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Growing economic inequality drives diversionary nationalism and makes war inevitable.

Solt ’11 Frederick Solt is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Sociology at Southern Illinois University, “Diversionary Nationalism: Economic Inequality and the Formation of National Pride” The University of Chicago Press, August 3rd, 2011. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.1017/s002238161100048x.pdf

How can the rise of nationalist populism in contemporary Western societies in the context of increasing socioeconomic inequality be explained, then? I will suggest here a tentative and succinct answer on the basis of the preceding theo- retical argument. The concept of 'nationalist populism' (or, for short, just 'populism') is used here to refer to the political ideas propagated by such parties as the Front Na- tional in France, the AfD in Germany, the FPÖ in Austria, the UKIP in Britain, the PVV in the Netherlands, the Lega Nord in Italy as well as the branch of the Republican Party embodied by the new president of the United States. Popu- lism in these different manifestations claims to represent the will of 'the peo- ple' or 'the nation' in opposition to a political and cultural 'elite' that sets itself apart from the large majority, serves its own interests to the detriment of the common good, and favours outsider groups of foreigners, immigrants, and ethnic and racial minorities. Populist leaders claim to voice the opinions of the people, defined as united and indivisible; therefore, their opponents can only be enemies of the people. In its stress on national unity and homogeneity, popu- lism is anti-liberal and anti-pluralistic (cf. Mudde 2007; Müller 2016). Two kinds of social scientific explanations for the growing attraction of populism in recent years have been advanced: a cultural explanation, which HSR 42 (2017) 4 | 35 This content downloaded from 205.118.22.70 on Thu, 13 Jul 2023 03:23:33 +00:00 All use subject to https: views populism's popularity as a backlash, a reaction against large cultural transformations in Western societies during the past few decades in the direc- tion of secularization, individualism, permissiveness, cosmopolitanism, and gender equality; and an economic or materialistic explanation, which views the movement primarily as a response to increasing relative deprivation and eco- nomic insecurity (Inglehart and Norris 2016). While both explanations find a degree of support in empirical research, they are, at best, only partial, even if combined. The cultural thesis cannot explain why populist movements of the kind and the size that we see today in Western societies, did not arise already in the 1960s and subsequent decades, when the cultural transformations that populism is supposed to be a reaction against were particularly strong. Moreover, not all populist parties distinguish themselves by an outspoken and comprehen- sive cultural conservatism. While the Christian Right, with its stress on family values and strict sexual morality, is a feeding ground and supporter of right- wing populism in the United States, this is not, or much less, the case in West- ern Europe. Thus, the Dutch populist leader Geert Wilders (PVV) stresses the national values of gender equality and sexual freedom against Islamic intoler- ance, traditionalism, and oppression of women (cf. Brubaker 2017). The economic explanation falls short as it does not make clear why material deprivation, economic insecurity, and increasing inequality would give rise to nationalist populism, and why these tendencies did not lead to more support for, and radicalisation of, established socialist or social-democratic parties (but rather to the contrary), to a renewed intensification of class conflicts, and to mass protests against the growing power and wealth of the corporate rich. True, in recent years there have been, in various countries, waves of radical, anti- capitalist opposition to growing inequality (such as the Occupy movement that started in New York in 2011), but these movements were mainly articulated and supported by intellectuals and high-educated young people with uncertain career prospects. Among the supporters of anti-immigration populist parties and politicians, on the other hand, people with lower educational qualifications and in economically vulnerable positions (manual workers, low-paid service workers, small entrepreneurs) are overrepresented (Inglehart and Norris 2016). In the broader explanation that I propose here, the recent rise of nationalist populism in Western societies is viewed as a manifestation of habitus changes that are related to transformations in the class structure: processes in which the growth of class inequalities combines with the blurring of class boundaries and the weakening of class identities. With the shrinking of the industrial working class since the 1970s, the decline of labour unions (in membership and bargain- ing power), the shift toward a postindustrial service economy and the increas- ing flexibilisation of work relations, 'class' has largely lost its significance as a basis of group identification and political outlook. Instead, and connected with these economic changes, an ethos of meritocratic individualism, which legiti- mates economic inequality as the result of fair competition on the basis of HSR 42 (2017) 4 | 36 This content downloaded from 205.118.22.70 on Thu, 13 Jul 2023 03:23:33 +00:00 All use subject to https: individual achievements and merits, has become more dominant. In this ideol- ogy, high incomes and large private fortunes reflect outstanding achievements by successful individuals rather than unjust social arrangements. With the power shift in favour of the owners and managers of transnational firms, these members of the economic elite enlarged not only their economic capital, but also their symbolic capital; popular media gave them increasing publicity as models of success to be followed; and the inclination to upwards identification with this economic elite among the less well-to-do grew stronger. Changes in power-interdependence relations on national and international levels also had an impact on the ideological orientations of politicians and political parties. Neo-liberalism, as it came to be called, with its core idea that government regulation of the economy should be kept to a minimum and that free markets serve the general interest, became the dominant creed. This ex- tended to parties that traditionally claimed to serve the interests of the under- privileged, such as Britain's Labour Party, the Social Democratic parties on the European continent and the Democratic Party in the USA, which accepted and instigated policies of privatization, deregulation, lower tax rates on profits and high incomes, and cuts in social expenditures (cf. Bourdieu 1999, 2001). What- ever one may think of this reorientation, its effect was that these parties could hardly function anymore as objects of identification for members of lower and middle strata, or canalize and articulate their grievances. Progressive parties came to align with 'identity movements' of women, gays, and ethnic and racial minorities, which had a strong base at universities and attracted high-educated people in particular. This only contributed to the growing distance between these parties and non-minority members of lower strata. Terms like leftist, progressive and (in the American discourse) liberal came to be associated in- creasingly with high-educated, intellectual, and elitist. At the same time, non-minority members of middle and lower classes in Western societies - comprising manual workers, small entrepreneurs, and service workers with low or intermediate educational qualifications - experi- enced material deprivations and status degradation, which fuelled grievances and resentment. They underwent, we may say, a fourfold relative loss. First, as citizens of rich nation-states they lost part of their privileged position with respect to the inhabitants of non-Western, poorer countries. Second, within their own societies their economic position worsened in comparison to wealthy and high-income groups. Third, with the strong expansion of formal education and the overall upgrading of educational requirements they lost ground - in terms of numbers, economic position, and social status - in relation to the growing stratum of high-educated professionals. And fourth, their position weakened in relation to people who are not counted as belonging to the ethnic- national majority, the overlapping (but not identical) categories of recent im- migrants and their offspring, and ethnic and racial minorities. Whereas the first and the fourth developments are connected with tendencies of decreasing ine- HSR 42 (2017) 4 | 37 This content downloaded from 205.118.22.70 on Thu, 13 Jul 2023 03:23:33 +00:00 All use subject to https: quality on a global scale, the second and the third ones reflect shifts of increas- ing inequality within national societies. The fourth development in particular is the feeding ground and primary mo- tive of nationalist populism. Mass immigration from poorer to richer countries as part of wider processes of globalization contributed to the dissolution of class identities, the blurring of class lines and the growth of class inequalities within the richer countries. Whereas members of upper and upper-middle strata can easily distinguish themselves from the large majority of these immigrants, this is more difficult for the less privileged, whose class position is more simi- lar to that of most immigrants. These minority groups became an easy target for grievances and antagonist sentiments, as they were defined as the others who threaten 'our' jobs and incomes, material security, physical safety, and ways of living. Antagonism is reinforced by resistance to 'integration' among groups of immigrants, who often remain strongly attached to their own ethnic group and country of origin, and sometimes embrace a militant version of Islam that de- fines itself as fundamentally anti-Western. This is a form of counter- stigmatisation that only contributes to negative stigmatisation on the part of the native population. This downward negative targeting of outsider groups is combined with the upward negative targeting of the (political and cultural) 'elite,' who are at- tacked for their supposed readiness to allow the outsiders to come in, to protect them and give them special advantages. Populist leaders try to win votes by promising to do away with this elite and 'give the country back to the people.' Among their followers, distrust toward politics and politicians often goes hand in hand with high trust in the new leader, anti-elitism with admiration for the strong man. The recent rise of nationalist populism reflects not only a change, but also continuity in habitus formation; or, to put it differently, habitus change builds on previous habitus formation that is connected with long-term social devel- opments. The ethnic or nativist nationalism that is at the core of present-day populism is a continuation of national we-feelings that spread in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth century in tandem with the intensification of inter- dependencies on the national level (cf. Gellner 1983; Elias 2013 [1989], 156- 68; Wilterdink 1993). Immigration and growing ethnic diversity have kindled these feelings and given them a more nativist character, in which sharp symbol- ic boundaries are drawn between the national we-group, defined in cultural, religious, ethnic and sometimes racial terms, and the non-native outsiders. This nationalism is now turned against 'the elite,' which is accused of abandoning the national values and neglecting the common national interests. Nationalist feelings are also strengthened by a perceived loss of national power and autonomy in relation to other nation-states. In Europe, the main culprit is the European Union, regarded by populist parties as an elitist project directed against the national interests. In the United States, the fear of losing HSR 42 (2017) 4 ļ 38 This content downloaded from 205.118.22.70 on Thu, 13 Jul 2023 03:23:33 +00:00 All use subject to https: global dominance has provoked similar reactions. In both Europe and the United States, populism aims at the restoration of national power, glory, and autonomy by retreating from organized international cooperation - which may have the paradoxical effect that the nation's power and international status actually weaken. There are, of course, important variations in the nature of populism and its social origins between countries and regions. The USA differs from Western European countries not only in its (still) hegemonic position in the world and the relatively strong impact of strict Christian religiosity within the country, but also in the long history of immigration, the strong cultural tradition of merito- cratic individualism ('the American dream'), and the legacy of racism and ethnic-racial dividedness - interconnected features that in turn may explain why the increase of socioeconomic inequality has been stronger there than in Western Europe (Wilterdink 2016), and why there is more upward identifica- tion with the wealthy entrepreneurial and managerial class and a more wide- spread popular aversion to government regulation and welfare state provisions. In several of these respects, however, Western European societies have become more similar to the USA in the past few decades. In spite of all the country-specific differences, nationalist populism in its various manifestations has common features and backgrounds. With the help of the theories of Elias and Bourdieu, we can understand its rise as manifestations of habitus changes that are rooted in transformations in power-interdependence relations and class structures on national and international levels. Present-day populism in Western societies, we may say, is a flawed revolt against rising socio-economic inequality and functional de-democratisation. Flawed, because it rests on illusions of national homogeneity and autonomy, because it is not primarily directed against the main driving forces and central actors of rising inequality, and because, if successful, it will not reverse tendencies of de- democratisation but rather reinforce them - most directly by excluding minori- ties. However, the current popularity of nationalist populism points to serious problems, for which no easy solutions are available.

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