No climate change solvency—requires impossible international coordination
Falkner & Buzan 22
Robert, Associate Professor of International Relations and Research Director of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment at the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK; Barry, Professor Emeritus at the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, and a Senior Fellow at LSE IDEAS. “Introduction.” Great Powers, Climate Change, and Global Environmental Responsibilities. Pg 3. LJS
Climate change is one of the most pressing global challenges of the twenty-first century. To avert catastrophic global warming, international society needs to take urgent, and internationally coordinated, action. Although virtually all nations are united in their desire to tackle the man-made causes of global warming, they have yet to reverse the long-term trend of rising greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The Covid-19 pandemic provided temporary relief in that it led to a drop in global emissions by up to 7% in 2020 (UNEP, 2020), but the post-pandemic economic recovery seems likely to return the world to a path of rising emissions again. As yet, states’ climate policy intentions and emission pledges have proved to be inadequate. Climate change is a truly global problem, requiring all nations to undertake mitigation and adaptation measures. At the same time, the responsibility for causing the problem is unequally distributed, as is the capacity to respond to the climate threat in an effective manner. Two-thirds of current global emissions originate from just 10 major economies, and by and large it is the same countries that also have the economic and technological clout to develop and finance the required global solutions. Climate change and international power inequality are thus closely entwined. Indeed, if the major emitters were to act decisively and in a coordinated manner, the chances of averting a climate catastrophe would be much improved. By the same token, even if only some of them fail or refuse to act responsibly, the world faces a bleak future. The International Relations (IR) literature on global environmental politics (GEP) has tended to acknowledge, implicitly at least, the important role that a few select major powers play, either as international leaders that set an example for others and shape international environmental agendas, or as veto players that block progress in multilateral environmental negotiations (Kelemen and Vogel, 2010; Liefferink and Wurzel, 2017; Eckersley, 2020). GEP scholarship has also highlighted the inherent inequalities that structure the environmental policy area, both within societies and between them, and especially with regard to unequal levels of economic development and consumption levels (Roberts and Parks, 2007; Ciplet, Roberts, and Khan, 2015). However, questions of power asymmetry in international environmental politics, the nature of states’ environmental power, what counts as a great power in the environmental field, and whether great environmental power comes with special responsibilities have not attracted the kind of systematic attention in GEP that they deserve. This book seeks to fill that gap. By connecting the IR literature on great powers and great power responsibility with GEP scholarship, it develops a new analytical perspective on international power inequality and the role of environmental great powers in GEP, with a special focus on international climate politics. The contributions to this volume develop and apply a conceptual framework for the study of environmental great powers and their special international responsibilities. They examine how individual great powers have responded to the global climate challenge and whether they have accepted a special responsibility for stabilizing the global climate. And they place emerging discourses on great power responsibility in the context of wider debates about international environmental leadership and climate change securitization. Great Powers and the Global Climate Challenge The urgency of the climate change problem is now well understood. Man-made global warming, which is caused by GHG emissions from the burning of fossil fuels (coal, oil, gas) and land use changes (e.g. deforestation), has already led to a 1°C increase of average global temperatures since pre-industrial times. If current net emission trends continue unabated, the world is likely to face a global warming trend of between 3°C and 5°C by the end of the twenty-first century. The ecological consequences of such runaway global warming would be catastrophic. If left unchecked, climate change is expected to result in the melting of glaciers and rising sea levels, more extreme weather patterns, heat waves and wild fires even in arctic lands, the destruction of biologically diverse ecosystems, and changes in the amount, frequency, and intensity of precipitation. Some of these changes are already occurring (disappearance of glaciers, coral bleaching, wildfires) while others will only kick in at a later stage. The challenge for humanity is that the longer global warming is allowed to carry on, the stronger future ecological stresses will be and the sooner we may reach ecological tipping points that lock in large-scale and irreversible environmental damage (Lenton et al., 2019; Dalby, 2020). International society has recognized the threat that global warming poses to human well-being and prosperity. What is unclear, however, is whether the UN’s multilateral climate regime can quickly enough come up with an effective response. The 197 countries that negotiated the 2015 Paris Agreement to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) agreed to keep global warming to well below 2°C. In order to stay within this temperature target, they will need to bring GHG emissions under control, first by reaching a global emissions peak as soon as possible and then by bringing them down to reach a balance between GHG emissions and sinks (so-called net zero) by the second half of this century. All of this is to be achieved through a system of voluntary climate mitigation pledges that are to be reviewed internationally. The key question is whether the Paris Agreement’s framework for ratcheting up national climate ambitions can set the world on the path towards deep decarbonization, and within a timeframe that keeps global warming below 2°C (Falkner, 2016b). The past record of multilateral efforts is far from encouraging. Issue complexity, institutional inertia, and diverging national interests have turned climate change into a ‘wicked’ global problem that seems to exceed the problem-solving capacity of environmental multilateralism (Levin et al., 2012; Keohane and Victor, 2016).