Unipolarity creates structural conditions for conflict---makes war inevitable
Nuno Monteiro 14, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, Theory of Unipolar Politics, 2014, pp. 5-7
Second, I show that a unipolar world is not peaceful. Despite frequent U.S. involvement in military conflicts throughout the last two and a half decades, not much has been written on the question of how unipolarity may contribute to interstate war.’4 I claim that unipolarity generates conditions propitious for significant conflict.’ Neither the structure of a unipolar world nor U.S. strategic choices have a clear beneficial impact on the overall prospects for peace. The absence of a global balance of power between two or more states, while eliminating great-power competition, makes room for significant conflict beyond the most powerful stares in the system. Unipolarity will generate abundant opportunities for war between the unipole and recalcitrant minor powers that do not have the capabilities or allies necessary to deter it. It will also make ample room for conflict among minor powers, which are less likely to be disciplined by great-power allies, as would be the case when an overall balance of power is present. As a result, unipolarity will be prone to produce asymmetric and peripheral conflicts.¶ Finally, my argument about grand strategy derives from the claims I make about durability and peace. Because the optimal strategy for a unipole varies depending on specific features of its situation — namely, the costs of war and the benefits it extracts from its power preponderance — that strategy cannot be determined a priori theoretically. Still, it is possible to determine, based on the arguments I make about unipolar peace and durability, what is the optimal strategy for a unipole such as the contemporary United States, for which the costs of war vis-à-vis peripheral states are low relative to the benefits it extracts from its current international position of preponderance. ¶ The United States’ interests are best served by a grand strategy of defensive accommodation, which combines a military strategy aimed at maintaining the international status quo – what I call defensive dominance – with an economic strategy that makes room for accommodating the interests of rising major powers. ¶ For the United States, defensive accommodation has pluses and minuses. On the downside, it will lead to frequent U.S. involvement in peripheral military conflicts. On the upside, it is the only strategy that allows for the durability of U.S. military power preponderance.¶ Militarily, defensive dominance requires the unipole’s regular involvement in conflicts aimed at maintaining the status quo. At the same time, however, it lowers incentives for regional arms races that would lift the power of all competitors relative to that of the United States, undermining the durability of its position. Defensive dominance is therefore conducive to a durable unipolar world. The present circumstances, in which the United States derives non-negligible economic benefits from its preponderant place in the international system, make defensive dominance preferable to disengagement, which would make room for major powers to compete with each other, eventually undermining U.S. power preponderance. Defensive dominance is also a superior strategic option vis-i-vis an attempt to increase the unipole’s global position — what I call offensive dominance. To begin with, offensive dominance is likely to entail even greater U.S. involvement in interstate wars. In addition, when implemented in regions inhabited by major powers that enjoy growing economic capabilities, offensive dominance would prompt them to balance against the unipole in an attempt to guarantee their long-term survival through continued economic growth. Defensive dominance is therefore the best grand-strategic military option of the United States, allowing for the maintenance of its status as primus inter pares.¶ Defensive dominance is not sufficient to guarantee the durability of U.S. power preponderance, however. As a military strategy, it says nothing about the economic posture of the unipole. To give other states incentives to allow the continuation of U.S. military preponderance, the United States must also implement an economic strategy of growth accommodation toward major economic powers. As a consequence, the continuation of the current U.S. position as a unipole is only possible by implementing a strategy that will not only involve U.S. military forces in frequent action but may also eventually make room for other major powers to overtake the U.S. economy. Clearly, the maintenance of U.S. military power preponderance is not free of cost.¶ These arguments highlight the mixed view of unipolarity I lay out ahead. Although military power preponderance certainly allows the unipole to shape the system in ways that are beyond the reach of one great power among several, it is not without peril. Minor powers who find themselves in opposition to the unipole will have great incentives to boost their defensive capabilities. Relations with such powers will be harder to manage and, at least before they acquire greater defensive capabilities, more likely to devolve into armed conflict. At the same time, a unipole must balance the international demands of global management with the domestic investments required to maintain its power preponderance.¶ In this sense, the ironic saying “may god protect us from answered prayers” applies to the U.S. global position after the demise of the Soviet Union.’ Its erstwhile foe long gone, Washington continues to face the consequences of the power vacuum left by Moscow’s demise as a global competitor, which are not an unmitigated boon.¶ At the same time, although the picture I paint in this book is certainly less rosy than most other views of the post—Cold War world, nothing in my argument foreordains the decline of U.S. power. My theory of unipolarity accounts for the possibility of frequent conflict in a nonetheless durable unipolar system. Such is the paradoxical nature of power preponderance. The overall power advantage possessed by the contemporary United States does not mean that it will be able to convert policy preferences into outcomes peacefully. Preponderant power, at least preponderant military power, does not necessarily get states what they want.