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Jobs guarantee structurally stabilizes the economy by addressing inequality in the labor market from the bottom-up

Pavlina R. Tcherneva in 2023

Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of Economics at Bard College, the Director of OSUN’s Economic Democracy Initiative, and a Research Scholar at the Levy Economics Institute, NY. She specializes in monetary and fiscal policy coordination and employment policy., The Job Guarantee: MMT's Proposal for Full Employment and Price Stability, Working Paper Series Open Society University Network Economic Democracy Initiative

Just like the shortest distance between two points is a straight line, the fastest way to eliminate unemployment is to hire the unemployed directly. The Job Guarantee does not eradicate unemployment through stimulus checks, tax cuts, subsidies or incentives, training, education, or other aggregate supply or aggregate demand management policies. Neither does it rely on progrowth policies that run the economy ‘hot’, worsen income inequality, and stimulate extractive and environmentally destructive investments. It is a net new job creation program, that hires those seeking employment directly, in areas of social and environmental need. It creates employment on demand or what Minsky (1986) called an infinitely elastic demand for labor. The Job Guarantee is not a ‘depression solution’ or ‘workfare’ either; it is permanent and voluntary and there are no requirements for participation in exchange for some other benefit. It is an additional program in the landscape of income and training support programs for the unemployed. Since millions of people look for living wage jobs unsuccessfully even during economic expansions, the program aims to ensure that enough employment opportunities are available. The Job Guarantee is not a replacement for any other social assistance or unemployment insurance and there is no requirement for participation. By design, the Job Guarantee is a bottom-up policy. While it provides an employment safety-net to all, it will benefit those at the bottom of the income distribution in particular. By contrast, top-down, progrowth, pro-investment policies tend to increase demand for the highly-educated, highly-paid and, often, already-employed workers. Top-down policies focus on closing the output gap and tolerate jobless recoveries, while bottom-up policies aim to close the labor demand gap and produce job-led growth (Tcherneva 2011a). As noted, a critical macroeconomic feature of the Job Guarantee is that it replaces the NAIRU, or the unemployed buffer stock, with an employed buffer stock. In recessions, workers who are laid off from the private sector would find employment opportunities in the Job Guarantee and, should they choose to take them, government spending on hiring would expand in a countercyclical fashion, generating a job-led recovery by design. When private sector demand for workers is restored, private firms would attract them away from the Job Guarantee with better pay and additional benefits. Government spending would automatically shrink, offsetting any inflationary pressures that may emerge from the increased private sector labor demand and spending. The key here is that government spending on the Job Guarantee program is not the source of inflation. Instead, it is a damper on deflationary and inflationary pressures that occur in the private economy. Such a countercyclical employment mechanism is necessary for a market economy, whose perennial feature is the business cycle, and where jobs are dependably the first casualties of those changes. In the U.S., 80 percent of total employment is created in the private for-profit sector, whereas non-profits, states and localities, and the federal government employ the remaining 20 percent, but it is the private sector that experiences the greatest employment volatility. Yet, experience has shown that countries which have achieved tight full employment over the business cycle, either via industrial and lifetime employment policies (as in postwar Japan) or employer-of-last-resort policies (as in postwar Sweden), do not have the same large fluctuation in overall unemployment. With a Job Guarantee in place, labor markets would be more stable and the program would not have to expand and contract as dramatically as unemployment currently does. Put differently, an economy that has an employment buffer stock is far more stable than one with an unemployment buffer stock. Forstater (1998) has argued that the Job Guarantee would operate with loose labor markets. This does not mean that employment in the Job Guarantee program would fluctuate dramatically; instead, it means that labor flows across sectors would be driven by abundant employment opportunities and not under duress due to job scarcity and economic insecurity. Another macroeconomic feature of the Job Guarantee is that it establishes a price anchor and a benchmark for all wages in the economy (Mitchell 1998). As workers would be hired by private employers at a premium above the Job Guarantee wage, the latter becomes the effective minimum wage. While many countries have minimum wage laws, they are not fully effective wage floors, because the wage of the person who seeks but fails to find employment at that wage would still be zero. In other words, working people need both a wage standard (a minimum wage - benefit package) and the guarantee of an available employment opportunity. It is worth noting that the Job Guarantee would secure that labor floor, even if Congress fails to amend the minimum wage law (which is long overdue)7, but the disruptive effects on the private sector would be minimized if the two policies were passed in tandem. In the present proposal, the Job Guarantee wage is fixed but not indexed to inflation, to avoid creating an automatic wage-price inflation mechanism. This proposal favors one fixed based wage (as opposed to tiered wages) to enhance price stability and prevent competition for workers between the public and private sectors across the wage spectrum. The structural innovation of the policy is to provide an opt-out for workers in poverty paying private sector jobs. To maintain the wage floor at a living level and ensure that workers capture productivity gains, Job Guarantee legislation should require statutory review of the wage-benefit package and mandate increases lockstep with productivity. At the time of this writing (2021), the proposed Job Guarantee wage is consistent with legislative efforts across the U.S. to raise the minimum wage to $15/hr. This level, however, may soon be inadequate to keep a family of four with two working adults above poverty, and the proposal would need to be revised. To sum up, the price stabilization features of the program include, 1) a base wage which is anchored at the living wage level, increased periodically lockstep with productivity gains, but not indexed to inflation; 2) a countercyclical spending mechanism that expands in recessions and shrinks in expansions, 3) spending on hiring that is always at the ‘right level’, and not more or less than what is necessary to employ the unemployed, 4) full employment without relying on general ‘stimulative’ aggregate demand policies, which tend to bid up the prices of already employed resources, including high wage workers, 5) an increase in both demand (from the purchasing power of the newly employed) and supply (public goods production), 6) an increase in supply associated with creating the highest primary, secondary, and tertiary effects, compared to other job creation policies, 7) a reduction in existing social and financial costs of unemployment and various anti-poverty measures, and 8) a method for building capacity that alleviates any inflationary pressures across sectors (e.g., providing school bus drivers during a pandemic shortage or deckhands at busy ports).

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