The GND would not cost much and would instead drive up Economic activity by trillions – Estimates from multiple theories and studies prove
Galvin and Healy 20 Ray Galvin - Department of Architecture, Cambridge University UK; ERC RWTH-Aachen University Germany, Noal Healy Professor Noel Healy’s research, teaching, and community engagement focuses on the socio-political aspects of rapid climate change mitigation, climate justice, public policy and inequality, fossil fuel politics, and economic and racial justice in climate and energy policy. Dr. Healy is a contributing author for the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change “The Green New Deal in the United States: What it is and how to pay for it,” Energy Research & Social Science Volume 67, September 2020, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214629620301067#abs0001 ///Mgal
3. Will the Green New Deal be inflationary? The GND resolution is in the form of an outline of intended policy initiatives and does not include detailed costing. As noted above, however, Sanders’ GND is costed item by item and serves as our case study. We begin by noting that Sanders’ GND costing does not include universal health care, which is one of the features of the GND resolution. Instead, his “Medicare for All” is structured separately from his GND [54] and he maintains his restructuring of health care will actually save the Federal government as much as $5.1 trillion over 10 years, which amounts to about 2.7% of GDP. Most independent estimates agree that Medicare for All would bring a net saving [55,56, 60], and in the light of these, Nersisyan and Wray [46] suggest a conservative estimate is a saving of 3.7% of GDP, which amounts to about $0.7 trillion per year, or $7 trillion over 10 years. However, in our analysis below we will err on the safe side by refraining from subtracting likely gains through healthcare reform from the cost of the GND. We will also consider the effects of Palley's claimed increase in health care in our analysis. Aside from heath care, Sanders’ $16.3 trillion GND plan aims to “pay for itself over 15 years” through generating revenue (or, as Keynesian economists might express it, through withdrawing money from circulation) from the following sources: (a) $3.085 trillion by eliminating all fossil fuel subsidies, increasing taxation of fossil fuel companies and increasing polluter fines and litigation; (b) $1.215 trillion from reducing military expenses related to protecting oil-shipping routes; (c) $6.4 trillion from selling energy via power marketing authorities; and (d) $2.3 trillion from income taxes on the 20 million new jobs created. Sanders also argues his GND will: (a) save $1.31 trillion by reducing the need for what the US currently spends on public assistance programs, due to the creation of 20 million new jobs; and (b) raise a further $2 trillion by making the wealthy and large corporations pay “their fair share” of taxes [57] .10 $16.3 trillion spent over 15 years is about 5.7% of GDP annually. What do critics and commentators say about figures such as these? One of the GND's most persistent critics working within a Keynesian framework is Thomas Palley [44], whose earlier critiques of green new deals in general [36,37] were in turn critiqued by a number of economists (e.g. Smithin [38], Timoigne and Wray [43]). Palley accepts the Keynesian tenets outlined in Section 2. Working within this framework he argues that “simple arithmetic” proves that the amount of extra government spending required for the GND would increase the money supply so much as to require unacceptably high taxes to keep inflation down. Since his is probably the most systematically thought-through economic critique, we outline his numbers and the steps in his argument below. We relegate explanations of technical terms to footnotes. First, Palley [44] calculates an additional expenditure for Medicare for All at 8.6% of GDP ($ 1.76 trillion per year), free college tuition for all at 1.7% of GDP ($0.35 trillion per year) and the GND itself at 2% of GDP ($0.41 trillion per year), less relief saving11 at 1% of GDP, a net increase of 11.3% of GDP ($2.32 trillion per year). He then includes a “Keynesian expenditure multiplier effect”12 of 1.5, implying that GND expenditure will result in a total increase in economic activity of $3.49 trillion per year (1.5 x $2.32 trillion) or 17% of GDP. We note that Palley's estimate of the cost of the GND itself is lower than Sanders’, at 2% of GDP compared to 5.7%. Second, Palley “generously” assumes the “full employment unemployment rate” is 2%, i.e. that “full” employment would actually see 2% of the employable workforce still unemployed, since unemployment has never been below 2% in post-WW2 years. Since the official unemployment rate was 3.9% (6.3 million persons) at the time of his critique, he maintains that this implies there is only room for reducing unemployment by 1.9% (3.1 million persons). He then uses an “Okun coefficient”13 of 0.5, to calculate that the economy has spare capacity of twice this percentage, i.e. 3.8% of GDP. He takes this to mean the economy could absorb an increase in economic activity of 3.8% of GDP without inflationary pressure due to job creation. Third, he points out that this 3.8% is well below the 17% increase that (he calculates) would result from the GND and associated social welfare programs. The difference, 13.2% of GDP, represents the excess of demand that cannot be absorbed by the fall in unemployment. He therefore concludes that the government would have to increase the tax take by 13.2% of GDP, or about $2.7 trillion, to mop up extra spending power and stave off high inflation. Current tax take is $3.48 trillion (equal to about 17% of GDP), so, he concludes, the total tax take would have to increase by about 77%. How sound is Palley's critique? We will apply Palley's approach to Sanders’ own estimates for GND funding (given in Table 2), which does not include Sanders’ estimated reduction in the cost of healthcare. The total cost of $16.36 trillion amounts to $1.636 trillion per year if condensed into 10 years. Sanders plans to spread the cost over 15 years, bringing it to $1.1 trillion per year, but we follow Palley for now and use the 10-year horizon. Sanders’ GND figures omit the cost of additional new housing, of $1.48 trillion [58], or $0.148 trillion per year over 10 years, as he intends to finance this through a national housing trust. However, we include it here so as to accord with Palley's approach, bringing the total annual cost to $1.784 trillion per year. Following Palley's approach by using a Keynesian expenditure multiplier effect of 1.5, this amounts to an increase in economic activity of $2.676 trillion on an annual basis. This is 13.1% of the 2018 GDP figure of $20.5 trillion [59], substantially lower than Palley's figure of 17%. Using Palley's assumptions for the minimum unemployment rate, this would result in an excess stimulus of 13.1 −3.8 = 9.3% of GDP, which could not be absorbed by further increase in employment. Using Palley's methodology on this figure the total tax take would therefore have to increase by 9.3% of GDP, or $1.907 trillion, an increase of 54.5%. This contrasts with Palley's figure of 77% and Sanders’ own figure of 40%. We note that if we were to remove health care costs from Palley's estimate, the required tax increase in his calculation would be much lower than 77%. . It is worth re-running Palley's approach to accord with Sanders’ plan to spread costs out over 15 years, bringing a total annual expenditure of $1.19 trillion per year. With a Keynesian multiplier of 1.5 this gives an increase in economic activity of $1.785 trillion, or 8.7% of GDP. Again assuming a dampening effect of 3.8% of GDP from the jobs scheme, this would require tax increases equivalent to 4.9% of GDP, or $1.00 trillion, to eliminate the inflationary effects of the GND. This would be equivalent to an increase in the total tax take of 28.6%, somewhat lower than Sanders’ estimate of 40%. We conclude, then, that Palley's figure of a 77% tax increase could only hold true if the GND were to be paid for within 10 years, the cost of Medicare for All were very large and positive rather than small or negative, and the new housing costs were accounted for within the GND plan – none of which is feasible. Indeed, even including the housing costs and assuming high costs for Medicare for All, the 15-year time frame would bring the required tax increase down to around 51%. We note, however, that a new, very robust study of US healthcare concludes that Medicare for All would save the US economy $450 billion per year [60]. Sanders’ proposed increase in the tax take by 40% is therefore reasonable, even perhaps an overestimate. It would amount to $1.4 trillion per year, a calculation that accords with Nersisyan and Wray's estimates [46, p.40], and this would reach $1.79 trillion with a tax increase of 51%. If this contingency did arise, the gap of $0.39 trillion could be covered by compulsory and voluntary savings. These would include the pension schemes associated with government-created jobs as well as war-type bonds aimed to mature at staggered intervals after the GND period, similar to how the US ran war bonds in the 1940s [61]. Hence, even using Palley's methodology on Sanders’ own figures and allowing for a portion of excess funds to be withdrawn from circulation via government bonds, we find that Sanders’ GND would require tax increases only a few percent higher than Sanders himself claims. Further, a major difficulty with Palley's approach is his non-dynamic assumptions about the unemployment rate. He assumes that increases in job opportunities do not stimulate people who are currently in economically non-productive roles to move into the workforce. Mroz and Savage [62] argue that creating more well-paid jobs actually increases the number looking for regular work as they turn away from activities like study, housekeeping or zero-hours contract work. This would provide scope for yet more government expenditure and act as downward pressure on inflation. There might still be 2% registered as unemployed, but many of these would represent new jobseekers entering the job market. The above line of argument, then, leads to an estimate for the required tax increase (for a GND of the form explicated in detail by Sanders) as lying close to Sanders’ figure of 40%. The question to be faced, therefore, is whether US society would find tax increases of around 40% acceptable. During WW2 total government expenditure – financed by taxes, fees, fines and bonds – rose to a peak of 45% of GDP in 1943–44 [59]. Clearly the US public found this acceptable in wartime. Interestingly, it then fell rapidly as the war continued, reaching 14% of GDP in 1946 and bottoming out at 10% in 1947. Further, inflation never went higher than 11% in the war years and averaged about 5% during that period [63] – despite government expenditure reaching 45% of GDP. In conclusion, Sanders’ GND proposal does not seem to break any vital economic rules and would not necessarily lead to inflation if managed sensibly. The main unanswered question is whether US society would accept 1940s-70s-style tax rates on its wealthiest citizens. One approach to this question is to consider tax rates in recent US history. The graph in Fig. 1, from data gathered by Thomas Piketty and used in his new book, Capital et idéologie [28] helps to address this question. It shows the proportion of different US groups’ income paid as tax, including all taxes less social welfare transfers and food stamps – i.e. the net proportion of persons’ income paid in tax. It is here clearly seen that prior to about 1981, the top earners in the US paid at least 40% more tax than today, as did the next highest band prior to about 1957. There are therefore many years of recent historical precedent for increasing tax rates for the very wealthy. Further, recent polls show significant support for a wealth tax and a 70% top income tax rate, across party lines [64,65].