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Social Security operates within a capitalist framework and was aimed to subtly eliminate working class struggles.

Jenkins & Brents ’89 [J. Craig Jenkins, Ph.D., State University of New York at Stony Brook; professor, chair of sociology, and faculty associate of the Mershon Center for International Security at The Ohio State University. Barbara G. Brents, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Sociology and Faculty Affiliate in Women's Studies at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. 1989. “Social Protest, Hegemonic Competition, and Social Reform: A Political Struggle Interpretation of the Origins of the American Welfare State.” American Sociological Review, 54(6), p. 891–909. https://doi.org/10.2307/2095714; JFan]

Neo-Marxists and state-centric theorists have recently offered interpretations of the formulation and passage of the Social Security Act of 1935. Quadagno's (1984, 1985) neo-Marxian interpretation sees the Social Security Act as a compromise between monopoly and competitive sector capitalists that "incorporated working class demands into legislation on capitalist terms" (1984, p. 646). The American state was "relatively autonomous" in that political leaders constructed this compromise, reconciling the economic and political interests of these two class fractions "operating at different levels within a hierarchical state structure" (1984, p. 646). Yet, contrary to most neo-Marxian interpretations, she concludes that the working class played "almost no role," pressures coming. instead from the middle-class Townsend movement. In contrast, state-centric theorists have advanced an institutional/ political process interpretation that emphasizes the interests of political leaders and the constraints of past policies. The initiative for Social Security came from a coalition for "bureaucratic autonomy" composed of progressivist political officials, policy intellectuals, middle-class political activists and a "handful" of liberal capitalists who responded to a general "democratic upsurge" and worked against the concerted opposition of "virtually all politically active business leaders and organizations" (Skocpol and Amenta 1985, p. 572; see also Skocpol and Ikenberry 1983; Orloff and Skocpol 1984; Amenta, Clemens, Olsen, Parikh, and Skocpol 1988; Orloff 1988).

These analyses have moved beyond earlier interpretations by framing specific hypotheses in terms of explicit theories of the state. ' However, by misspecifying the autonomy of the state, these analyses have failed to distinguish policy formulation from policy- making, underestimated social protest as a force in placing social welfare proposals on the political agenda, and misanalyzed the sources and significance of intracapitalist conflicts over the passage of the Social Security Act and related "Second New Deal" reforms .2

We draw on Poulantzas (1973, 1980) to argue that the liberal democratic state constitutes a "relatively autonomous" political arena which simultaneously mediates intra- capitalist hegemonic competition and inter- class struggles. This "relative autonomy" frames our three major arguments. First, the liberal state creates the arena or political space within which lower classes (and other politically excluded groups) mobilize and make political demands. We argue that a wave of social protests. (including strikes, demonstrations, movement campaigns, and resulting electoral instability) created a sense of political crisis among elites, thereby placing major reforms on the political agenda. Second, capitalist fractions use this arena to organize political coalitions that compete for political dominance, those that prevail becoming the dominant power bloc. We argue that a rising "corporate liberal" coalition guided the formulation of the Social Security Act, thereby placing policy proposals onto the agenda of political leaders that reflected a new global strategy favoring that coalition's economic and political interests. Yet, and third, this "autonomy" is "relative" in that political actors operate within a capitalist context that defines the major contending interests and sets limits on the range of likely solutions. Thus, the economic crisis of the Great Depression generated a wave of protests and, in response to convergent interests in political stability and economic growth, capitalist coalitions and political- leaders developed alternative programs that responded to these underlying problems within a capitalist framework.

Poulantzas' theory, however, has three major limitations. First, it does not account for the complexities of "class struggles," especially the multigroup bases of social protests and the links between extra- institutional and conventional politics. Draw- ing on theories of social protest (Piven and Cloward 1977; Tilly 1978), we argue that protest is rooted in political exclusion and attempts to renegotiate the terms of political access. In other words, the conflicts are largely over political access rules and the protesters are frequently drawn from diverse groups whose primary interest lies in altering these rules. Moreover, these "struggles" frequently combine unruliness with institution- alized pressure activities. Second, the theory lacks an analysis of political opportunities, implicitly treating them as constant. We argue that new opportunities are primarily created by upper-class splits which facilitate party realignments, thereby creating incentives for elected officials to support bids for political access (Piven and Cloward 1977; McAdam 1982; Jenkins 1985). Third, the theory does not analyze the processes involved in hege- monic competition. We draw on Domhoff (1978) to argue that the dominance of particular capitalist coalitions depends on policy-planning efforts and campaign invest- ments. Hegemonic competition, then, is a process by which rival capitalist blocs use policy planning and electoral investments to guide responses to emerging political crises. Political dominance depends on victory in both arenas. Before turning to an examination of this political struggle theory, we look briefly at how these arguments depart from recent analyses of the formulation of Social Security.

RECENT NEO-MARXIST AND STATE-CENTRIC ANALYSES OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT

Drawing on Althusser' s structuralism and Gramsci's theory of hegemony, Poulantzas (1973, 1980) argued that the modem liberal democratic state cannot be understood as an instrument of a dominant class or class fraction but as an arena of class struggle: "The State is not a monolithic bloc but a strategic battlefield" (1980, p. 152). The "relative autonomy" of the liberal state means that it performs two mediating political functions: (1) "It represents and organizes the dominant class or classes; or more precisely it represents and organizes the long-term politi- cal interests of a power bloc, which is composed of several bourgeois class frac- tions" (1980, p. 127); and (2) "by bringing the power bloc and certain dominated classes into a variable game of provisional compro- mises . . . [which] often involves imposing material compromises on the various fractions of the power bloc," it recreates the conditions for capital accumulation and political stability (1980, p. 140). In short, the liberal democratic state is sufficiently independent from particular capitalist interests that it can serve as an arena for mediating intracapitalist conflicts while simultaneously framing policies that incorporate lower-class demands in ways that reinforce capitalist development.

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