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Blok and Lemmens 15 (Vincent, PhD in Philosophy of Technology and Responsible Innovation from Leiden University, Pieter, post-doctoral fellow at Wageningen University and Research, Communication, Philosophy and Technology, “The Emerging Concept of Responsible Innovation. Three Reasons Why It Is Questionable and Calls for a Radical Transformation of the Concept of Innovation”, Tilburg Law School, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17308-5_2 - SH)

With regard to the output of responsible innovation processes, it is assumed that the incorporation of societal and ethical aspects in the innovation process decreases unintended societal impact of technological developments and will therefore lead to more responsible innovations (cf. Rogers-Hayden and Pidgeon 2007). Although stakeholder involvement may result in more desirable outcomes, the involvement of stakeholders doesn’t necessarily guarantee a more responsible output of the innovation process. For example, many stakeholders were involved during the development of biofuels and this innovation seemed to be promising according to various stakeholders; biofuel is inherently renewable, locally produced, less polluting, etc. An unexpected outcome of the increased demand for biofuels however, was that food prices increased because farmers started to grow more and more crops for biofuel production. Although multiple stakeholders were involved, it turned out that especially people in developing countries were negatively affected by the increased food prices. Unexpected outcomes can be seen as a main characteristic of innovation processes. Recent literature tends to see innovation as a cumulative, stepwise process of collaboration between multiple actors with often unexpected outcomes (Rammert 1997). If innovation is a highly uncertain process, though, which is characterized by interdependency, serendipity etc., it is questionable whether this uncertainty can ever be steered in desired directions through relatively simple means. Well-known puzzles like the Jevons Paradox—innovations that increase energy efficiency for instance tends to increase the consumption of energy as well—show that the outcome of innovations may be contrary to what was intended (cf. Owen 2012). Also, most of the responsible innovation literature starts from the plausible premise that innovations are radically uncertain and that their societal and environmental consequences are virtually unpredictable (for an example, see Ozdemir et al. 2011). The question then is what responsibility could mean if this premise were indeed true. Are responsible innovations those forms of science and technology development whose protagonists are willing and able to take accountability for, or ‘stand up for’, the societal and environmental consequences of their endeavors? If there is practically no way to predict or foresee such consequences, however, all talk about responsibility in this context would seem groundless and misleading. This point can be illustrated with the requirement of ‘accountability’ that has found its way in the recommended Code of Conduct for Responsible N&N (Nano sciences and Nanotechnologies) Research for the European Union: “Researchers and research organizations should remain accountable for the social, environmental and human health impacts that their research may impose on present and future generations” (European Commission 2008).2 This extremely far-reaching commitment exposes Nano researchers, as two analysts rightly point out, to “unbounded hazards of moral luck” (Grinbaum and Groves). In the future, researchers could be held liable for any untoward effects of their research that are as yet impossible to predict but that may manifest themselves only after decades. Their fate could be even worse than that of the Italian seismologists who were sued and convicted for failing to accurately predict an impending earthquake. Or is being held ‘accountable’ deemed to have no consequences for the researchers? Then the stipulation in the Code of Conduct is just an empty play of words.3 We have to admit that the EU Code of Conduct for Responsible N&N Research is not representative for the essential meaning of responsible innovation. Nevertheless, while the radical uncertainty of innovations and the unpredictability of their societal and environmental effects is fully acknowledged, it is suggested that this uncertainty can somehow be overcome by making the whole process more inclusive and more reflexive from the very outset (cf. Flipse 2012). Owen and Goldberg for instance argue: “Embedding iterative risk (and benefit) analysis with technology assessment and public/stakeholder engagement approaches within innovation research proposals was seen as offering a mechanism that considers technical risk issues and associated uncertainties, but that could also provide opportunities for identifying as yet unforeseen effects (economic, societal, and ethical) as these emerge. It may also facilitate upstream engagement with stakeholders and the public as to how these emerging impacts are received” (Owen and Goldberg 2010, p. 1705). Regardless of the inherent unpredictability of the future, ‘foresight’ can still be exercised, it is claimed, when stakeholders are involved to deliberate on various scenarios for possible futures; societal values and concerns can still be taken on-board ‘midstream’ and then ‘modulate’ on-going technological trajectories. René von Schomberg expresses the underlying view as follows in an interview in LEV: “You need a smart innovation process in which you do not place your bets too much on one particular technology, because technology development is unpredictable. Bring all involved societal parties together and let them jointly determine what they expect from the research trajectory. Then you can formulate research agendas, which can be mutually adjusted in order to arrive at the desired end result”. In another publication he wrote that societal actors become “co-responsible for the innovation process by a constructive input in terms of defining societal desirable products” (Schomberg forthcoming). While he acknowledged that “an ethics focused on the intentions and/or consequences of actions of individuals is not appropriate for innovation”, he nevertheless held that there is “collective responsibility both for the right impacts and negative consequences” (von Schomberg 2013). Arguably this still presumes that these impacts and consequences, although perhaps not attributable to the actions of individuals, can somehow be foreseen by the various societal actors that are involved in the innovation process, a presumption that had initially been denied. The third reason to question the possibility of responsible innovation is, that the ‘responsibility’ or ‘accountability’ is principally limited because of the radical uncertainty of innovation processes. This uncertainty even increases in case of wicked problems like sustainable development, because no simple solutions exist; all our proposed solutions will have unintended consequences and remain finite and provisional compared to the complexity and depth of the sustainability problem itself. Because our knowledge of the solution of wicked problems is principally limited, we can call this an epistemic insufficiency (cf. DeMartino 2013). If the output of responsible innovation processes is characterized by a fundamental uncertainty, which means that our knowledge of the impact of our innovations is not only limited but principally insufficient, the presupposed ‘foresight’ of responsible innovation becomes questionable. In other words, our knowledge is principally insufficient to assess the impact of innovation processes and there will always be unintended consequences of our innovations which can be harmful. The analysis of the input, throughput and output of innovation processes raised several questions with regard to the possibility of responsible innovation and pointed at several difficulties which undermine the responsible character of innovation processes. It became clear that the practical applicability of the concept of responsible innovation is highly problematic and that a more thorough inquiry of the concept is required. In the next section, we therefore ask what concept of innovation is presupposed in the responsible innovation literature. 2.3 The Presupposed Concept of Innovation in the Responsible Innovation Literature What concept of innovation is self-evidently presupposed in the responsible innovation literature? In a recent paper, Benoît Godin sketched the history of the innovation concept. Although innovation always existed throughout history, it became only very recently “the emblem of the modern society” (Godin 2009, p. 5; cf. Nowotny 2008). While the concept originally concerned novelties in the broadest sense of the word—including imitation, invention, creative imagination, change—it became only recently restricted to technological innovation and commercialized innovation. Nowadays, it is almost self-evident that innovation does not only concern the exploration of new technologies, but also the commercial exploitation of these new technologies. According to Godin (2009, p. 21), the restriction of innovation to technological innovation is rooted in what he calls, the ‘culture of things’ or material culture: “The origins of this culture go back to the Renaissance: due to commercial exchanges, exploration and travel, natural and artificial objects have been what is valued in arts, science, and real life”. The focus on technological innovations is further enhanced by the introduction of patent laws from the fourteenth century onward, because only these kinds of innovations can be patented (cf. Macleod 1988). With the emergence of economic thought in the seventeenth century, the utilitarian value of innovations became most important (Godin 2009; Schumpeter 1943). As a consequence of this economic paradigm of technological innovation, alternative forms of innovation like systems innovations (for instance agro-ecological innovations) or attitudinal innovations (for instance prevention or life style interventions) receive less attention because it is difficult to develop a business model on the basis of these kinds of innovations. A good example is the case of agricultural science and technology (S&T). Because of the current technological regime of agricultural S&T, technological innovations like genetic engineering are locked in and systems innovations like agro-ecological innovations are locked out (Vanloqueren and Baret 2009; cf. Mortensen et al. 2012). The same economic paradigm of technological innovation is presupposed in case of responsible innovation. The Dutch research council for instance started recently with a new responsible innovation program which is intended for “short-term research projects into the ethical and societal aspects of new technology”. Besides the scientific quality of the research projects on responsible innovation, the “added value, societal relevance and knowledge utilisation” are the most important criteria for funding (our emphasis, NWO 2012; cf. Technology Strategy Board 2012). Also from the EU perspective, responsible innovation is, among others, characterized by “Assessing and effectively prioritising social, ethical and environmental impacts, risks and opportunities, both now and in the future, alongside the technical and commercial” (Matter 2011). The economic paradigm of technological innovation is also reflected in the fact that investments in responsible research and innovation (RRI) is primarily legitimized by the macro-economic arguments, i.e. that RRI will lead to the creation of jobs and economic growth (von Schomberg 2013). In the Lund declaration for instance, it is claimed that “meeting the grand challenges will be a prerequisite for continued economic growth and for improved changes to tackle key issues” (cited in von Schomberg 2013, p. 12). The applicability of the economic paradigm of technological innovations on the concept of responsible innovation may be questioned, because exactly the imperative of economic growth and profit is at odds with the other P’s People and Planet, to say the least. Some philosophers even argue that the growth imperative is above everything else ‘responsible’ for the rapid environmental destruction, resource depletion and impoverishment of populations all over the globe. Huesemann and Huesemann (2011, p. 256) for instance argue, that “our economic system’s inherent dependence on growth for survival (i.e. more of everything: more markets, more consumers, more raw materials, more energy, more cheap labor, etc.) is the root cause of many environmental problems and is in direct conflict with sustainability”. For our discussion of the applicability of the economic paradigm of technological innovations on the concept of responsible innovation, it is sufficient to raise the question whether the fundamental tensions between the growth imperative and the demand for sustainability can ever be overcome, as long as we embrace the economic paradigm in our concept of responsible innovation. It is striking, in this respect, that corporate innovation is underrepresented in current research on the concept of responsible innovation. Another assumption in responsible innovation is that innovations are inherently good, as they produce prosperity and jobs and meet societal challenges at the same time (von Schomberg 2013). Innovation is seen as a panacea for all problems (Godin 2009) and responsible innovation in particular serves the ‘public good’ (Matter 2011). Some researchers even argue for cognitive enhancement in order to increase the innovative abilities of the species (Greely et al. 2008, cited in Godin 2009). With this focus on the inherently good of innovation, the ‘Faustian’ aspect of innovation processes is neglected. According to the godfather of innovation studies, Joseph Schumpeter (1883–1950), innovation is the product of creative destruction. To Schumpeter, “Capitalism […] is by nature a form or method of economic change and not only never is but never can be stationary. […] The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new consumers’ goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates. […] The opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the organizational development from the craft shop and factory to such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate the same process of industrial mutation […] that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. It is what capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got to live in” (Schumpeter 1943, p. 82–83). According to Schumpeter, it is exactly innovation which is responsible for creative destruction. The construction of new and innovative solutions is accompanied by the annihilation or destruction of the old rules and the old order (including the ‘writing off’ of ‘obsolescent’ skills, technologies and capital stocks), i.e. the positive impact of responsible innovation and contribution to the public good, is therefore accompanied by negative impacts elsewhere. This Faustian aspect of innovation processes is largely ignored by the responsible innovation literature. Furthermore, in line with the idea that innovation is a cumulative process with often unexpected outcomes (Sect. 2.2), we cannot claim that the outcome of responsible innovation will automatically contribute to the public good. Well-known puzzles like the Jevons Paradox—innovations that increases energy efficiency for instance tends to increase the consumption of energy as well—show that the outcome of innovations may be contrary to what was intended (cf. Owen 2012). Innovation implies pain, annihilation and destruction, and it is questionable whether this ‘Faustian aspect’ of innovation can ever be overcome by integrating social and ethical aspects in the design process. The effort to integrate social and ethical aspects in the design process shows another assumption of responsible innovation. Mutual responsiveness means that multiple stakeholders participate or are able to participate in the formation of societal and ethical norms. These norms are valid if the participants agree to it as participants of practical discourses (Habermas 1990, 1993). In order to form societal and ethical norms together, stakeholders should be able to listen to others, to be empathetic with regard to the interests of others, to take the perspective or standpoint of the other etc. (Kaptein and van Tulder 2003). Mutual responsiveness therefore presupposes symmetry between moral agents and moral addressees (Mackin 2011). Only because stakeholders can hear the voice of the other and can take the perspective of the other, they can become mutual responsive. Given the existing information asymmetries and investment imbalances, let alone the epistemic insufficiency with regard to future generations for instance (cf. Sect. 2.2), it is highly questionable whether the presupposed symmetry between moral agents and moral addressees is legitimized. The analysis of the concept of innovation which is presupposed in current literature on responsible innovation, shows that innovation is self-evidently seen as (1) technological innovation, (2) which is primarily perceived from an economic perspective, (3) is inherently good and (4) presupposes a symmetry between moral agents and moral addressees. 2.4 Conclusions In Sect. 2.2, we raised several questions with regard to the possibility and applicability of responsible innovation processes. We pointed at several difficulties with regard to responsible innovation, i.e. with attaining a more socially just and environmentally sound trajectory of innovation that will appeal to all the stakeholders involved. Especially with respect to the ‘grand challenges’ or wicked problems, it turned out to be very difficult if not impossible to satisfy the ideal of responsible innovation. But also more generally, it became clear that the wish for (more) responsibility clashed with the realities of existing innovation processes. As we have pointed out with respect to the input, throughput and output of innovation processes, the demand for responsibility runs into serious problems. The main difficulty of responsible innovation revolves around the response-ability of actors in the innovation process, due to ‘epistemic’ factors like the inherent complexity, uncertainty and unpredictability of technological innovation on the one hand, and ‘moral’ and ‘political’ factors like conflicting worldviews, interests and value systems among stakeholders and power imbalances on the other. We concluded that the practical applicability of the concept of responsible innovation is highly questionable. In Sect. 2.3, we analyzed the presupposed concept of innovation in responsible innovation. With regard to the first two characteristics—innovation is technological and primarily seen from an economic perspective—we have to conclude that the prevailing concept of innovation is uncritically taken over in the concept of responsible innovation. With regard to the third characteristic of innovation—innovation is inherently good—we showed that the current concept of responsible innovation is highly naïve. Finally, our discussion of information asymmetries and our epistemic insufficiency to assess the future impact of our innovations (Sect. 2.2) raised fundamental questions with regard to the fourth assumption of responsible innovation—the symmetry of moral agents and moral addressees. 32 V. Blok and P. Lemmens Because the possibility and applicability of responsible innovation is highly questionable and the presupposed concept of innovation is uncritical, narrow and naïve, we have to conclude that the conventional concept of innovation—innovation is technological and seen from an economic perspective—cannot be upgraded to a more responsible concept of innovation; responsible innovation calls for a radical transformation of the concept of innovation itself. Based on the findings in this article, we propose the following research agenda for future research on responsible innovation: • With regard to the input of innovation processes, future research should focus on the question how to deal with power-, vision-, goal-, sector- and motive-deviations among stakeholders involved in responsible innovation processes, especially with regard to social and ethical aspects.4 • With regard to the throughput of innovation processes, future research should focus on the question how stakeholders become mutual responsive to each other, given the remaining investment- and risk imbalances and given the remaining information asymmetries among stakeholders involved in responsible innovation processes. • With regard to the output of innovation processes, future research should focus on the question how to assess the future impact of responsible innovation processes, given the fundamental uncertainty of innovation processes and given our epistemic insufficiency with regard to the future impact of responsible innovation processes. We can also raise more fundamental question with regard to the concept of responsible innovation itself. With regard to the concept of innovation which is presupposed in the majority of the responsible innovation literature, future research should broaden our conception of innovation, including non-technological innovations and non-market environments. Furthermore, future research should consider the concept of response-ability in the context of alternative strategies of innovation, in which the relationships between stakeholders substantially differ from those involved in conventional innovation processes. A particularly promising direction for future research might be the examination of user-based or user-centered innovations, free and open source, and commons-based peer-to-peer (p2p) innovation strategies. These alternative strategies have steadily proliferated over the last two decades in various domains of the economy, may possess characteristics that are less susceptible to the flaws that we have diagnosed in this article, and may therefore provide directions for more responsible innovation processes in the future. With regard to the concept of responsibility which is presupposed in the majority of the responsible innovation literature, future research should consider the question what consequences our epistemic insufficiency will have for our concept of responsibility in general and responsible innovation practices in particular.

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