Status quo preperation makes attacks likely.
Lyon ’21, Regan F Lyon, Department of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, “Military Medicine,” Oxford Academic, 01, July, 2021, https://academic.oup.com/milmed/article/186/7-8/193/6135020#267060456, @BC
Even though biological warfare is considered a “weapon of mass destruction” and is prohibited by a treaty drafted by the 1972 United Nations Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), not all adversaries adhere to these standards. Terrorist groups and covert operations have utilized biological weapons for small operations because the actors, by nature, are either non-eligible to ratify the treaty or would not do so if they could. Although there have been no intentional large-scale attacks, especially by adversarial nation states, this is not guaranteed to be the case in the future. The BWC does not prohibit ratified nations from having pathogens or toxins for peaceful purposes, such as the development of vaccines. After the natural outbreak of smallpox and its subsequent eradication accomplished by the World Health Organization in 1980, less virulent poxviruses have continued to be used in a variety of laboratories for research and development of vaccines for a variety of diseases. The original, more deadly strain of smallpox has been retained at two facilities in Russia and Atlanta. Because smallpox’s virology makes it an ideal biological weapon, the samples in Atlanta and Russia offer defense through researching countermeasures should an attack occur and simultaneously provide a repository from which a biological weapon can be acquired. “Deterrence” and “defense” are two concepts which are typically described in terms of nuclear warfare, but they can also be applied to national security from a biological attack. Deterrence is the ability to prevent an adversary from taking some action during peacetime. For biological warfare deterrence, vaccines and preventative medicine measures prevent susceptibility to a microbe. For a largely vaccinated and/or health-conscious population, the costs of production, storage, and dissemination of a bioweapon greatly outweighs the rare chance of the target contracting the disease. New Zealand’s robust public health measures, citizen compliance, and continued efforts to sustain a caseload under 20 since April is a strong deterrent for biological attack. Defense mechanisms decrease the effectiveness of the attack, putting a high cost-to-benefit burden on the adversary. A defense measure for bioterrorism would be an adequate medical treatment response to casualties of the bioweapon, decreasing mortality and the overall effectiveness of the weapon.