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Climate is an apriori ethical issue—evaluate the round through the lens of impacts on the global biosphere and an ethics of responsibility – any other ethical framework falls into anthropocentrism by denying subjectivity to nonhuman life and future generations

Farah and Giudice 23 (Paolo Davide Farah and Alessio Lo Giudice. “Climate Justice in the Anthropocene and Its Relationship with Science and Technology: The Importance of Ethics of Responsibility,” Connecticut Law Review. June 2023. https://scholarship.law.pitt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1567&context=fac_articles *edited for gendered language) @ehatt

WARNING: possibly a massive reproductive futurity link—be prepared to defend future generations lol

In Jonas’s reading, the Western ethical tradition, 173 founded on a synchronic and anthropocentric conception, appears inadequate to face the moral dilemmas produced by the technological civilization of the second modernity. It is precisely the technological focus of contemporary human beings that requires a change of perspective. First of all, this reversal of paradigm passes from a conception of duty no longer limited in an anthropocentric sense. Following Jonas’s lead, it is more than reasonable, in the context in which we live, to ask whether or not human beings have a duty to take care of the biosphere and protect biodiversity. The question of duty is one that is rationally based on the de facto domination, unprecedented compared to the past, of humans over the environment. But the recognition of the existence of a moral claim on the part of the biosphere does not presuppose a questionable representation of the anthropomorphization of the natural environment. In reality, it is equivalent to the adoption of a point of view placing, at the center, rational subjects as integral parts of the environment to be preserved. From a natural science and geographical perspective, nature and the environment are more rational than, or at least as rational as, human beings. Non-humans and humans have always had similar self-preservation instincts and a fundamental tendency to behave in a manner that avoids injury and maximizes chances of survival.174 As from the Anthropocene epoch, it seems that a fracture has happened. The majority of humans have gradually moved from the countryside and now live in modern and industrialized cities or locations far from nature.175 In most cases, they do not need to fight to provide food, water, and/or shelter to their families, and they do not have an immediate perception of how nature and biodiversity are more and more affected by industrialization, the related means of production, global commercialization, and their overgrowing needs connected to both consumerism and market demands. Consequently, because of their lack of awareness of the impending risk and their distance from nature, human beings did not immediately realize the need to reverse their actions, which are endangering the environment, because their self-preservation instinct was not triggered by the external factors that are more visible in nature. Nature follows rules that are certainly rational and include rational subjects in the paradigm, but with very different categories and perspectives than human equivalents. Anthropocentrism is a structural trait of ethical reasoning, despite Jonas’s claim to neutralize it. But it can take on a moderate connotation if the very concept of the environment is understood as the synthesis and coexistence of nature and culture, as a biosphere and biodiversity and human presence. On the other hand, the representation of the Anthropocene epoch surely leads to such a conception of the environment. If so, environmental rights176 lose any ideological characterization to assume a rational foundation from an ethical point of view. If this is the case, as Jonas maintains, “[i]t would mean to seek not only the human good but also the good of things extrahuman, that is, to extend the recognition of ‘ends in themselves’ beyond the sphere of [humans]man and make the human good include the care for them.” 177 The synchronic foundation of traditional ethics should, therefore, be questioned. The rights of future generations should coincide and be positively combined with environmental law in a diachronic and therefore trans-temporal perspective. Thus, a new moral imperative, adapted to such a change of perspective, would be: “Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life.” 178 This is an imperative based on the level of historical rationality, starting from the awareness of the potential of contemporary technology that is able to produce structurally and incessantly long-term effects. How technology is integrated into the biosphere will have consequences that affect the complex environment provided by humans. This new imperative is one that, on a strictly ethical level, is justified considering that, before respecting the freedom of others to do anything that does not violate freedom, we must allow those other people in a trans-temporal sense to exist as moral subjects. The principle of the responsibility of humans toward future generations, which bases the rights of each generation on the basis of the duties of the present generation, is philosophically justified by the first purpose of humanity, which is to continue to exist. This principle feeds on fear, in the sense of apprehension for the vulnerability of those who do not yet exist (on the model of the ethics of parental responsibility). This fear should lead to prudent public action to intervene, as a precaution, as enshrined, for example, in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, which states: “In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall be not used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”179 Principle 15 can be deduced from Jonas’s imperative, which is aimed mainly at public policy and not directly at the behavior of private individuals. Again, Jonas’s ethics of responsibility differs from Kant’s view. The coherence invoked by Jonas’s imperative and the principle of responsibility is, in fact, one that should be between the ultimate effects of our actions and the permanence of human activity in the future. For this reason, the causal order of reference is not provided by private behavior but by political choices of a collective nature. The universalization that this imperative implies is not hypothetical, as in the Kantian case of the logical projection of the subject with respect to the representation/imagination of all the others. Instead, it is a universalization that is measured on the basis of the practical success calculated over the time horizon of the future. Therefore, the ethics of responsibility feeds on the cognitive contribution provided by predictive science. It is on the basis of this contribution, in fact, that its success is measured. All this returns us to the background from which we started. It brings us to the framework of the global world and the awareness of the need to remedy the political failure of globalization. Jonas’s ethics of responsibility acquires, in fact, full meaning only in a global perspective and calls into question the establishment of effective political structures of governance of globalization capable of affecting an emblematically global phenomenon such as climate change.180 But the ethics of responsibility also makes it possible to pull the threads of reflection on the relationship between science, technology, and the Anthropocene. Responsibility toward future generations is justified because of technical domination, as the result of a self-perpetuating process, and the evidence of the Anthropocene as an environmental and anthropic result of this domain. In other words, the principle of responsibility is supported by the very fact of a technically manipulated environment that risks calling into question the conditions for the permanence of human life. At the same time, in light of the relationship between technology and the Anthropocene, it is clear that the ethics of responsibility represents a rational foundation for the conception of climate justice. If taken seriously, the environmental ethics here, sketched and reworked from a starting point of Jonas’s reflections, stands in contrast with the techno-economic model that dominated the second modernity. As Jonas wrote: The object’s self-owned futurity is the truest futural aspect of the responsibility, 181 which thus makes itself the guardian of the very source of that irksome unpredictability in the fruits of its labors. Its highest fulfillment, which it must be able to dare, is its abdication before the right of the never-anticipated which emerges as the outcome of its care. Its highest duty, therefore, is to see that responsibility itself is not stifled, whether from its source within or from constraints without. In the light of such self-transcending width, it becomes apparent that responsibility as such is nothing else but the moral complement to the ontological constitution of our temporality. 182 Unlike the perspective provided by ecological modernization, the ethics of responsibility makes it possible to theoretically institute collective choices that can lead to rethinking models of development, production processes, and lifestyles. Climate justice, as an aspiration not only for a fair distribution of the costs of climate change but also of political responsibilities, can bring about a reversal of the trend in public institutional choices. This reversal can occur only if it identifies, as the basis of its proposal, the protection of vulnerability183 understood in a radical sense by embodying within its theoretical framework future generations and their rights. From this perspective and focus, rationally based on the ethical and not the ideological level, it is factually consequential and politically sustainable to expand the protected subjects to include the most vulnerable groups in the present time. But to achieve this result, it is necessary that a global and universal projection of the aspirations of climate justice occurs. Further, this projection must coincide with the rights of the future generations and therefore of the preservation of a healthy environment in which they will live. There is no gap between present vulnerability and future vulnerability; they are two faces of the same coin. By protecting the latter, justice is done for the former in the name of the continuity of the species (and bearing in mind the hope of eternity and the wishes of infinity well above us), which allows us to belong to humanity beyond our historical time.

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