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The aff is an exercise in Keynesian economics – that acts as a form of social control through financialization

Lucarelli 10 (Stefano Lucarelli is a professor in economics at University of Bergamo. “Financialization as Biopower,” Semiotexte. January 1 2010. https://www.academia.edu/4949737/_Finanzialization_as_Biopower_in_Andrea_Fumagalli_e_Sandro_Mezzadra_eds._Crisis_in_the_Global_Economy._Financial_Markets_Social_Struggles_and_New_Political_Scenarios_MIT_Press_Series_Semiotext_e_Active_Agents) @ehatt

My thesis is that contemporary capitalism is characterized by an accumulation regime that tends to lead every specific moment of individual existence back into the process of valorization. The means through which this happens do not only include economic politics of neoliberal inspiration, but also include the command devices that are only understanable if they are put in the hybrid zone where the political economy meets social psychology (I’m referring to the wealth-effect). I will therefore try to analyze financialization as a practice of social control. In fact, it seems to me that to understand an accumulation regime unable to construct longlasting modes of regulation, there is only one alternative: assume a new point of view that immediately focuses on the problems of command and power. This new capitalism needs a social control compatible with democratic societies where order is based on the formalized participation of great masses.3 One of the new characteristics of the financialization process that involves us is its mass participation, its formal democracy. In order to articulate this line of reasoning, I will borrow a few categories from Michel Foucault, in particular biopower and governmentality (§2);4 I will then adapt them to my object of analysis, concentrating on the role that the wealth-effect assumes in the financialization process (§3). I will then illustrate the role assumed by monetary policy in the described accumulation regime (§4). Lastly, I will refer to the American economic model—intended as ideal-type—and I will propose a personal reading of the financial crisis (§5): the roots of the crisis are to be sought in the instabilities in the new accumulation regime that is characterized by a dominant technological paradigm. The new technological paradigm started with the crisis of Fordism and the so-called Smithian division of labor. In the new division of labor, along the whole productive assembly line, knowledge plays a key role in the redefinition of the capital-labor relation.5 The so-called subprime crisis then will be explained as a phenomenon endogenously produced by the dynamics of the new accumulation regime that has affirmed itself ever since the crisis of Fordism; an accumulation regime—it is important to stress—compatible only with nonauthentic modes of regulation, or ones that don’t assume the exercise of conflict as a necessary premise for a social pact. Social control (biopower) thus emerges in a new form, more difficult to perceive and contrast.6 Here, I’d like to limit myself to simply indicating another moment for the necessary consideration on the political-economic proposals in response to the crisis.7 1. Foucaultian Categories The term biopower—coined by Foucault in the area of a vaster reasoning on the rationality of western politics—refers to the great structures and functions of power; in his own words, it is a great two-sided technology, anatomic and biologic, that acts on the individual and the species: the comprehension of power cannot stop at the specific social places in which discipline is exercised, but also presupposes the analysis of the regulation of populations in their daily lives (the anatomic and biological aspects therefore participate in a political dimension). This all began to be discovered in the 18th century, when it was realized that the relation of power to the subject or, more precisely, to the individual, cannot be based merely on subjection—that permits power to take goods, riches and, possibly, even the body and blood from subjects—but that power must be exercised over individuals in as much as they constitute a kind of biological entity which must be taken into consideration if the population is to be used as a machine to produce wealth, goods or other individuals.8 The logic of biopower is the production of wealth through the daily use of the population, in opposition to anatomo-politics, which is to say the whole of mechanism and procedures limited to disciplining subjects. The new mechanisms presuppose that the population is not simply perceived as a sum of the individuals that inhabit a territory. As Adelino Zanini has rightly pointed out, what must interest the scholar is the passage from the art of government to political science, from a system dominated by structures de souverainété to one characterized by techniques du gouvernement. A passage made possible by imposing a new paradigm of the political economy.9 Political economy—according to Foucault—is the science which able to identify the law necessary for the scope of governing according to the modern logic of the gouvernment de la population: “The new governmentality, that in the 17th century had thought itself capable of entirely investing itself in a complete and unitary policing project, now finds itself in the situation of having to refer to a neutral area, which is the economy.”10 The logic of biopower therefore takes us to the exact modalities of control that Foucault called governmentality: With the word “governmentality” I mean three things. [First,] the whole of institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations and tactics that permit the exercising of this specific and quite complex form of power, that has the population as its main target, in the political economy the privileged form of knowledge and in the security devices the principle technical tool. Second, for “governmentality” I mean the tendency, the driving force that, in the whole West and for a long time, continues to assert the preeminence of this type of power that we call “government” over all of the others—sovereignty, discipline—with the consequent development, on one hand, of a series of specific government apparatuses and, [on the other hand,] a series of knowledges. Lastly, for “governementality” we should mean the process, rather than the result, of the process through which the state of Medieval justice, having become the administrative state in the course of the 15th and 16th centuries, gradually found itself “governmentalized.”11 Foucault didn’t elaborate his research in the direction of financial and monetary history. Yet, a history of governmentality—as I see it—cannot leave out the financial and monetary apparatuses that came into existence in the 18th century. As many important studies conducted on the history of money have shown, this century represents an incredibly significant moment for the history of money in Europe: it is the moment in which European money frees itself from the traditional configuration, that of guaranteeing account correctness and payment stability in the whole Empire. Before then, in fact, it was the duty of the Prince of conserving a treasure from which it is possible to draw upon if needed, which is to say if the community’s need imposes it, and its regulatory function is limited to this. […] The “nature” of money is exhausted in its distributive capacity and is naturally delimited by the measure in which the goods are present. In respect to such measure, money is constantly able to take account of the presence of things, but can never solicit that they come into presence: it is both measure of abundance and scarcity starting from their natural alternation in time.12 In modernity—in the course of the 18th century—the need to strengthen the territorial states shattered the imperial political-administrative equilibrium just described. The dominant need became that which money can change value in relation to the changing needs that are manifested in nation-states, which is the valorization of money. Money’s “nature” is no longer delimited by the measure in which goods are present, but consists in the urge to get rich. Grasping the trait that joints both this function of money and the regulation of populations for the production of wealth, clarifies the concrete meaning of biopower. In order to transform the Foucaultian concept of biopower in a political category useful for the analysis of the current process of financialization, it must be understood simultaneously in the two dimensions proposed above. If the quickest way to produce abstract wealth, i.e. money, is trying to realize it minimizing the risks that are run and the conflicts that come up when raw goods production is organized, it is only rational to minimize the costs of production, including state and bank control over economic activities, thus maximizing the possibility of money’s autonomously deciding what it has at its disposition. In such a way, a new power of control over the population is exerted. The risk distribution inherent to the production of money through money becomes the strategy to employ. The power that is exercised within an accumulation system dominated by finance is something different from the power exercised by a sovereign state over its citizens. The search for governmental freedom that markets claim goes right along with the management of the populations which nation-states take responsibility for. So that the population produces wealth within money’s valorization cycle, a form of social control that substantiates the different relations both between master and slave and between state and citizen. My thesis is that financialization represents the very form of social control necessary for such scope. It is in fact a form of socialization (of risk but also of the prospectives of enrichment that are complementary to it) that leads to a revolution in the concept of sovereignty. What financialization puts at stake is no longer the immediate application of sovereign power but the directing of the whole of the human behaviors necessary so that sovereignty is coherent with the financialization process. 2. Financialization and the Wealth-Effect First of all, financialization can be defined as the diversion of domestic economy savings to stock market shares.13 Ever since the 1980s, the American economy has been characterized by the process of financial market liberalization and the consequent explosion of new financial tools: thus the passage from a Keynesianism built on a pact between producers in an environment of a monetary system that binds currency and financial maneuvers—already weakened by president Nixon’s declaration of the inconvertibility of the dollar to gold in 1971—to a financial Keynesianism based on private deficit spending, in which the largest financial market deregulations are accompanied by the diminution of social incomes distributed by the welfare state. We are facing an evolution in liberal governmentality. In other words, financial Keynesianism is a modality of liberal governmentality. Shareholder value14 becomes the principle macroeconomic indicator, the scepter and the pastoral that govern both investment and consumption through the wealth-effect.15 For a psychological dynamic that would be worthy of further study but that represents a necessary condition of stability of the American economic model (here intended as ideal-type), the wealth effect induced by an increase of value in the markets affects consumption behaviors more than the expected wealth due to an increase in wages.16 The model has a high risk of instability; the fact that financial crises have followed one after another so quickly over the last few years is proof of this. The exercising of liberal governmentality means that this form of specific command over individual behavior is reintroduced each time: the rule that has been consolidated consists in passing from one bubble to the next,17 forcing individuals to believe that their wealth depends more on financial markets than demands for wages or other forms of possible claims. Following this approach, the wealth-effect represents the form of command typical of financial Keynesianism, here understood as liberal governmentality. The dynamic that goes from profit to financial market and vice-versa substitutes the principle political decisions in the Fordist-Keynesian paradigm: the productivity-wage connection and the production-mass consumption connection. The impact of financial returns on patrimonial decisions becomes the key factor in investment decisions; these must keep count of the financial returns, and not only on the variations in demand. Consumption continues to depend on the accumulation of traditional income from labor (i.e. wages) but a variable that measures the value of the financial tools that families own intervenes too. If financialization is highly developed—which is if family wealth depends more on the quote of income coming from financial markets than wages—wage moderation, favoring companies’ profitability, increases financial returns; thus a dynamic founded on the wealth-effect aimed at favoring private consumption while even facing falling real wages can be triggered. The level of production becomes a consequence of financial value. This inverts the relations between the real sphere and the financial sphere that prevailed under Fordism: the market dynamic replaces wages as source of cumulative growth. This inversion also revolutionizes social control mechanisms that concern the individuals in the modern world. In other words, the wealth-effect that supports the financial world’s thought process depends on the degree of subsumption not only of labor, but of life itself and finance (this is where biopower’s feature lies). In macroeconomic terms, this dependent relation is translated in the growing liquidity that financial markets attract starting with private savings that were previously invested in State bonds. Even so, this growing liquidity is not enough by itself. There is a second explanatory variable necessary so that the wealth-effect continues: it is the common sense that forms between individuals about the reasons that should explain the production of money by means of money, and about the hierarchy of needs to satisfy in order to maintain an acceptable social status. The logic of valorization leads to the transformation of social relations. More precisely, this means that financialization is a form of socialization that makes liberal governmentality evolve. So, it is comprehensible as to why the analysis of financialization cannot be limited to the study of the conditions of the macroeconomic sustainability of the system; it also requires paying particular attention to the social codes through which human relations are reciprocally limited. We must thus understand these conventions that settle in the population, starting from the business world. A convention furnishes a valuation system a priori, pointing out the whole of the social rules able to make the different behavior of single individuals homogeneous. Therefore, it presupposes a theory of imitation. This is the observational point that Keynes uses to explain the generation of long-term expectations: There is, however, not much to be said about the state of confidence a priori. Our conclusions must mainly depend upon the actual observation of markets and business psychology. […] Thus certain classes of investment are governed by the average expectation of those who deal on the Stock Exchange as revealed in the price of shares, rather than by the genuine expectations of the professional entrepreneur. How then are these highly significant daily, even hourly, revaluations of existing investments carried out in practice? In practice we have tacitly agreed, as a rule, to fall back on what is, in truth, a convention. The essence of this convention—though it does not, of course, work out quite so simply—lies in assuming that the existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely, except in so far as we have specific reasons to expect a change […] Nevertheless the above conventional method of calculation will be compatible with a considerable measure of continuity and stability in our affairs, so long as we can rely on the maintenance of the convention. 18 However, the analysis of conventions cannot be limited to the business world. The state of trust defined by conventional valuation is in fact legitimated by public opinion.19 It spills into the business world, involves the populations and becomes political object. Hence it helps in focusing the (Foucaultian) problem of the govermentality of civil society. The dominant accumulation system in contemporary capitalism supposes more than one change in the political sphere: first of all, growth conditions depend on the acceptance of a new productive model in which labor assumes a different role. It is not only a deconstruction of the Fordist union; nor is it merely the reduced importance of wages in as much as a fundamental macroeconomic variable for accumulation and therefore the annihilation of the inherent conflict in wage claims. Instead, it is the construction of a valorization process in which the acknowledged objective reasons that are at the base of the production of wealth change; valorization becomes dependent on the conventions that are asserted in the financial community. Macroeconomic stability depends largely on the interventions of the Central Banks that, facing a scarcity of liquidity in the financial markets, must be quick enough to prevent a financial crisis. The Central Banks react facing the need for liquidity, aware that they are sustaining the wealth-effect on which it plays—in Foucaultian terms—the security of the territory’s population delimited by the financial markets. The levers of power are no longer in the distribution of banking credit, nor in deficit spending. The independent variable is neither wages, nor profit, but is the accumulation rate from financial appreciation. The offer of currency is freed by the quantum of currency held by the Central Bank and is tied to the reorganization of the division of labor and the redefinition of social relations in the circulation-reproduction sphere. In other words, money supply is tied to the dynamic of capital-(living) labor: as the contributions by “Primo Maggio” workgroup on money show, monetary policy represents a modality of capitalist command.20 Today this task is no longer accomplished through the control of the quantity of currency in circulation nor merely in the name of inflationist thrusts. In the Central Bank and academic worlds, throughout the 1990s a principle was established according to which the credibility of monetary policy must realize itself either through pegging the exchange rate or through delegating monetary politics to a foreign Central Bank with elevated inflation aversion. First, this New Consensus negates Friedman’s monetary policy: the main instruments for monetary policy control are interest rates, no longer money supply. In theory, the role of the Central Bank consists in assuring the equality between the monetary interest rate and the real interest rate that regulates the balance between loanable and investment funds. When market rates (in real terms) are fixed under the natural rate, inflation is created. A restrictive monetary policy would have no negative effects and would help to control inflation. In reality, to support the rate of accumulation from financial surplus value, the highest monetary policy institutions didn’t hesitate in behaving differently: At the head of the Federal Reserve there are still people with good sense that have sacrificed, as in Greenspan’s case, their philosophic maximalism in the name of the preservation of the system even with tools completely contrary to that maximalism. But even in Europe, the maximalism of the very ECB statute was substituted by the good sense of those that manage our highest monetary organism. Greenspan didn’t hesitate to cut the Federal Fund rates 11 times in one year, bringing it to the lowest nominal level of the last 40 years. And the ECB willingly followed his example!21 Monetary policy in a finance-led growth regime must follow the needs of valorization, supporting the conventions. The monetary creation influenced by financialization is substantialized in a recovery process of capital’s profitability that involves people’s lives in financial risk. Financialization determines the times of capitalistic reorganization, facilitating the subsumption of circulation within the entire process of valorization.22 This last element is the one that connects the three phases of the financialization process ever since 1993: the boom of the New Economy (1993–2000), the reaction to its crisis (2000–2003), and lastly the real-estate bubble (2003–2007). All three phases occur in the same technological paradigm. For this reason, the conventions that regulate financial valuation are not subjected to radical changes. The valuation logics in the financial community are, for the most part, the same.

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