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Social insurance is a way of preventing class conflict and makes real redistribution impossible, reinforcing existing class structures while avoiding conflict

Gonzalez and Wen 14 (Franciso, PhD in Economics from Boston University, Jean Francois, PhD at Queen’s University, The Economic Journal, “A THEORY OF TOP INCOME TAXATION AND SOCIAL INSURANCE”, https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12126 - SH)

The development of the welfare state in the Western economies between 1930 and 1990 coincided with a puzzling pattern in the taxation of top incomes. Effective tax rates at the top increased sharply during the 1930s and 1940s, but then gradually decreased, even as social transfers continued rising. We propose a new theory of the development of the welfare state to explain these facts. Our main insight is that social insurance and top income taxation are substitutes for averting social conflict. Our detailed arguments build on the policy histories of the US, UK and Sweden. Social transfers grew spectacularly in the Western economies between 1930 and 1990. Meanwhile, tax rates on the top 1% of the income distribution increased sharply in the 1930s and 1940s but then decreased gradually between 1960 and 1990. This pattern of top income taxation is particularly striking in the US and the UK but it is qualitatively similar in other countries.1 Why was there so little change in social transfers until the Great Depression? If the state taxes the wealthy to supply transfers to others, why did top income taxes decline after 1960? We propose a new theory of the development of the welfare state to address these questions. A risk-neutral elite, or governing group, is presumed to have control over policy but it requires the cooperation of a risk-averse non-governing group to be able to produce. The interests of the governing group are aligned with the economic interests of the top of the income distribution.2 We characterise public policy as the outcome of Pareto efficient equilibria of a repeated game where in every period the governing group designs income transfers and the non-governing group makes a participation choice. The threat of conflict – non-participation in production – enables the non-governing group to obtain a part of the surplus from cooperation. Since the non-governing group is exposed to risks that private insurance markets fail to cover, the governing group has an incentive to provide redistribution in the form of state-contingent transfers, that is, social insurance. This allows it to secure social peace with smaller average transfers compared to providing pure redistribution. Our main insight is that insurance and top income taxation are substitutes for averting social conflict. This can explain the pattern of top income taxes and social transfers. Future incomes were perceived as riskier in the aftermath of the Great Depression, making social conflict more attractive. As social insurance coverage was initially inadequate for counteracting risk, an increase in redistribution financed by top income taxes was required to avoid conflict. We argue that constraints in revenue collection, record-keeping and programme administration necessitated, historically, an incremental approach to social insurance coverage. Consequently, the increase in top income taxation was reversed gradually as social insurance programmes matured to provide better coverage and conflict was made increasingly less attractive. Through the lens of our theory, the expansion of the welfare state can be understood as a process of exploitation of efficiency gains made possible by learning by-doing and technical improvements in public administration. This mechanism could not have operated before the taxation innovations resulting from the Second World War, nor after the 1980s, at which time all major social insurance programmes were in place and public administration records were fully computerised in the Western economies. Our view complements other explanations of the development of the welfare state, which are discussed in Section 1. In the 1951 annual report of the National Bureau of Economic Research, Arthur Burns described the unprecedented decline in the top income shares between 1930 and 1950 as ‘a transformation that has been carried out peacefully and gradually, but which may already be counted as one of the great social revolutions of history’ (Burns, 1951, p. 3).3 From our perspective, it is precisely the supply of social insurance by power elites who are not the main beneficiaries of the programmes, and the increased taxation of the top incomes, that underlaid this peaceful transformation in the distribution of national income. It is commonly argued that the increase in top income taxes in the period 1930–50 was a key factor preventing the top income shares from recovering after the Second World War, and also that the tax cuts after the 1960s precipitated the increases in the income shares of the very top of the distribution in several countries after 1980.4 These arguments, however, take as given the evolution of taxation, without addressing its causes. Our view is that the period of declining top tax rates was the concomitant of a more efficient supply of social insurance.

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