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Bioterrorism limits U.S. military response options and forces nuclear war

Pifer et al. ’10, Steven Pifer, Nonresident Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, “U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges”, Foreign Policy at Brookings, May 2010, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/06_nuclear_deterrence.pdf, @BC

It is such a prospect that led University of Maryland scholar John Steinbruner to note “One can imagine killing more people with an advanced pathogen than with the current nuclear weapons arsenals.” The state developing this BW agent might simultaneously develop a vaccine against the new disease and use that vaccine to inoculate its own people. It might then use the biological pathogen as a weapon, or a threat, against another country. That could be a country it was interested in conquering; it could also threaten use against the United States and broader international community, to deter other countries from coming to the rescue of another state being attacked directly by the aggressor (analogous to how Saddam Hussein would have liked to deter the U.S.-led coalition from coming to Kuwait’s aid in 1990-1991). If the United States faced the prospect of millions of its own citizens, or hundreds of thousands of its own troops, becoming sick as it considered a response to aggression, and its only recourse was conventional retaliation, its range of options could be limited. Indeed, the very troops called on to carry out the retaliation might become vulnerable to the disease, jeopardizing their physical capacity to execute the conventional operation. Perhaps they could be well protected on the battlefield, once suited up, but they could be vulnerable before deployment, along with the rest of the American population. A potential adversary, seeing these possibilities, might find the concept of such an advanced pathogen very appealing. Would there be a clear and definitive policy or moral argument against the use of a nuclear weapon in retaliation for a BW attack that killed hundreds of thousands—or even millions—of Americans? If the origin of the attack could be identified, as it might well be under numerous scenarios like the one sketched above, and if huge numbers of American civilians had been targeted, the case for restraint would be hard to make. At the least, it might be no stronger than the case for absorbing a nuclear weapons strike and choosing not to retaliate. What if the United States thought a biological attack by an aggressor imminent? Or what if it had already suffered one attack and others seemed possible? In such circumstances, there could be potential value in a nuclear retaliatory threat against the belligerent state, warning that any future use of biological attacks against the American people or U.S. allies might produce a nuclear response.

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