Fiscal stimulus is needed to fight recession.
Stone 20 [Chad Stone, chief economist at Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, “Fiscal Stimulus Needed to Fight Recessions Lessons From the Great Recession” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, April 16, 2020, Fiscal Stimulus Needed to Fight Recessions (cbpp.org)]
The economy was in the longest expansion on record before the COVID-19 pandemic, but a sharp decline in economic activity is now inevitable, with unemployment insurance claims skyrocketing and many forecasters saying that the economy has already entered a recession. The last recession — the Great Recession — was a stark reminder of the need to lessen the human hardship and economic dislocation associated with a recession. It left key lessons for policymakers, who should now use a wide array of available policy tools to keep this and future downturns as short and shallow as possible.
Economists’ thinking about anti-recessionary policies has evolved in the last decade, informed in part by the limits of conventional monetary policy that fighting the Great Recession revealed. This experience generated renewed attention among policy economists to the importance of fiscal stimulus (temporary increases in government spending and reductions in government revenues) in supporting overall spending and employment when the economy weakens and preventing serious and long-lasting damage when recessions do occur.
In March, lawmakers enacted three increasingly sizeable pieces of legislation to address the harm that the pandemic and efforts to contain it are causing. 1 One of the most important lessons from the Great Recession is that they should be prepared to do more. While the Great Recession measures were substantial and prevented an even more severe recession, they ended prematurely and were insufficient to promote a robust recovery. The protracted period of high unemployment and underemployment after the economy stopped contracting and began to grow again in June 2009 continued to generate human hardship and hurt long-term growth. Because lawmakers did not include provisions in the recently enacted coronavirus legislation to “trigger” additional stimulus automatically, based on further deterioration in economic conditions, they must be prepared to enact additional measures as conditions require and to ensure they remain in place until the recovery is clearly underway.
The following account describes the importance of keeping recessions as short and shallow as possible and how both the economy and economists’ views have changed since the Great Recession. 1 The Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act, the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, and the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act. 1275 First Street NE, Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20002 Tel: 202-408-1080 Fax: 202-408-1056 center@cbpp.org www.cbpp.org 2 It then provides a set of principles and policies for fiscal stimulus informed by lessons learned in the Great Recession and its aftermath. (This analysis provides background and general policy principles; CBPP has also released a number of analyses directly addressing the needs of families hit hard by COVID-19 and the resulting economic fallout. 2 )
In brief:
• Recessions have profound human and economic costs. Prolonged unemployment harms not only workers’ job prospects and lifetime earnings but also the health and well-being of them and their families. Workers without a college degree and workers of color are the most vulnerable to these adverse effects. Moreover, long unemployment spells and diminished demand for goods and services in a recession erode job skills among unemployed workers and reduce business investment, which can depress the economy’s productive capacity long past the end of the recession.
• Interest rates are considerably lower now than they were in the two decades leading up to the Great Recession. The Federal Reserve has already exhausted the room it had for its standard approach of cutting short-term interest rates to offset an economic downturn and stimulate a recovery in response to COVID-19. The Fed is proceeding with unconventional measures to support economic activity similar to those used in the Great Recession and its aftermath, as well as significant emergency measures to stabilize financial markets in the pandemic. Yet, fiscal measures are still required.
• Fiscal policy has a greater role to play in fighting recessions and stimulating recoveries than academic economists’ policy advice reflected prior to the Great Recession, especially in light of the limits to conventional monetary policy. Strengthening the fiscal policy response to a weakening economy requires more robust “automatic stabilizers” — the features of tax laws and spending programs like unemployment insurance and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly the Food Stamp Program) that automatically reduce income losses and support consumer spending in a downturn — together with a willingness of policymakers to enact additional temporary discretionary measures when the automatic stabilizers alone are insufficient, as is the case now with the pandemic.
• Fiscal stimulus is most effective if: 1) it is implemented as early as possible in a recession; 2) it is directed to individuals and entities who will spend any additional resources they receive quickly; 3) it errs on the side of being larger than ultimately necessary rather than smaller; and 4) its size and duration respond to changing circumstances.
• Concerns that the United States does not have the “fiscal space” — due to high levels of deficits and debt — to enact robust fiscal stimulus to minimize the human and economic costs of a recession are misguided. The United States has a long-term fiscal challenge, not an immediate debt crisis. Deficit and debt concerns should go on the back burner in a recession.