China is restrained – PLA commanders know they’re unprepared for new wars
Blasko ’19 [Dennis J. Blasko is a retired lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army with 23 years of service as a military intelligence officer and foreign area officer specializing in China, former Army attaché in Beijing and Hong Kong, “The Chinese Military Speaks to Itself, Revealing Doubts,” 2-18-19, https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/the-chinese-military-speaks-to-itself-revealing-doubts/]
After becoming Central Military Commission chairman in 2012, Xi has sought to raise the overall level of the PLA’s combat readiness, embodied in the slogan “be able to fight and win” (néng dǎzhàng, dǎ shèngzhàng, 能打仗、打胜仗). By raising its warfighting capabilities and demonstrating them to the world, the PLA seeks to enhance its deterrence posture directed at a variety of threats to China’s national interests and to achieve China’s political objectives without fighting. In 2013, Xi revived the Deng-era slogan the “Two Inabilities” (liǎnggè nénglì bùgòu, 两个能力不够), which says the PLA’s ability to fight a modern war and the ability of its cadres (officers) at all levels to command modern war are not sufficient. The first half of this formula is similar to the first part of the “Two Incompatibles,” but the second portion is a general criticism of PLA combat leadership capabilities. That same year, the “Two Big Gaps” (liǎnggè chājù hěn dà, 两个差距很大) often began to accompany the “Two Inabilities” in usage. The “Two Big Gaps” speaks of “big gaps” between the PLA’s military modernization level and the requirements for national security compared to the level of the world’s advanced militaries. It reiterates leadership concern over PLA fighting abilities in general, but compares them to other advanced militaries, highlighting the relative gap between Chinese and advanced military capabilities. One of the few instances of a Chinese-origin, English-language reference to the “Two Big Gaps” and “Two Inabilities” was published in 2016. However, it does not include the two slogans themselves and casual readers could miss the larger context and history behind this passage: Improving the army’s combat strength has become a major focus. But the modernization level of the Chinese army is inadequate to safeguard national security, and it lags far behind advanced global peers. The Chinese army is not capable enough of waging modern warfare, and officers lack command skills for modern warfare. The following year, the “Three Whethers” (sāngè néngbùnéng, 三个能不能) asked (a) whether the PLA can maintain the party’s absolute leadership, (b) whether it can fight victoriously when needed, and (c) whether commanders at all levels are competent to lead troops and command in war. This slogan adds a political dimension to concerns about the military’s operational and leadership abilities. (Other slogans, such as the “Five Excesses” (五多) and “Four Winds [or Four Bad Styles]” (四风), that focus on political and ideological issues, are not be addressed here.) However, the “Five Incapables [Cannots]” (wǔgè bùhuì, 五个不会) from 2015 is probably the most important criticism of all. It emphasizes that “some” officers cannot judge situations, understand higher authorities’ intentions, make operational decisions, deploy troops, nor deal with unexpected situations. These are the basics of combat leadership, applicable at all levels of war, for all militaries. This appraisal and the “Two Inabilities,” which also mentions leadership problems, are now the most frequently repeated slogans in the Chinese military media. Since 2006 when the “Two Incompatibles” was first promulgated, these five assessments have appeared in over 500 articles in the PLA Daily alone. Harvard Professor Alastair Iain Johnston has graphed the number of articles in which one or more of these terms each has been observed annually through 2018 in the PLA Daily: The total number of PLA Daily articles in which the following assessments have appeared is: “Two Incompatibles”: 120 articles “Two Inabilities”: 169 “Two Big Gaps”: 78 “Three Whethers”: 27 “Five Incapables”: 163 Total: 557 These self-criticisms are used specifically to justify many training events and leadership activities. For example, the 17 Stride and Firepower-series trans-regional exercises in 2016 were expressly designed to resolve commanders’ “Five Incapables” problem; during the summer of 2018, all four services held senior leadership training focused on the same set of leadership issues. The “Two Inabilities” was cited specifically as a reason to improve realistic training when the updated Military Training Outline was disseminated in 2018. The “Peace Disease” In addition to the general assessments identified above, the PLA leadership acknowledges that the force has developed lax attitudes and practices resulting from four decades without fighting a major campaign against a foreign enemy. Current vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, General Zhang Youxia identified this weakness in 2009 when he was Shenyang Military Region commander: Today, the PLA hasn’t been in actual combat for many years now, yet the fires of war are burning throughout the world. In this area, the gap between the PLA and foreign militaries is growing day by day. This is an actual problem. The Chinese media frequently urges the troops to overcome the “peace disease” (hépíng bìng, 和平病), “peacetime habits” (hépíng jīxí, 和平积习), and “peacetime practices [or problems]” (hépíng jībì, 和平积弊). In an exchange email, Johnston indicated the term “peace disease” was first observed in the late 1980s and that these three terms have appeared roughly 565 times in the PLA Daily from 2012 to mid-2018. They continue to be used regularly in 2019 as shorthand for challenges to be overcome. The recently announced regulation to improve centralized training inspections specifically cited the need to eliminate “peacetime practices.” If soldiers have a peacetime attitude and do not expect to go to war during their period of service, they may take shortcuts, develop bad habits, or just “go through the motions” during training, compromising unit readiness. Rectifying this problem is an important motive behind Xi’s current emphasis on raising combat readiness. Xi’s call to be able to “fight and win” and “cure the peace disease,” however, does not imply that the PLA should undertake a military campaign to test its warfighting capabilities. Rather it is the equivalent of the U.S. military’s priority to be ready to “Fight Tonight.”