No risk of US-China war or escalation
Lieven ‘20 [Anatol Lieven holds a doctorate in political science from Jesus College, Cambridge, is a professor at Georgetown University and a visiting professor at King's College London, “Stay Calm About China,” 8-26-20, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/26/china-existential-threat-united-states-xi-jinping/]
Rivalry with China should thus be conceptualized by the U.S. foreign and security establishment as a limited competition in particular areas, not a universal and existential struggle between good and evil. Apart from anything else, to center the whole of U.S. policy on struggle with China will be a terrible distraction from what are in fact much greater threats to the well-being of U.S. citizens: at home, economic inequality and racial tensions; in the world as a whole, climate change and its consequences. The coronavirus pandemic should also help the United States better to understand the real interests of ordinary Americans. Whatever the administration of President Donald Trump may now be trying to suggest, it has been a virus (albeit made worse by Chinese and U.S. governmental incompetence), and not a rival great power, that at the time of writing has killed more Americans than died in the Vietnam War and Korean War put together. U.S. competition with China is real, serious, and bound to increase. That is inevitable, both for economic reasons and because of the incompatibility between Chinese ambitions and the U.S. establishment’s determination to maintain U.S. global leadership. However, it is not an existential struggle between two fundamentally opposed systems, nor is it a universal struggle that must be fought in every corner of the world. A comparison with basic features of the Cold War should make the difference clear. China is not promoting communist revolution around the world. In fact there is no evidence at all that it is aiming at the overthrow of existing states. As a great capitalist trading power, it has a strong stake in the stability of markets and the safety of Chinese investments. If the Chinese government in principle prefers authoritarian states, it has as yet done nothing to foster such systems. Chinese influence operations in the West are real and should be resisted, but they are intended to influence Western policies toward China, not cause state collapse and revolution. And the United States has an old and tried arsenal of international influence operations of its own that it can deploy in response. As to the U.S. political system, the impact of Chinese (and Russian) covert propaganda on U.S. politics has been minimal compared to the impact of the United States’ own domestic problems. It was not China that killed George Floyd. As a capitalist trading state, China is dependent on the health and stability of the international capitalist system. Unlike the Soviet Union, it needs a degree of rules-based international order—though not if (as seen from China) this means a system in which the United States sets all the rules and then breaks them whenever it wishes. On the other hand, China has certainly sought with great determination to increase its international influence through international capitalism. Some of these efforts (like Huawei’s role in fifth-generation telecommunications technology) must be strongly resisted. They do not however as yet greatly exceed past U.S. patterns of international economic influence. The impact of Chinese (and Russian) covert propaganda on U.S. politics has been minimal compared to the impact of the United States’ own domestic problems. It was not China that killed George Floyd. The defense and strengthening of U.S. capitalism in competition with China is indeed essential, but needs to be seen not just in terms of tariffs on Chinese imports (as the Trump administration has seen it), but as requiring a massive program of U.S. domestic economic reform and investment in infrastructure and technology—in other words, the way the Chinese government conducts this competition. When it comes to hard geopolitical influence and the expansion of Chinese military power, with one important exception China has proceeded with great caution. In the Indian Ocean, until now the Chinese program of port construction has been entirely commercial (except for a small refueling and repair station in Djibouti, next to a much bigger U.S. one). The Chinese naval presence in the region is insignificant compared to that of the United States, let alone the United States plus India. Above all, China has not sought to exploit U.S. difficulties in the Middle East, despite multiple opportunities to do so. The contrast between the strategies of Beijing and Moscow in this regard is extremely marked. Readers may wish to imagine, for example, the impact on the United States’ position in the region if China were to devote even a fraction of its resources to a full-scale program of strengthening Iran economically and militarily. The reasons for this Chinese abstinence are not of course altruistic. In the first place, China as the world’s greatest energy importer depends on the stability of the Persian Gulf—far more than does the United States, since thanks to fracking the United States is now virtually self-sufficient in oil and gas. Secondly, as a Chinese official told me a decade ago, China has studied the repeated and disastrous messes that the United States has gotten into (and sometimes caused) in the Middle East, and has no desire to follow suit. There is no evidence that this very sensible approach has changed in the years since.