Fiscal redistribution means taxes OR transfers
IMF ’14 [International Monetary Fund; Jan 23; the IMF Is a major financial agency of the United Nations, and an international financial institution, headquartered in Washington, D.C., consisting of 190 countries; IMF Policy Paper, “Fiscal Policy and Income Inequality,” http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/012314.pdf]
20. Evaluating the redistributive impact of fiscal policies requires a comparison of incomes after taxes and transfers with those that would exist without them. In principle, assessments of the incidence of fiscal policies should incorporate information on consumers’ and producers’ behavioral responses to taxes and transfers and their impact on market incomes. In practice, most studies do not incorporate this aspect, since sufficient data on behavioral responses are often unavailable. In these studies, the incidence of commodity taxes is typically assumed to fall on consumers, factor taxes are assumed to fall on factor suppliers (labor and capital), and transfers to beneficiaries do not lead to changes in factor supplies. The evidence below is drawn from such studies. In econometric studies, on the other hand, behavioral responses are captured—Box 3 provides a summary of recent empirical literature evaluating the distributive impact of fiscal policy based on econometric analysis of cross-country panel data.
The use of regression-based models to study the redistributive impact of fiscal policy has grown in recent years. In principle, these models can provide estimates of the effects of fiscal policy without assumptions on compliance and take-up rates. They can also capture the general equilibrium effects of taxes and transfers. The models usually regress the disposable income Gini coefficient on variables capturing the composition of taxes and spending, while adding control variables to account for other factors that can affect income distribution. Several difficulties are encountered in these empirical studies. For example, data may not be fully comparable across countries or over time; estimation methods may not adequately address the endogeneity of fiscal variables and omitted variable bias; and the results and their interpretation are sensitive to model specification and data sources. These models can also obscure the fact that the design of taxes and transfers also matters for their distributive incidence, as they implicitly assume a similar design across countries.
The findings from regression-based studies suggest that greater reliance on income taxes and higher spending on social benefits reduces inequality. The majority of the studies provide evidence that is qualitatively consistent with those from micro-simulation models: direct taxes are more redistributive than indirect taxes, and social protection spending reduces inequality. At the same time, these studies find that higher spending on targeted social benefits (such as means-tested social assistance) does not always reduce inequality. This could reflect the behavioral response of benefit recipients, such as their withdrawal from the labor market. Such results underscore the importance of designing benefits in a manner that does not discourage work effort.
A. Advanced Economies
21. Fiscal policy has played a significant role in reducing income inequality in advanced economies, with most of this reduction being achieved on the expenditure side through transfers. Over recent decades, direct income taxes and transfers have decreased inequality in advanced economies by an average of one-third (Figure 6). For instance, in 2005, the average Gini for disposable income was 14 percentage points below that of the average market income Gini. The redistributive impact of transfers accounts for about two-thirds of the decrease in the Gini. Within transfers, non-means-tested transfers (including public pensions and family benefits) account for the bulk of the redistribution (Immervoll and others, 2005; Paulus and others, 2009). On the tax side, personal income taxes make an important contribution to reducing inequality in a number of economies—in fact, in most economies, the redistribution achieved through income taxes is even higher than for means-tested transfers.
22. Social insurance and other transfers are far less redistributive when examined from the perspective of lifetime income. Pension systems, for example, redistribute income across an individual’s own lifetime, with pension contributions being made during peak earning years, and benefits received during retirement when incomes are lower. Similarly, households receive more in transfers when they have children. The fiscal redistribution of incomes from the lifetime rich to the lifetime poor is thus smaller than that implied by a snapshot in any one year. For instance, Bovenberg, Hansen, and Sorenson (2012) show that about three-fourths of redistribution in
Denmark involves redistribution over peoples’ lifecycle as opposed to redistribution from lifetime rich to lifetime poor—they also report similar magnitudes for Australia, Ireland, Italy, and Sweden from other studies.
23. Reductions in the generosity of benefits and less progressive taxation have decreased the redistributive impact of fiscal policy since the mid-1990s. Between the mid-1980s and mid1990s, the Gini coefficient for market income increased by 3.1 percentage points, while that for disposable income increased by only 1.1 points (Figure 7). Therefore, fiscal policy offset about two-thirds of the increase in market income inequality over this period. Over the subsequent decade (mid-1990s to mid-2000s), market income inequality increased by a further 2.2 percentage points while disposable income inequality increased by 1.8 percentage points. Therefore, while market income inequality increased by less than over the previous decade, disposable income inequality actually increased by more. As a result, during the two decades from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s, fiscal policy offset less than half of the increase. In the absence of policy changes, the absolute distributive impact of fiscal policy would have been higher (and the increase in disposable income inequality lower) than observed over the second decade. This is the case because a progressive tax and benefit systems tends to redistribute income even more when market inequality rises (e.g., due to unemployment or rising incomes of top earners). The decrease in the redistributive power of fiscal policy has been attributed to fiscal reforms in many economies since the mid-1990s that have reduced the generosity of unemployment and social assistance benefits as well as income tax rates, especially at higher income levels (OECD, 2011a).
24. The evidence on the effects of reductions in corporate income taxes on inequality is mixed. In theory, the impact of corporate taxes on wages and capital income over the long run depends on the relative mobility of capital and labor across both sectors and countries (Auerbach, 2006). Where capital is more internationally mobile, the incidence of corporate taxes will tend to fall on wages to the extent that labor is immobile, with this impact being reduced when the home country is large enough to affect the international rate of return on capital. However, the taxation of “rents” (i.e., above normal profits) is still likely to fall on owners of capital. Recent empirical evidence on the long-run incidence of corporate taxes suggests that between 45 and 75 percent of the corporate tax burden falls on wages (Gentry, 2007; Arulampalam, Devereux, and Maffini, 2010). Since wage earners typically have lower mean incomes than those with capital income, corporate income taxes may not be as progressive over the longer term as is often believed.
25. The overall redistributive impact of fiscal policy is also influenced by the distribution of indirect taxes and in-kind transfers. Empirical evidence suggests that indirect taxes tend to be regressive or proportional to incomes (O’Donoaghue, Baldini, and Mantovani, 2004; Cnossen, 2005). While both the value-added tax (VAT) and excise duties are found to be regressive, excise taxes are especially regressive. However, the regressivity of indirect taxes is typically much smaller when assessed against lifetime income or consumption. In-kind transfers such as education and health spending are very progressively distributed (i.e., their benefits are more equally distributed than disposable incomes). On average, in-kind transfers are found to decrease the Gini coefficient by
5.8 percentage points in five European economies (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, and the United Kingdom), with health (3.6 points) and education (2.2 points) accounting for virtually all of this impact (Paulus, Sutherland, and Tsakloglou, 2009). In addition, expansion of access at lower levels can decrease earnings inequality in the medium term (De Gregorio and Lee, 2002).
B. Developing Economies
26. Much less evidence exists on the overall distributional incidence of fiscal policy in developing economies. One exception is Latin America, where recent studies provide a more comprehensive picture than in other developing regions. For other regions, studies tend to focus on specific tax and spending components. Despite the relative paucity of research, it is still possible to provide a broad picture of the redistributive role of fiscal policy by combining the insights from these studies with information on the composition and overall level of taxes and spending.
27. Low levels of both taxes and social spending limit the redistributive impact of fiscal policy in developing economies. While average tax ratios for advanced economies exceed 30 percent of GDP, tax ratios in developing economies (excluding emerging Europe) generally fall in the range of 15–20 percent of GDP (Figure 8). As a result, social spending is also much lower in developing economies, which substantially reduces the redistributive effects of fiscal policy. For instance, differences in the redistributive impact of tax and spending can explain two-thirds of the difference in the disposable income Gini coefficient between Latin America and advanced economies (Box 4).
28. In addition to having lower total social spending, developing economies allocate a relatively smaller proportion to social transfers. The share of social spending allocated to social transfers (including social insurance and social assistance transfers) is especially low in low-income countries in the Asia and Pacific region and in sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 8). The redistributive impact of these social transfers is further diminished by low coverage of low-income groups, resulting in most of the benefits going to higher-income groups (Figure 9). In Latin America and the Caribbean, high coverage reflects the extensive coverage of households in social assistance programs, which tend to have lower benefit levels than other social transfers such as pensions. As a result, the poor in this region still receive a low share of total social transfers.
29. The distribution of in-kind social spending has been found to be regressive in many developing economies, reflecting the lack of access by low-income households to key public services such as education and health. The incidence of spending varies across different categories (Figure 10; see also Demery, 2000, and Van de Walle, 1995). Primary health care spending, for example, is progressive, but higher-level spending is regressive. In education, primary education spending is progressive, while secondary and tertiary education spending are regressive. These results suggest that spending geared towards increasing access to basic education and health services (“extensive expansion”) is likely to be much more progressive than current spending. Expansion of access to education and health can also reduce income inequality over the medium term by reducing inequality of education outcomes and earnings (De Gregorio and Lee, 2002).
DESIGN OF EFFICIENT REDISTRIBUTIVE FISCAL POLICY
A. Conceptual Framework
30. This section discusses how fiscal policy can contribute to achieving distributional objectives at minimum efficiency cost. As highlighted earlier, while there is broad consensus regarding recent trends in income inequality, there is less consensus regarding the forces driving these trends—for example, whether its reflects inefficient rent seeking or efficient market rewards for increasing productivity—or on the policy implications for countries. However, there is clear evidence of rising popular support for redistribution from public attitude surveys in advanced and developing economies.
31. Redistributive fiscal policy should be consistent with an appropriate level and composition of public spending and fiscal sustainability. In theory, the optimal level of spending is where the marginal social benefit of spending equals the marginal social cost of financing this spending. Since this applies to each category of spending, for a given source of financing, the marginal social benefit of spending should also be equal across spending categories. These considerations have three implications. First, the optimal level of redistributive spending will vary from country to country, as it depends on preferences and costs (including the efficiency costs of taxation). Second, the benefits from additional spending on redistribution should be compared with the benefits of raising outlays in other areas, such as public infrastructure to support higher growth. Third, redistributive fiscal policy should be consistent with fiscal sustainability, which can support economic growth and the capacity to finance higher spending on redistribution over the longer term.
32. Fiscal redistribution can usually most efficiently be achieved through direct instruments that tax or provide benefits based on income. Fiscal redistribution, by its very nature, involves transferring resources from higher-income to lower-income households through taxes and transfers. On the tax side, personal income taxes, for example, are often preferable for achieving redistribution than taxes on consumption because they directly take account of the ability of households or individuals to pay. On the spending side, cash transfers to poor households are usually superior to indirect methods such as price subsidies. Better targeting of transfers reduces their fiscal cost and the tax levels required to finance them, thus achieving distributional objectives in a more efficient manner. Targeting, however, is not without efficiency costs and must be designed carefully (see below).