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Chinese modernization is sufficient to trigger a regional war with the U.S. even if it cannot compete for global hegemony.

Kupchan 14 [Charles A. Kupchan, Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University, SECURITY STUDIES, “The Normative Foundations of Hegemony and The Coming Challenge to Pax Americana,” Volume 23, Issue 2, 2014, pp. 219-257, accessed 5-20-2015: academic search premiere //wyo-tjc]

Should diplomacy fail to avert rivalry, Sino-American competition may nonetheless fall short of the bipolar enmity of the Cold War. China and the United States are economically interdependent whereas the Soviet Union and the United States carved out separate economic blocs. Moreover, China's geopolitical ambition, at least for the foreseeable future, seems focused primarily on East Asia, suggesting that rivalry with the United States could be more contained than the global competition that ensued between the United States and the Soviet Union. China's regional ambitions are, however, poised to clash head-on with America's determination to maintain strategic primacy in Northeast Asia. Even if it does not match the hostility of the Cold War, the resulting confrontation could well resemble the naval race between Great Britain and Germany that commenced at the turn of the twentieth century. Although Wilhelmine Germany did not threaten the global dominance of the Royal Navy, its naval buildup in the European theater fueled a spiral of hostility that culminated in World War I. On the socioeconomic front, China has successfully fashioned a stable compact between its ruling elite and its rising bourgeoisie. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Imperial China was particularly adept at co-opting a rising merchant class into the existing political order. The same goes for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) today. The CCP has deliberately incorporated China's rapidly expanding middle class into the centralized state, ensuring at least for now that the spread of private wealth does not undermine the party's unitary grip on power. As Kellee Tsai notes, “China's capitalists are pragmatic and creative but they are not budding democrats.” “Economic growth,” she concludes, “has not created a prodemocratic capitalist class.” The status quo certainly faces challenges from economic inequality, corruption, environmental degradation, factional strife within the CCP, and restive minority populations. But meritocratic entry into public service, the continued competence of China's leaders, and governance that is broadly aimed at shared societal gains rather than rent-seeking augur in favor of political stasis. From this perspective, China's ascent should not be expected to transform its socioeconomic order along Western lines any time soon. On the contrary, its domestic order is likely to continue shaping its economic and geopolitical ascent, favoring policies that advantage the compact between the party and the middle class. If so, China is poised to emerge as a hegemonic power well before it democratizes, meaning that the world's leading economy will not ascribe to the dominant political norms associated with the Western liberal order.

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