Increased short-run unemployment benefits effect unemployment rates in the long-run.
Hagedorn et al. 13 [Marcus Hagedorn, Department of Economics at the University of Oslo. Faith Karahan, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Iourii Manovskii, Department of Economics at the University of Pennsylvania. Kurt Mitman, Institute for International Economic Studies at Stockholm University. “UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE GREAT RECESSION: THE ROLE OF MACRO EFFECTS,” NBER Working Paper Series, [Working Paper 19499]. National Bureau of Economic Research [October 2013]. https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w19499/w19499.pdf]
Column (1) of Table 1 contains the results of the estimation of the effect of unemployment benefit duration on unemployment using the baseline specification in Equation (14). We find that changes in unemployment benefits have large and statistically significant short-run effect on unemployment: a 1% rise in benefit duration for only one quarter increases unemployment rate by 0.049 log points. Equation (12) helps us extrapolate these effects and estimate the effect of a permanent unanticipated increase in benefit durations. Using the average quarterly separation rate of 10% in JOLTS data, we find that the effect of permanently (n = ∞) increasing benefits from ω1 = 26 to ω2 = 99 weeks is quite sizable: The effect on unemployment is 80%, meaning that such a permanent increase would increase the long-run average unemployment rate from 5% to 9.13%.As we have stresses several times by now, the strength of the effect of unemployment benefit extensions on labor demand depends on the full expected sequence of future benefit durations (see the direct evidence in Section 4.2 below). In particular, a permanent increase in benefit durations has the strongest negative impact on labor demand as firms expect to bargain with workers entitled to high benefits at all future dates. The benefit extensions enacted following the onset of the Great Recession, however, were not designed to be permanent and benefit durations varied over time. Assuming perfect foresight of future benefits, our estimate of 0.049 implies that if standard durations of unemployment benefits (26 weeks) had prevailed following the Great Recession, the unemployment rate in 2010 and 2011 would have been 2.7 and 2 percentage points lower, respectively. Although the duration of benefits was fairly similar in 2010 and 2011, the implied effect on unemployment was substantially larger in 2010. This is because firms creating jobs in 2011 expected benefit duration to decline in the following year (lowering the expected wage bill and making it easier to cover the costs of vacancy creation). In contrast, firms considering creating jobs in 2010 were confronted with an additional year, 2011, of high benefit durations, which discouraged vacancy creation. This example illustrates an important general property of the effects of unemployment benefits on unemployment. To the extent that employers anticipate future changes in benefits, unemployment evolves smoothly over time and fully responds to future changes in benefits before those changes actually occur. Thus, unless expectations are known or controlled for, the relationship between contemporaneous changes in benefits and unemployment is uninformative of the true labor market impact of unemployment benefit policies. When comparing the magnitude of the effect we find to the experience in the data, it is also important to keep in mind that it is based on the difference across pairs of border counties. Thus, the effects of various other shocks or policies that affect these counties symmetrically are differenced out. For example, the 2% reduction to an employee’s share of Social Security payroll taxes implemented in all states in 2011 and 2012 might have had a substantial negative impact on unemployment, counteracting some of the effects of unemployment benefit extensions.