US needs to sustain economic hegemony or else China will be the next hegemon- evidence proves they remain unaffected from financial crises
Louis 21, Patrick Louis, One-year Political Science MA programme in Global Politics and Societal Change Dept. of Global Political Studies, “American Economic hegemony – under threat or unsurpassable?”, Malmo University, May 20, 2021, https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1562120/FULLTEXT01.pdf
Hegemony in a politics-setting represents the material power and economy In order to undertake the task of exploring whether China poses a threat to the US world order, it is first important to define what is meant by term ‘hegemony’. Throughout this paper reference to a hegemonic power shall borrow from the description given by Robert Gilpin in which he describes the concepts of a hierarchy of prestige and power, “The hierarchy of prestige in an international system rests on economic and military power. Prestige is the reputation for power, and military power in particular. Whereas power refers to the economic, military and related capabilities of the state, prestige refers primarily to the perceptions of other states with respect to a state’s capacities and its ability and willingness to exercise power”. (Gilpin, 1981, pp30-31). From this it can be taken to understand that when using the term American hegemony, we are referring not only to the strength of American military and economic power in relation to other states, but the perception from other states that America is willing to exercise said power. However, the concept of prestige in global politics is a contentious and debated topic that includes concepts such as soft power and roles of institutions which lies outside the remit of this essay which is focussing on the material reality of the economic power of the US as a hegemon with direct reference to Strange’s analysis of the structural power of finance not the concept of prestige. Therefore, for the purpose of this essay we shall focus on hegemony as the power of the United States’ economic capabilities. This is an interpretation of hegemony also supported by John Mearsheimer (2001) who points out that it is within every state’s best interest to be the hegemon, as a method of protection 18 and defence against other states ambitions. (Mearsheimer, 2001; p.3). For Mearsheimer, the international system shapes the actions and decision making of states, in the sense that the international system increases the motivation for states to maximise their power as this will in turn maximise their security from other states. His theory of ‘offensive realism’ is a descriptive theory, explaining how states act and why they act this way (Mearsheimer, 2001; p.11). A central question important to Mearsheimer’s theory, and this essay’s explanation of American hegemony can be found in Mearsheimer’s analysis of power, and as mentioned above Mearsheimer’s analysis of power concludes that “Power is based on the particular material capabilities that a state possesses” (Mearsheimer, 2001; p.55). Susan Strange presented an argument stating that hegemonic power is made up of four key structures: security, production, finance and knowledge. The main purpose of this essay shall be the investigation of America’s economic hegemony and the US Dollar and therefore mostly exploring Strange’s concepts of financial power. (Strange, 1987; p.565). Strange’s definition of financial power is applied to a state that is “able to determine the structure of finance and credit through which (in all but the most primitive economies) it is possible to acquire purchasing power without having to either work or to trade it” (Strange, 1987; p.565). Moreover, some analysis on Strange’s concept of production is also referenced in the literature of hegemonic studies and the international system (Babones and Aberg, 2019; Starrs, 2013) therefore for the purpose of this literature review we shall also explore this concept, however the central topic of this essay is solely concentrated on Susan Strange’s concept of structural power in finance. Noting this, the structural power of production was defined by Strange as a state “able to control the system of production of goods and services” (Strange, 1987; p565) in order to 19 assert their power and maintain their position of hegemons. This paper shall show in detail how these two structures work in the American context and seek to show how they are not under threat from China. International finance is a key way in which America has maintained its hegemonic power, as Strange mentions “What I am comparing is the structural power to extend or restrict the range of operations open to others which has been, and still is, exercised by the United States” (Strange, 1987; p.259). In her analysis of how America holds structural power in the domain of finance, Strange refers to “the system by which credit is created, bought and sold and by which the direction and use of capital is determined”. (Strange, 1990; p259). Strange’s work (1990) focusses on the relationship of Japan and America in the 1980s in the sphere of international finance. Although Japan in contemporary political literature is no longer considered to be a hegemonic rival to the United States, Strange’s analysis can also be used to analyse the current Sino-American relationship. Strange notes how the Japanese Yen is not widely used in international markets, a similar problem also facing the Chinese Renminbi. Strange concludes “Japanese power in finance is relational only whereas that of the United States is structural. The process of equalization if it ever happens will take a long time and would involve radical reform if the international economic organisations over which the US has a constitutional veto power.” (Strange, 1990; p.273). This conclusion, although concerning Japan, can also be applied to the case of China today. The IMF is still working under the structure in which the United States alone has veto power, therefore it can be said international institutions continuously work in a way which reinforced American dominance in the field of finance making a hegemonic challenge from China difficult. 20 Babones and Aberg (2019) further Strange’s analysis on structural power defining structural power as “the power to shape and determine the structures of the global political economy within which other actors, political institutions, economic enterprises and (not least) scientists, and other professional people have to operate.” (Babones and Aberg, 2019; p.301). This definition used of structural power can also be used in the analysis of hegemony, for example, it is clear when analysing hegemony that the hegemonic power uses it status to shape and determine the structures of the global political economy. It is also of importance to clarify what is meant by the term ‘international order’ and show how China poses a threat to such an order, in order to signify how relevant this essay’s research is to global politics. Simply put the characterisation of order can be seen to be the “interstate agreement over the norms, rules and institutions that regulate interstate behaviour” (Johnston, 2019; p.23). When discussing this supposed order therefore it is important to understand America’s role in forming and maintaining this order, to then determine how China poses a threat to it. America is the lone state which holds veto ability at the IMF, this indicates clearly the central role and power the United States has in shaping the global economy, as well as also being one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council which holds veto power, again signalling the central role America has in the current international order. Khanna and Winecoff (2020) make the important point that when analysing hegemonic orders and hegemonic powers, too often in literature analysis is concerned solely on the attributes of the dominant state not its relation to the international system; “Hegemonic powers gain influence through their structural prominence, and this is a function not only of their attributes but also of their connections to the rest of the system.” (Norrlof et al, 2020; p114). In the analysis section of this essay, this shall be taken into account as we are exploring how US Dollar centrality affects and shapes the rest of the international system to maintain hegemony. 21 Khanna and Winecoff (2020) view “international orders as overlapping, multidimensional sets of durable arrangements, that can be theorised, and measured as a multilayer network” (Norrlof et al., 2020; p114). These international orders change and shift in response to unpredicted, unforeseen or even predictable damaging events. Historical cases of this can be the two world wars which resulted in a global order realignment in favour of America as the central state in the global order, replacing Britain. The early 21st century has seen a financial crash that created economic instability throughout the international system, as well as a global pandemic which the effects of are still being recorded. These two events suggest that there could be a redrawing of lines in the global order. China remained relatively unscathed from the financial crisis and continued its strong economic growth as Khanna and Winecoff state “If there was to be a major reorganisation of the system then the critical components seemed to be in place: a rising power, a major crisis in the central status quo power, and a perceived de-legitimation of the ex ante order.” (Norrlof et al., 2020; p.115). From this we can see a view that is found in much of the literature concerning American hegemony, that being the challenge of a rising power, and a supposed decline of the United States which threatens its status specifically following a crisis such as the 2008 financial crash or the global Coronavirus pandemic