No impact to slow growth.
Fettweis 17 – Dr. Christopher J. Fettweis, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University, PhD in Government and Politics from the University of Maryland, “Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace”, Security Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3, p. 434-442 [language modified]
Others are more skeptical of institutions’ potential to shape behavior, and believe instead that stability is dependent upon the active application of the hegemon’s military power.51 The second version of the hegemonic-stability explanation is based upon a different view of human nature than is the liberal, one less sanguine about the potential for voluntary cooperation. Actors respond to concrete incentives, according to this outlook, and will ignore rules or law if transgressions are not punished. The would-be hegemon must enforce stability, therefore, not merely establish it. Policing metaphors are common in this literature, with the United States playing the role of sheriff or globocop charged with keeping the peace.52 [FOOTNOTE] 52 Richard N. Haass, The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States after the Cold War (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1997); Colin S. Gray, The Sheriff: America's Defense of the New World Order (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2004). View all notes [END FOOTNOTE] Take away the police, or damage their credibility, and instability would soon return. “The present world order,” according to Robert Kagan, “is as fragile as it is unique,” and would collapse without sustained US efforts.53 “In many instances,” add Lawrence Kaplan and William Kristol, “all that stands between civility and genocide, order and mayhem, is American power.”54 Though this argument is commonly associated with neoconservatism55—and will be referred to as the neoconservative explanation from here on in—it is also accepted by a number of scholars and observers generally considered outside of that ideological approach.56 The two versions are united on this point: it is not unipolarity in general that accounts for the New Peace, but American unipolarity in particular. US hegemony is essentially benevolent, according to both liberals and neoconservatives. The United States has constructed an order that takes the interests of other states into account, which decreases revisionist impulses. At the very least, it is nonthreatening, and does not generate the kind of balancing behavior that might be expected to bring it to an end.57 In the liberal version, the order constructed by the United States is beneficial to all its members, who have a stake in its maintenance. Adherents of the more muscular version, whether neoconservative or not, assume that the default position of smaller states in a unipolar system is to bandwagon with the center.58 No one seems to suggest that there is an irenic structural logic of unipolarity independent of US behavior. The question is therefore not so much about the connection between unipolarity and the New Peace as much as it is whether US behavior, in one form or another, has brought it about. Hegemonic stability is in some ways more theoretically elegant than the other possible explanations for the New Peace. For one thing, it does not suffer from questions regarding its causal direction. While it may be reasonable to suggest that peace produced the expansion of democracy and/or economic development rather than the other way around, peace did not produce unipolarity. In fact, if the United States is indeed supplying the global public good of security, it might be able to take credit for a number of these positive trends. Not just peace but democracy, economic stability, and development all might be beneficial side effects of unipolarity. 59 “A world without U.S. primacy,” argued Samuel P. Huntington, “would be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth.”60 There is a great deal at stake here, for both scholarship and practice. If hegemony is responsible for the New Peace, then its peaceful trends are unlikely to last much beyond the unipolar moment. The other proposed explanations described above are essentially irreversible: nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented, and no defense against their use is ever going to be completely foolproof; the pace of globalization and economic interdependence shows no sign of slowing; democracy seems to be firmly embedded in the cultural fabric of many of the places it currently exists, and may well be in the process of spreading to the few places where it does not. The UN, while oft criticized, shows no signs of disappearing. And finally, history contains precious few examples of the return of institutions deemed by society to be outmoded, barbaric, and/or futile.61 In other words, liberal normative evolution is typically unidirectional. Few would argue, for instance, that either slavery or dueling is likely to reappear in this century; illiberal normative recidivism is exceptionally rare.62 If the neoconservatives are correct and US hard power is primarily responsible for the New Peace, however, then it cannot be expected to last long after US hegemonic decline, or adjustment in its grand strategy toward retrenchment. If liberal internationalists are right and the New Peace is largely a product of the world order that the United States has forged, then it may have a bit more staying power beyond unipolarity, but not necessarily much. Determining the relationship between hegemony and the New Peace has importance that goes beyond the academy. Whether or not decline is on the immediate horizon, unipolarity is unlikely to last forever. If the New Peace is essentially an American creation, that post-unipolar future is likely to be quite a bit more violent than the present. Evidence for and against Pax Americana Since the world had never experienced system-wide unipolarity prior to the end of the Cold War, judgments about its relative stability and likely duration are necessarily speculative.63 Extrapolations can be made from regional unipolar systems, like the Roman Mediterranean, but definitive system-wide statements cannot be made from one case. Still, if US power were primarily responsible for the New Peace, one would expect that it would leave some clues about its effects. This section reviews three kinds of evidence regarding Pax Americana in order to determine whether an empirical relationship can be said to exist between various kinds of US activity and global stability. Conflict and Hegemony by Region Even the most ardent supporters of the hegemonic-stability explanation do not contend that US influence extends equally to all corners of the globe. The United States has concentrated its policing in what George Kennan used to call “strong points,” or the most important parts of the world: Western Europe, the Pacific Rim, and Persian Gulf.64 By doing so, Washington may well have contributed more to great power peace than the overall global decline in warfare. If the former phenomenon contributed to the latter, by essentially providing a behavioral model for weaker states to emulate, then perhaps this lends some support to the hegemonic- stability case.65 During the Cold War, the United States played referee to a few intra-West squabbles, especially between Greece and Turkey, and provided Hobbesian reassurance to Germany’s nervous neighbors. Other, equally plausible explanations exist for stability in the first world, including the presence of a common enemy, democracy, economic interdependence, general war aversion, etc. The looming presence of the leviathan is certainly among these plausible explanations, but only inside the US sphere of influence. Bipolarity was bad for the nonaligned world, where Soviet and Western intervention routinely exacerbated local conflicts. Unipolarity has generally been much better, but whether or not this was due to US action is again unclear. Overall US interest in the affairs of the Global South has dropped markedly since the end of the Cold War, as has the level of violence in almost all regions. There is less US intervention in the political and military affairs of Latin America compared to any time in the twentieth century, for instance, and also less conflict. Warfare in Africa is at an all-time low, as is relative US interest outside of counterterrorism and security assistance.66 Regional peace and stability exist where there is US active intervention, as well as where there is not. No direct relationship seems to exist across regions. If intervention can be considered a function of direct and indirect activity, of both political and military action, a regional picture might look like what is outlined in Table 1. These assessments of conflict are by necessity relative, because there has not been a “high” level of conflict in any region outside the Middle East during the period of the New Peace. Putting aside for the moment that important caveat, some points become clear. The great powers of the world are clustered in the upper right quadrant, where US intervention has been high, but conflict levels low. US intervention is imperfectly correlated with stability, however. Indeed, it is conceivable that the relatively high level of US interest and activity has made the security situation in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East worse. In recent years, substantial hard power investments (Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq), moderate intervention (Libya), and reliance on diplomacy (Syria) have been equally ineffective in stabilizing states torn by conflict. While it is possible that the region is essentially unpacifiable and no amount of police work would bring peace to its people, it remains hard to make the case that the US presence has improved matters. In this “strong point,” at least, US hegemony has failed to bring peace. In much of the rest of the world, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Washington’s intervention choices have at best been erratic; Libya and Kosovo brought about action, but much more blood flowed uninterrupted in Rwanda, Darfur, Congo, Sri Lanka, and Syria. The US record of peacemaking is not exactly a long uninterrupted string of successes. During the turn-of-the-century conventional war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a highlevel US delegation containing former and future National Security Advisors (Anthony Lake and Susan Rice) made a half-dozen trips to the region, but was unable to prevent either the outbreak or recurrence of the conflict. Lake and his team shuttled back and forth between the capitals with some frequency, and President Clinton made repeated phone calls to the leaders of the respective countries, offering to hold peace talks in the United States, all to no avail.67 The war ended in late 2000 when Ethiopia essentially won, and it controls the disputed territory to this day. The Horn of Africa is hardly the only region where states are free to fight one another today without fear of serious US involvement. Since they are choosing not to do so with increasing frequency, something else is probably affecting their calculations. Stability exists even in those places where the potential for intervention by the sheriff is minimal. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. It seems hard to make the case that the relative peace that has descended on so many regions is primarily due to the kind of heavy hand of the neoconservative leviathan, or its lighter, more liberal cousin. Something else appears to be at work. Conflict and US Military Spending How does one measure polarity? Power is traditionally considered to be some combination of military and economic strength, but despite scores of efforts, no widely accepted formula exists. Perhaps overall military spending might be thought of as a proxy for hard power capabilities; perhaps too the amount of money the United States devotes to hard power is a reflection of the strength of the unipole. When compared to conflict levels, however, there is no obvious correlation, and certainly not the kind of negative relationship between US spending and conflict that many hegemonic stability theorists would expect to see. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on defense by about 25 percent, spending $100 billion less in real terms in 1998 that it did in 1990.68 To those believers in the neoconservative version of hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace,” argued Kristol and Kagan at the time.69 The world grew dramatically more peaceful while the United States cut its forces, however, and stayed just as peaceful while spending rebounded after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the military budget was cut under President Clinton, in other words, and kept declining (though more slowly, since levels were already low) as the Bush administration ramped it back up. Overall US military spending has varied during the period of the New Peace from a low in constant dollars of less than $400 billion to a high of more than $700 billion, but war does not seem to have noticed. The same nonrelationship exists between other potential proxy measurements for hegemony and conflict: there does not seem to be much connection between warfare and fluctuations in US GDP, alliance commitments, and forward military presence. There was very little fighting in Europe when there were 300,000 US troops stationed there, for example, and that has not changed as the number of Americans dwindled by 90 percent. Overall, there does not seem to be much correlation between US actions and systemic stability. Nothing the United States actually does seems to matter to the New Peace. It is possible that absolute military spending might not be as important to explain the phenomenon as relative. Although Washington cut back on spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. The United States has accounted for between 35 and 41 percent of global military spending every year since the collapse of the Soviet Union.70 The perception of relative US power might be the decisive factor in decisions made in other capitals. One cannot rule out the possibility that it is the perception of US power—and its willingness to use it—that keeps the peace. In other words, perhaps it is the grand strategy of the United States, rather than its absolute capability, that is decisive in maintaining stability. It is that to which we now turn. Conflict and US Grand Strategy The perception of US power, and the strength of its hegemony, is to some degree a function of grand strategy. If indeed US strategic choices are responsible for the New Peace, then variation in those choices ought to have consequences for the level of international conflict. A restrained United States is much less likely to play the role of sheriff than one following a more activist approach. Were the unipole to follow such a path, hegemonic-stability theorists warn, disaster would follow. Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski spoke for many when he warned that “outright chaos” could be expected to follow a loss of hegemony, including a string of quite specific issues, including new or renewed attempts to build regional empires (by China, Turkey, Russia, and Brazil) and the collapse of the US relationship with Mexico, as emboldened nationalists south of the border reassert 150-year-old territorial claims. Overall, without US dominance, today’s relatively peaceful world would turn “violent and bloodthirsty.”71 Niall Ferguson foresees a post-hegemonic “Dark Age” in which “plunderers and pirates” target the big coastal cities like New York and Rotterdam, terrorists attack cruise liners and aircraft carriers alike, and the “wretchedly poor citizens” of Latin America are unable to resist the Protestantism brought to them by US evangelicals. Following the multiple (regional, fortunately) nuclear wars and plagues, the few remaining airlines would be forced to suspend service to all but the very richest cities.72 These are somewhat extreme versions of a central assumption of all hegemonic-stability theorists: a restrained United States would be accompanied by utter disaster. The “present danger” of which Kristol, Kagan, and their fellow travelers warn is that the United States “will shrink its responsibilities and—in a fit of absentmindedness, or parsimony, or indifference— allow the international order that it created and sustains to collapse.”73 Liberals fear restraint as well, and also warn that a militarized version of primacy would be counterproductive in the long run. Although they believe that the rule-based order established by United States is more durable than the relatively fragile order discussed by the neoconservatives, liberals argue that Washington can undermine its creation over time through thoughtless unilateral actions that violate those rules. Many predicted that the invasion of Iraq and its general contempt for international institutions and law would call the legitimacy of the order into question. G. John Ikenberry worried that Bush’s “geostrategic wrecking ball” would lead to a more hostile, divided, and dangerous world.74 Thus while all hegemonicstability theorists expect a rise of chaos during a restrained presidency, liberals also have grave concerns regarding primacy. Overall, if either version is correct and global stability is provided by US hegemony, then maintaining that stability through a grand strategy based on either primacy (to neoconservatives) or “deep engagement” (to liberals) is clearly a wise choice.75 If, however, US actions are only tangentially related to the outbreak of the New Peace, or if any of the other proposed explanations are decisive, then the United States can retrench without fear of negative consequences. The grand strategy of the United States is therefore crucial to beliefs in hegemonic stability. Although few observers would agree on the details, most would probably acknowledge that post-Cold War grand strategies of American presidents have differed in some important ways. The four administrations are reasonable representations of the four ideal types outlined by Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross in 1996.76 Under George H. W. Bush, the United States followed the path of “selective engagement,” which is sometimes referred to as “balance-of-power realism”; Bill Clinton’s grand strategy looks a great deal like what Posen and Ross call “cooperative security,” and others call “liberal internationalism”; George W. Bush, especially in his first term, forged a strategy that was as close to “primacy” as any president is likely to get; and Barack Obama, despite some early flirtation with liberalism, has followed a restrained realist path, which Posen and Ross label “neo-isolationism” but its proponents refer to as “strategic restraint.”77 In no case did the various anticipated disorders materialize. As Table 2 demonstrates, armed conflict levels fell steadily, irrespective of the grand strategic path Washington chose. Neither the primacy of George W. Bush nor the restraint of Barack Obama had much effect on the level of global violence. Despite continued warnings (and the high-profile mess in Syria), the world has not experienced an increase in violence while the United States chose uninvolvement. If the grand strategy of the United States is responsible for the New Peace, it is leaving no trace in the evidence. Perhaps we should not expect a correlation to show up in this kind of analysis. While US behavior might have varied in the margins during this period, nether its relative advantage over its nearest rivals nor its commitments waivered in any important way. However, it is surely worth noting that if trends opposite to those discussed in the previous two sections had unfolded, if other states had reacted differently to fluctuations in either US military spending or grand strategy, then surely hegemonic stability theorists would argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. Many liberals were on the lookout for chaos while George W. Bush was in the White House, just as neoconservatives have been quick to identify apparent worldwide catastrophe under President Obama.78 If increases in violence would have been evidence for the wisdom of hegemonic strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the relationship between US power and international stability suggests that the two are unrelated. The rest of the world appears quite capable and willing to operate effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise have precious little empirical support upon which to build their case. Hegemonic stability is a belief, in other words, rather than an established fact, and as such deserves a different kind of examination.