China and Russia are counterbalancing – cooperation and populism prove
Dr. Alfredo Toro Hardy 22, former Venezuelan ambassador to Canada, PhD in international relations from the Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations, America’s Two Cold Wars: From Hegemony to Decline?, pg. 88-91, Blitz
Beijing-Moscow: Strategic Partnership or Axis? China and Russia have shaped a strategic partnership with two main objectives—the stabilization of their respective political regimes and the counterbalance of Western and American influence. For China, the partnership with Russia was a major help in bolstering its efforts to become a global power as Russia provided it with military, diplomatic, and technological support. Thanks to Russia, China made significant advances in modernizing its armed forces and gaining access to energy sources uncontrolled by the Western world. Currently, both countries pursue the strengthening of a multipolar world and have coordinated their foreign policies in relation to multiple issues. The latter includes Iran, Iraq, NATO, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Venezuela, and common positions within the UN Security Council. At the same time, they have acted together in the development of a sub-regional security system in Eurasia. Experts have argued that if American hostility to China and Russia increases, both countries may appeal to some sort of military alliance as a counterbalancing instrument. In 2019, Moscow and Beijing re-labelled their relationship as a “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination in the new era”. The two parties have expressed their willingness to create a new geopolitical order where the West is excluded from their respective areas of influence. In that sense, according to some analysts, theirs would be a true geopolitical bloc in the making, whereas for others an axis between them already exists. Actually, the Kremlin calls its connection to Beijing as an “allied relationship”, while the latter has asserted that there are “no restricted areas” and “no upper limit” to their partnership (Kim, 2021; Rozman, 2014; Shambaugh, 2020 [1, p. 354]; Tetrais, 2021; Voskressenski, 2020, pp. 233–250).
Some of the highlights of this strategic partnership have been the following: China’s Xi Jinping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin have held nearly thirty meetings since 2013; in the military area both countries conducted 111 multiple high-level exchanges, strategic coordination meetings, and joint military drills between 2003 and 2018, while undertaking together equipment and technology developments; in 2021 they reached a bilateral trade of US$140 billion; 40 million tons of crude and 4 billion cubic meters of LNG are transmitted yearly from Russia to China; China remains as the largest export destination for Russia’s agricultural products; China and Russia inked a Memorandum of Understanding to build a shared international scientific research station on the moon; and they have supported each other in fields such as vaccine development, epidemic control, and treatment plans (Feng, 2021; Saunders, 2020, p. 202).
The Global Times, a propagandistic voice of the Chinese Communist Party, declared that the two countries cannot be separated from each other, maintaining a back-to-back and shoulder-to-shoulder strategic relation. Moreover, it stated that their cooperative relation has no upper limits, which will make any attempt to attack China or Russia a daunting one. Being too big a country to be handled or truly accepted by the West, Russia’s national interest fits China’s aspirations, which in both cases diverge from those of the United States. Their partnership is the most important diplomatic and strategic asset that both countries have in order to confront external challenges (Global Times, 2021).
Why Did Russia Approach China?
To understand the reasons why Russia became so close to China, while in the aftermath of the URRS’ collapse it leaned toward Washington, requires some historic background. One of the most difficult moments faced by Gorbachev after the dissolution of the Soviet’s Eastern and Central European bloc was the reunification of Germany in 1990. This implied that Moscow would have to accept a reunified Germany within NATO, which was a bitter concoction to swallow. To make this concoction more palatable, the Americans made a fundamental concession to Gorbachev: As stated by then Secretary of State James Baker, there would be no further expansion of NATO’s jurisdiction one inch to the east. However, Bill Clinton’s administration repudiated this commitment under the argument that Baker’s word had been given to the Soviet Union, which no longer existed (Gaddis, 2005 [2, Chapter 7]). By successive phases, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latonia, Lithuania, Rumania, Croatia, Albania, Montenegro, and Northern Macedonia would all be incorporated into NATO. Russia’s neighborhood would thus become hostile to it. Moreover, the bombardment of Belgrade and the occupation of Serbia by NATO forces, as well as the ulterior recognition given to Kosovo’s independence, in countercurrent to Moscow’s strong objections, also fell within the same Russian resentment chapter; one that also included the creation by the United States of NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program for the former Soviet republics, which began conducting joint military exercises in the region from 1997 onwards. By the same token, all Central Asian countries joined NATO’s North American Co-operation Council (NATC), while in 1999 the United States integrated Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova into a military structure known by the acronym of GUUAM. Then, between 2004 and 2005, came the color revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kirgizstan, promoted under Washington’s Freedom Agenda. Equally offensive was the United States’ encouragement of oil and gas pipelines’ building between the former URRS republics of the Caspian Sea and Europe, with the double intention of diminishing Russia’s influence in these counties and the relevance of Russia’s hydrocarbons in Europe (Cooley & Nexon, 2020 [4, p. 52]; Mitchell, 2011; Moniz Bandeira, 2017; Nazemroaya, 2012 [1]; Rutland, 2018, pp. 219–237; Stent, 2014 [1]).
Meanwhile, the United States downgraded the United Nations’ Security Council, the only institution where Russia retained parity with it. From Iraq to Libya, the Security Council was bypassed, or its resolutions manipulated to obtain a different result from the one agreed upon. In another context, for eighteen years until finally succeeding in 2012, Russia fought for its admission into the World Trade Organization, the longest negotiation to date. The reason for this delay was Washington’s objection resulting from the application of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment against Russia, a relic from the Cold War.
Step by step the United States, duly accompanied by the European Union in this endeavor, tried to reduce Russia to irrelevance. This process not only overlooked Yeltsin’s initial desire to approach the West but also Putin’s support to America’s Global War on Terror, and his aspiration to become an essential partner of Washington in this war. Moreover, it ignored the fact that shortly after entering the Kremlin, Putin, as Yeltsin had done before him, suggested the possibility of Russia joining NATO. In 2013–2014, finally, the West try to cross a bridge too far. Its attempt to incorporate Ukraine into the Western sphere and into NATO was responsible for triggering a strong Russian reaction. Putin’s actions were easy to understand considering that Ukraine is a flat land extension that had been marched over by Napoleonic France, Imperial Germany, and Nazi Germany to invade Russia. No Russian leader would have tolerated that a military alliance that until recently had been Russia’s mortal foe, positioned itself in Ukraine. No one would cross his arms while Ukraine was being integrated into the Western World. Not understanding the portentous meaning that Ukraine has for Russia was indeed a huge blunder (Kissinger, 2014; Mearsheimer, 2014; Stent, 2014 [2, pp. 69–75]).
Ukraine and Crimea
As a result of Putin’s annexation of Crimea and his bold exploits in Southeast Ukraine, the West imposed sanctions on Moscow. This increased resentment and acrimony, and further pushed Russia into Beijing’s arms. It had been Boris Yeltsin, however, the first to put in motion the rapprochement to China, because of America’s doings.
After the implosion of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Russian State, there was an internal struggle inside the Kremlin between groups representing “Atlanticism” and “Eurasianism”. While the former pressed toward Washington, the latter looked in the direction of Asian powers. Had Washington acted differently, the “Atlanticist” group might have prevailed. Actually, the Kremlin’s collaboration with the successive administrations of Bush and Clinton to ensure that the former Soviet nuclear weapons were either destroyed or relocated on Russian soil was exemplary. However, the scale ended up leaning in the opposite direction as a result of Clinton’s gross disregard of Russian sensibilities and his critical standing toward Yeltsin’s handling of the Chechen War. The “Eurasianist” view took shape by way of the so-called Primakov Doctrine. This doctrine bore the name of its architect, Yevgeny Primakov, Prime Minister of Russia between 1998 and 1999, who aimed at building a strategic alliance between his country and China, India, and Iran. The straw that broke the camel and tilted the balance toward Asia, was a consequence of the clash between Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton in the meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, held in Istanbul in November 1999. One month later, Yeltsin visited the People’s Republic of China to cement Sino-Russian strategic ties in the face of Washington’s continuous shoving aside of Russia (Nazemroaya, 2012 [2, pp. 169–172, 279–282]; Sarotte, 2021).
Russia’s contribution to China may end up becoming of the upmost importance, should an armed conflict erupt between Beijing and Washington. However, in another field this contribution has already proved invaluable to China: Vladimir Putin has become the godfather of rightwing populism, the cancer that threatens to destroy Western democracies from within. This has materialized not only through the Kremlin’s cybercampaigns on populists’ behalf but by way of their ideological affinities. Referring to the Trump-Putin summit, held in Helsinki in July 2018, Robert Kagan said that it was a meeting between allies, with convergent interests and common goals—to destroy the liberal world order that the United States had helped create seven decades before. Populism has become a formidable tool within Russia’s geopolitical aim of weakening America’s led network of alliances (particularly NATO), and in promoting the collapse of the European Union. No need to mention that the havoc populism has unleashed in the United States’ political system, has become one of China’s major strategic advances in its confrontation with that country (Cooley & Nexon, 2020 [5, p. 78]; Kagan, 2018).