Hegemony is unsustainable – fiscal and military pressure undermine stability
Suri and Valentino 16 (Jeremi, Mack Brown Distinguished Chair for Leadership in Global Affairs at The University of Texas at Austin, Benjamin, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, 2016, “Sustainable Security: Rethinking American National Security Strategy”, pg. 5-9, http://tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assets/Sustainable%20Security%20-%20All%20Chapters.pdf)//EAW
Strategic crises are common and they rarely result in enduring shifts of power. The systemic elements of the international system—geography, the allocation of wealth, the mobilization of military capabilities, perceptions of political legitimacy, and routines of behavior—are generally more resilient than the pressures of a particular moment, even a major war. For this reason, American international predominance has continued with remarkable consistency across the last six decades, despite repeated policy miscalculations and misallocations of resources. American strategic leadership has been mediocre, at best, but American strategic predominance has remained largely invulnerable. Many observers expect this trend to continue with the new energy resources emerging from North America, expansion of global markets for commerce, increased demands for political participation across the globe, and rising political-economic turmoil around East Asia and Europe—the only two regions capable of producing a strategic peer to the United States in the foreseeable future. According to this analysis, American predominance will continue even if America fails to adapt its national security strategy to a changing world. This is a comforting and humbling prediction, echoing German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s contemptuous nineteenth century comment that “God has a special providence for fools, drunks, and the United States of America.” Perhaps America’s luck is finally running out. There is reason to believe that the mediocrity of American strategic leadership is now imperiling the country’s inherited strategic advantages. The crises facing the United States today are not new, but they appear to be reaching a historical tipping point because of the accumulated costs of past decisions, the density of current challenges, and, above all, the stagnation of American policy-making. Simply stated, the United States is operating in an incredibly difficult international environment with extensive commitments but limited reserves, and even more limited readiness at home to adjust to these circumstances. These pressures are not transitory, but the consequence of long-term trends that are unlikely to reverse themselves in the near future. The accumulated and current pressures on the United States do not make a strategic tip inevitable, but they make a serious consideration of new policy options and assumptions imperative. That is the motivation for this book. The United States remains a wealthy and dynamic society that can spend more on its security than any of its peers. The United States also continues to support a more powerful military than most of its competitors combined. American military and communications technologies are, in many cases, at least one and often two generations ahead of others. The United States consistently deploys more advanced weapons in larger numbers and with the better-trained operators than our adversaries. That will not change in coming years. American military expenditures are high in absolute terms, but remain at a historically sustainable level of about five percent of gross national product. The trouble is not that the United States spends too little on the military, but that it may have too many commitments both at home and abroad. There are a dizzying number of latent demands on American force across the globe; and while political realities make it unlikely that American military spending will rise dramatically in the foreseeable future, no conceivably sustainable military budget could ensure that all American commitments are simultaneously protected. American ships patrol all the major waterways of the world, American bases constitute what one scholar calls a global “archipelago” of facilities, and American aircraft fly daily missions (manned and unmanned) above virtually all terrain. Basic American military operations are ubiquitous, they are labor intensive, and they are expensive. Within a political climate that demands an “all-volunteer” force, there is little available capacity in the incredibly large American military for multiplying regional conflicts that demand additional personnel and capacities. For all its extraordinary size and skill, the American military can easily become overstretched. It might have reached that point already. In conflicts like those in Iraq and Afghanistan—and now a new war against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, as well as other terrorist groups—US armed forces quickly find themselves spread too thin to accomplish strategic aims. The civilians who direct American policy—including the president, the secretaries of state and defense, and the national security advisor—find themselves in perpetual crisis mode, reacting to new demands rather than thinking systematically about strategic priorities. Another inherited burden on resources is demographic. As Cindy Williams argues, although the United States does not confront population decline (as in Europe and East Asia), the country faces ballooning health and retirement obligations that are crowding out other investments. After a half-century when the United States has fielded the largest peacetime military force in its history, it is now obligated to finance higher economic transfer payments to veterans than ever before. An all-volunteer military compounds these problems because volunteers demand more long-term benefits for retention. These expenses are threatening to break the Pentagon’s budget, just as they are producing exorbitant national debt obligations. The American military, like other major civilian institutions, is asked to address a growing number of current commitments and crises while it must devote a higher proportion of its resources than ever before to personnel who are no longer active. We may be at a tipping point where inherited costs undermine current investments. Defense Secretaries Robert Gates and Leon Panetta both articulated these urgent points, as they called for more restraint in American military commitments and serious reform in health and retirement entitlements. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen made the clearest public statement about these resource challenges. In September 2011, on the eve of another recurring budget battle in Congress, he told a group of business executives that the “biggest threat to our national security is our debt.” Mullen focused on the higher costs for capital equipment and “increases in pay, and especially increases in the cost of health care.” Mullen closed his candid statement with a clear call for greater restraint in American military commitments and more attention to the prudent reallocation of resources: “We must consider the world as it is -- the threats as we see them -- not wishing away the danger nor blowing it out of proportion,” Mullen said. “Pragmatism and practicality must be our watchwords moving forward,” he added, “[and] strategy must become our acumen.” Despite the enormous influence of Gates, Panetta, and Mullen, these figures failed to make serious headway on reform. American policy-makers in the Bush and Obama administrations were more cautious about intervening in foreign conflicts after long frustrating months of combat in Afghanistan and Iraq, but they have not shown any serious willingness to reduce costly inherited commitments around the world. If anything, the “Asian pivot” has created a new obligation to increase the American land, sea, and air presence in Asia, while maintaining military hegemony in the Persian Gulf, Western Europe, and all major waterways around the globe. Civil wars and territorial disputes throughout East and South Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East threaten to suck in further American military forces, based on security guarantees that the United States has inherited, in some cases, from the early years of the Cold War. Resource pressures demand some degree of American retrenchment, but political calculations push policy-makers to avoid all the difficult trade-offs. Without attention to tradeoffs, there can be no coherent strategy. Perversely, the across-the-board sequester budget cuts of 2013 reinforced the resource problem because they exclude reductions to entitlements, they leave inherited obligations in place, and they are accompanied by the increasing demands on American security forces around Syria, North Korea, Libya, Somalia, and other international trouble-spots. The sequester simply asks the American military, and all other government agencies, to do more with less. This is a recipe for even greater overstretch and under-achievement in American foreign policy. This is also a recipe for more strategic blunders like the Iraq War of 2003, where ambitious policy aims were accompanied by clearly insufficient resource commitments. Observing the widening mismatch between ambitions and resources, numerous commentators have focused on the dysfunctional elements of American domestic politics. Neither partisanship nor politicization of foreign policy are new, but the heightened elements of both phenomena press dangerously on current resource vulnerabilities. It looks, at times (especially during the government shutdown and threatened default of October 2013), like a perfect storm. The political posturing of American international dominance is blowing hard against the weakened walls of available American capabilities and domestic support. American military personnel, diplomats, and other officials are now spread so thin that one must question whether they can continue to perform basic functions with the competence citizens expect. High standards of quality usually decline when personnel are asked to do more with less. The natural tendency is to cover-up seemingly small holes in capabilities until they are exposed in disastrous fashion. There is an accompanying urge to silence warnings about potential shortfalls in fulfilling required missions. This has been the experience for other government agencies under similar conditions in the past.