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Chinese transition is peaceful

Harris 14 (Peter, contributor to the National Interest and newsletter editor for the International History and Politics section of the American Political Science Association, 2014, “Problems with Power-Transition Theory: Beyond the Vanishing Disparities Thesis”, Asian Security, p. 253-254)//EAW

It should be noted that power-transition theorists tend to argue that rising states will be the ones to initiate hegemonic war with a declining state rather than the other way around. There are actually several assumptions embedded in this claim that a vanishing disparity in power will cause a rising state to initiate war with a declining state. First, Organski assumes that there are distributional consequences to how the international order is organized, which create material incentives for states to compete over its form. Second, because dominant states are presumed to have had a hand in constructing the extant international order, such states always benefit disproportionately from their dealings with others in the international system, receiving “the greatest share of the benefits that flow from the existence of the international order,” and thus have a rational self-interest in maintaining the status quo. Third, Organski assumes that rising states invariably stand to gain from changing the status quo because a new international order would serve them better than the extant one. Fourth, Organski implies that international order can be remade by rising states—that is, world order is sufficiently malleable such that a newly dominant state could have significant influence over its shape if that rising state is able to displace or unseat the established hegemon. Fifth, war against the preexisting hegemon is cost-effective for the rising state or group of states—that is, the benefits of usurping a dominant state via force outweigh the costs of waging hegemonic war. Viewed through the lens that Organski has bequeathed, then, Thucydides’s trap is a lethal contraption indeed. Consider, for example, its application to the contemporary and anticipated rise of China. China is the third largest country in the world by area and the first biggest by population. Its economy has grown rapidly for decades and is forecast to overtake that of the United States at some point during this century. China is already the world’s largest trading nation, its biggest producer of steel, and the second biggest consumer of oil. Its voracious appetite for raw materials spurs economic growth in countries on its periphery and farther afield. Beijing’s economic policy is geared towards the urbanization and industrialization of what has historically been a primarily agrarian society. While its GDP per capita is still quite low relative to other industrialized economies, this only portends the distance that China still has to go and foretells the enormous latent potential that the country still has at its future disposal. In short, China already surpasses the United States on some of Organski’s key measures of national power and is almost certain to eclipse its rival along his other dimensions in due course. What is more, neither the United States nor any other world power seems capable of doing much to halt China’s rise. At some point—namely, the point at which Chinese power comes close to eclipsing that of the United States—Organski’s formulation of power-transition theory would clearly predict that conflict between the United States, China, and their respective allies will ensue. China is destined to want to change the extant world order, which unambiguously is the product of the United States and its liberal, maritime-capitalist, Anglo-Saxon predecessor as world hegemon, the British Empire. The scene is set for a Great Power showdown of epic proportions.

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