A Green JG Lowers energy consumption, poverty, and mortality It would cost very little too – Economic models prove
Godin 12 Antoine Godin - Senior Social Economic Research at the Levy institute at Bard College, “Guaranteed Green Jobs: Sustainable Full Employment,” Levy Economics Institute, May 2012, https://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_722.pdf ///Mgal
Literature on cost-benefit analysis of green buildings is wide. Some authors focus only on domestic houses (Clinch and Healy 2001, Hens and Verdonck 2001, Levine et al. 2007, POST 2005), while others focus on public buildings (Kats et al. 2005, Kats 2006, Lee et al. 2000). Generally, various benefits are cited: energy and water savings, improved health and decreased mortality, enhanced student learning, increased productivity, job creation—all leading to clear economic and social profits. 17 We will only consider energy savings both in dwellings and public buildings. 5.1 Adding the ELR into the Model Introducing a green-job employer-of-last-resort (ELR) into the economy does not change the model much. Table 5 is the social account matrix. The only difference from the previous model is that now unemployed workers do not receive an unemployment subsidy, but are employed by the state for a minimum wage. The balance sheet does not change and is not reproduced here. There are no substantial modifications. First of all, as already stated, wage earners’ income is now composed of private sector earnings and ELR wage instead of the dole. Second, works done under ELR have an effect both on governmental and household energy consumption. Equation (20) shows that we relax the hypothesis of constant government spending, as public energy consumption decreases proportionally to the size of ELR (measured by u, the private unemployment rate). Equation (21) indicates that wage earners’ propensity to consume energy ( ) also diminishes proportionally to the ELR size. (20) (21) 5.2 Green-Job ELR vs. Baseline The first set of simulations18 analyses the structural effect on the economy of a green-job ELR scheme (hereafter GJ). The GJ starts in period 25. The policy consists of an expected increase of total government spending of 10 percent, an increase that is devoted to the wage paid to ELR workers. 19 Furthermore, ELR changes the consumption patterns of both wage earners and the public sector following (20) and (21). It is important to note that since these two equations constantly modify the parameters, no steady state can be reached. The economy is constantly changing according to the new preferences of wage earners as well as to the new government spending. Figures 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 14 show the results obtained through these simulations. In all graphs, the blue line represents the green-job ELR results, while the red line represents the baseline ones. All the results are relative changes from steady state values. Obviously, unemployment disappears as soon as ELR is put into action. However, not all workers are employed in the private sector. The analysis is conducted on how private unemployment (i.e., all workers not employed in the private sector; that is, ELR workers) varies. Figure 8 shows that private unemployment decreases directly by almost 15 percent. Then, due to the structural change that green jobs imply, private unemployment keeps decreasing rather steeply, at first, then more gently. This result of decreasing unemployment depends on whether the energy sector is more or less labor intensive than the consumption good industry. It is also interesting to note that the predicted 10 percent increase in government spending is not reached at all. Private unemployment decreases drastically due to the increase in aggregate consumption from both household sectors, lowering the cost of ELR. Both households sectors see an increase in their income after the green-job program is enacted. This leads to an increase in their wealth, resulting in an increase in desired bond holding. This implies an increase in the public debt level. Furthermore, GDP increases also, due to an increase in consumption and investments. The increase in public debt is nonetheless larger than the increase in GDP, leading to an increased level of debt to GDP of about 0.4 percent. The 6 percent increase in government expenditure observed at the beginning of the program is lowered as private unemployment keeps decreasing, removing workers out of ELR and as public energy consumption decreases. The structural change in the economy can be observed through employment in widget and energy production sectors. In the short run, the increase in income by both wage earners and capitalists increases energy consumption. In the long run, the reduction in energy consumption by both the public sector and wage earners leads to a reduction in energy consumption. This leads to a reduction in employment in the energy industry. However, the reduction in energy employment is countered by an increase in the widget sector. 20 Three conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. First, an ELR is a direct way to remove all involuntary unemployment and address poverty issues. Second, a green-job ELR implies structural changes in the economy, aiming at lower energy consumption. Regarding the 20 As noted before, the total reduction or increase in employment depends on whether the energy industry is more or less labor intensive than the widget one. 21 structural change, the present model does not include synergy effects that a green-job public sector might imply. It is obvious that imitative firms would appear on the market as soon as new green technologies would be used in the green-job program. Finally, aggregate ELR cost has to be lowered by the reduction in unemployment due to the spur in aggregate demand that higher income implies. In our simulation, a predicted 10 percent increase in government spending leads to an ex-post increase of only 4 percent. Furthermore, poor people usually receive benefits, which could be removed for ELR workers, further lowering the cost of ELR.