Manning and Burrows, 23
[Robert A. Manning -- distinguished senior fellow with the Reimagining US Grand Strategy project, Mathew Burrows -- Distinguished Fellow with the Reimagining US Grand Strategy program at the Stimson Center ,”Red Cell: The Fallacy of Perpetual US Primacy,” Stimson, 2-07-2023, https://www.stimson.org/2023/red-cell-3-the-fallacy-of-perpetual-u-s-primacy/, accessed 3-29-2023]
This state of affairs persisted after the Cold War, from 1990 to 2001, but violently ended with 9/11 and the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. Then the 2007-08 global financial crisis spurred new uncertainties of a post-Cold War multipolar milieu, a redistribution of wealth and power and a time of unfinished transformation.
Enter Ukraine. Ergo, a resurgence of American hegemony standing in the way of tyranny. Certainly, the December 2022 U.S. visit of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy enthralled Washington and an America much in need of a hero. U.S. support for Ukraine appears popular. President Joe Biden’s success in mobilizing European and Asian allies in support of Ukraine has been impressive, a Cold War-like consensus.
The advocates for perpetual U.S. global primacy do have a point. All things considered, U.S. primacy with its enlightened self-interest — in defense of principles — has broadly been a source of stability and prosperity. Nevertheless, it is a specious argument to say that realists conceive national interests only as direct attacks on U.S. soil. Rather, realists argue for balances of power, opposing Russian and Chinese attempts at hegemony over Europe and Asia, and occasional intervention to restore that balance. They are skeptical of foreign meddling for other ends, which can lead to overreach.
Many advocates of perpetual U.S. primacy dismiss such concerns. They see failed foreign adventurism as stemming less from the folly of an expansive definition of U.S. interests, than as an aberration of liberal hegemony. They tend to discount those failed U.S. interventions that ended in catastrophe, including Vietnam, Afghanistan, Libya, and especially the 2003 Iraq War. Both neoconservatives and liberals were cheerleaders for these fiascos. The destabilizing destructiveness of these unnecessary interventions spawned lingering global resentment and cannot be easily airbrushed from Americans’ collective memory.
Kagan and others argue that, in the aftermath of 9/11, Americans saw Afghanistan and Iraq as matters of security. A good case can be made for the initial effort to overthrow the Taliban. Iraq was an unwise contrivance, however, as many in and outside the Bush administration warned at the time. A chaotic, unsettled Iraqi state, like a Communist-led Vietnam, was not the undoing of the Western world. It is difficult to argue, however, that past debacles did not undermine American power. Was that merely the price of liberal order maintenance? Or does the logic of exceptionalism to “make the world like us” compel us to ignore the costs?
Kagan echoes the inflated threat rhetoric seen from the Vietnam and Iraq wars to the current Ukraine conflict and debates over Taiwan: “The liberal world order will be threatened if Ukraine falls.” The international order is rules-based, but, Kagan candidly cites Reinhold Niebuhr’s observation, that “these rules themselves are a form of American hegemony.” He adds, “They are not neutral but are designed to sustain the international status quo, which for eight decades has been dominated by the American-backed liberal world. The rules-based order is an adjunct to that hegemony.”
Is more continuity in a recycled binary world of China/Russia strategic competition the predetermined future? In a word, no. The U.S. rise of the past 130 years has essentially peaked. Wealth and power have diffused. Witness much of the Global South — including democracies like India, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey — rejecting the Western consensus on Ukraine. This is symbolized by new groupings like the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), and associations—Xi Jinping’s warm welcome in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; and Turkey’s provision of drones to Azerbaijan.
The problem with the notion that Ukraine has given the U.S.-led order a second wind to take on a new Cold War-like threat — the combined China/Russia authoritarian menace — is that the world is not static. It is breaking down amid a historic, but still uncertain, transformation. It is already fragmenting amid growing economic nationalism. The United States appears oblivious to the dilemmas arising from its past success. Similarly, the British Empire undergirded globalization in the 19th century and saw its power diminish as others’ wealth and power rose and technology improved.
Today, U.S.-driven globalization has ushered in an increasingly multipolar world, but a disorderly one with much debt, hunger, and underdevelopment in the Global South. Meanwhile, democracies like India, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa do not define themselves as part of the Free World but as autonomous actors pursuing national interests. These countries do not want to align with any of the major powers: the West, Russia, or China.
Past Performance No Guarantee of Future Success
For the U.S. public, domestic concerns will always trump foreign interests. Polling shows that Americans are already growing more concerned about the magnitude of assistance going to Ukraine. Foreign aid has never been popular.
Similarly, major trade and investment accords that would have deepened U.S. economic integration in Europe were shot down in a backlash to globalization. This was underscored when President Donald Trump killed President Barack Obama’s plan for the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership regional trade agreements linking the U.S. with large swaths of Asia and Europe. There is now a bipartisan anti-trade consensus, with lawmakers fearing job losses to foreign competition, though polls suggest public opinion is more pro-trade. China’s influence is built on trade and subsidized investment, not just with Asian neighbors, but also in Africa and Latin America — regions that used be closer to Europe and the United States.
The U.S. foreign policy establishment has long resisted the idea of multipolarity. It is much more comfortable with a bipolar world in which the U.S. replicates its victory over the Soviet Union, only this time with China as the adversary. President Biden says he does not want a Cold War, but it is impossible to read the National Security Strategy (NSS) without seeing the United States girding itself again for a fight with a near-peer competitor. Polling, however, shows that most Americans, though increasingly negative about China, see the Chinese more as competitors than as enemies, suggesting that Americans are not prepared for an all-out conflict with a nuclear power and the world’s second-largest global economy.