased reporting of sex crimes. Citing the New State Ice dissent, he wrote: “It makes no sense to criticize the Commonwealth for its failure to offer empirical data in support of its rule; only by allowing state experimentation may such empirical evidence be produced.”39 Justice Marshall has raised an important criticism of this kind of deference.40 He criticized his fellow Justices who, even at the behest of a rights claimant facing a death sentence, embraced the notion that the “Court should postpone consideration of the issue until more state supreme courts and federal circuits have experimented with substantive and procedural solutions to the problem.”41 He commented on the expansion of Brandeis’s concept: When Justice Brandeis originally analogized the States to laboratories in need of freedom to experiment, he was dissenting from a decision by the Court applying a now-discredited interpretation of the Due Process Clause to strike down an Oklahoma statute regulating the sale and distribution of ice. As Justice Brandeis recognized, an overly protective view of substantive due process unnecessarily stifles public welfare legislation at the state level. Since then, however, the power of the States-as laboratories metaphor has propelled Justice Brandeis’ concept far beyond the sphere of social and economic regulation. Now we find the metaphor employed to justify this Court’s abstention from reaching an important issue involving the rights of individual defendants under the Federal Constitution.42 New State Ice has also been offered as a justification for striking down federal statutes to preserve room for the free play of state policies. The oldest invocation of Brandeis’s laboratories concept to argue against federal legislative power instead of the scope of individual constitutional rights appears in Justice Jackson’s dissent in Federal Power Commission v. East Ohio Gas Co., 43 a case in which the majority determined that Congress had authorized the Federal Power Commission to regulate the accounting method used by an intrastate gas company.44 Adopting a narrower reading of the statute, Justice Jackson dissented. He attributed Brandeisian notions about experimentation to Congress: Congress may well have believed that diversity of experimentation in the field of regulation has values which centralization and uniformity destroy. As Mr. Justice Brandeis said, “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” Long before the Federal Government could be stirred to regulate utilities, courageous states took the initiative and almost the whole body of utility practice has resulted from their experiences. . . . . . . . If now and then some state does not regulate its utilities according to the federal standard, it may be a small price to pay for preserving the state initiative which gave us utilities regulation far in advance of federal initiative.45 Justice Jackson’s deference to the states paid respect to their role in the vanguard of utilities regulation. Contributing to that deference is a sense that there may be no right answers, at least in some areas, such as the accounting methods at issue in that case: “We must not forget that regulatory measures are temporary expedients, not eternal verities—if indeed they are verities at all.”46 Preserving state autonomy in such areas, according to Jackson, could help the vanguard continue to advance: Certainly one of the matters on which the states might well be indulged—the right to an opinion of their own—is as to the accounting methods of a utility whose whole property and business being accounted for is within the state. Out of their diversity of practice and experience emerge pragmatic tests. What the Federal Power Commission seeks to require of this Ohio gas company, for example, is to revert by accounting methods to emphasis on original cost, a basis which William Jennings Bryan for an earlier generation of progressives eloquently urged this Court to reject in the field of railroad rate-making. . . . It must be remembered that closer than any federal agency to those they regulate and to their customers are the state authorities, whose mechanisms are less cumbersome and whose principles can much more quickly be adjusted to the changing times.47 Note that Jackson’s “indulge[nce]” toward the states is supported by the fact that the Federal Power Commission had not endorsed what he considered to be the progressive position and by his faith, inspired by the states’ history of past progressivism, in their potential to arrive at good solutions to real problems. Yet, while projecting this prudence and faith onto Congress, Jackson simultaneously forswore judicial activism: “We should not utilize the centralizing powers of the federal judiciary to destroy diversities between states which Congress has been scrupulous to protect.”48 An important recent invocation of New State Ice to support the invalidation of a federal statute appears in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 199049 in United States v. Lopez. 50 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O’Connor took note of various state and local approaches to eradicating violence in schools and the uncertainty about how best to solve the problem. Justice Kennedy wrote: While it is doubtful that any State, or indeed any reasonable person, would argue that it is wise policy to allow students to carry guns on school premises, considerable disagreement exists about how best to accomplish that goal. In this circumstance, the theory and utility of our federalism are revealed, for the States may perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far from clear.51 It has been argued that the existence of a federal law imposing strict prison terms for the gun possession in schools does not detract from the states’ ability to experiment with other solutions to the same problem.52 This is not so: a state or locality that would like to experiment with parental responsibility or with gun-exchange programs53 is looking for an alternative to harsh imprisonment. Sweeping youths into lengthy prison sentences undercuts these experiments despite the fact that the federal government handles the prosecution and runs the prisons.54 New State Ice has also been used to withdraw protection of state autonomy and to empower Congress to impose on the state, as was seen in the majority opinion in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. 55 Garcia is the high water mark in the recognition of federal legislative power over the states, so the opinion’s use of Brandeis’s New State Ice dissent might seem puzzling at first, but here Justice Blackmun wielded elegant—if not entirely convincing—rhetoric: The essence of our federal system is that within the realm of authority left open to them under the Constitution, the States must be equally free to engage in any activity that their citizens choose for the common weal, no matter how unorthodox or unnecessary anyone else—including the judiciary—deems state involvement to be. Any rule of state immunity that looks to the “traditional,” “integral,” or “necessary” nature of governmental functions inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes. “The science of government . . . is the science of experiment,” and the States cannot serve as laboratories for social and economic experiment, if they must pay an added price when they meet the changing needs of their citizenry by taking up functions that an earlier day and a different society left in private hands.56 That is to say, the good thing about state autonomy is freedom to innovate. It is the vanguard state that Justice Brandeis wanted to promote, so he would see National League of Cities v. Usery’s protection of “traditional [state] governmental functions” as exactly backward.57 Why it would protect the laggards, the states working the traditional field—Justice Blackmun seems to say58—while leaving the vanguard states open to regulation! He therefore perceives nothing worth protecting at the state level and opts to give a free hand to Congress, which seems to be the institution undertaking innovation. It is innovation, after all, that inspires judicial boldness, in the Brandeisian model, so, according to Justice Blackmun, the Court should unleash Congress rather than make a protected sphere for the states.

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