The aff’s expansion of Medicare is an example of the state’s investment in the individual’s health in order to maximize revenue streams based in human capital.
Kenny ’15 [Katherine Kenny is currently finishing her PhD in Sociology and Science Studies at the University of California, San Diego. She studies the politics of knowledge production in policy relevant science, “The biopolitics of global health: Life and death in neoliberal time,” Journal of Sociology, August 2015, https://sci-hub.live/10.1177/1440783314562313] [A.G]
Becker (1962: 9) defined human capital as those ‘activities that influence future real income through the imbedding of resources in people’ including the2 knowledge, skills, dispositions and health that are embodied in people that make them economically productive. Some of the ways to invest in one’s human capital, Becker argued ‘include schooling, on-the-job training, medical care, vitamin consumption, and acquiring information about the economic system’ (1962: 9). These investments vary in their relative effects on earnings, that is, in their relative return on investment. ‘But all improve the physical and mental abilities of people and thereby raise real income prospects’ (Becker, 1962: 9). The epistemic underpinnings of human capital theory, then, inevitably invoke a neoliberal political rationality in which an economic lens is applied across the entirety of human existence and, importantly, practices of individual self-investment are privileged over welfare state provision. While Becker acknowledged the importance of health as a form of human capital, the concept was more fully theorized by Becker’s student Michael Grossman (1972, 2004). He conceptualized health as something consumers demand for two reasons. First, as a consumption commodity it ‘enters into their preference functions’, that is, people prefer a state of health over a state of ill health. Second, and importantly for the argument here, health is conceptualized as an investment commodity because it ‘determines the total amount of time available for market and nonmarket activities … [such that] an increase in the stock of health reduces the time lost from these activities’ (i.e. time away from market and non-market activities) (Grossman, 1972: 225). Health as a site of investment yields life, here configured as a form of time. The return on investment in health as human capital is an increased dividend of time. The monetary value of increased life-astime, or, conversely, the ‘monetary value of the reduction [of lost productive time]’ Grossman continued, ‘is an index of the return to an investment in health’ (1972: 225). Investing in one’s health extends the duration of possible participation in market and non-market activity, and maximizes the term over which investment in one’s human capital can be realized. Premature death represents the foreshortening of the term of investment. Health, on the other hand, extends life. But figuring health as a form of human capital results in the reconceptualization of life a revenue stream. With health as human capital, and lifetimes disaggregated into life/time, life is reassembled as a revenue stream. But perhaps more worryingly, premature death becomes not just a foreshortening of time, but a form of failed investment, or, more accurately, a failure to self-invest. Grossman explains: “[I]t is assumed that individuals inherit an initial stock of health that depreciates over time – at an increasing rate, at least after some stage in the life cycle – and can be increased by investment. Death occurs when the stock falls below a certain level, and one of the novel features of the model is that individuals ‘choose’ their length of life.” (Grossman, 1972: 225) With health imagined as a form of human capital, the length of one’s life becomes the result of investing, or failing to invest, in one’s own health. Death is no longer a disease outcome, it is rendered a decision outcome; a decision outcome that the future-oriented, risk-minimizing economically maximizing rational actor should, obviously, avoid through self-optimizing practices of investing in one’s own health. This rendering of health as human capital, the disaggregation of lifetimes into life/time and reassembly of life as a revenue stream presupposes a neoliberal homo oeconomicus who must optimize their own health in the present in order secure future life/time. This conceptualization of the length of life as a consumer choice can be seen in the DALY metric’s use of a standard life expectancy table. Despite the egalitarian principle behind the standard life expectancy, when the duration of life is conceptualized as resulting from individual investment choices, entire high-mortality populations are recast as failed investors; as having failed to invest adequately in their own stock of health capital. Of course, individuals choose their length of life to approximately the same degree that they choose where they are born. Any rational actor would choose to be born amidst a low mortality population; every homo oeconomicus should invest in their own health so as to ensure maximal life expectancy. But recasting life expectancy as an investment choice locates it firmly within the territory of individual agency, with the result that individuals born amidst high-mortality populations are immediately rendered failed investors. When cast in the light of human capital theory, the ‘egalitarian principle’ involved in the DALY metric’s use of a standard life table starts to look far less egalitarian. The DALY metric was conceived in a broadly egalitarian spirit and designed for the purposes of carrying out cost–benefit analyses of potential health interventions so as to design emerging health systems according to a logic of economic optimization. But more than just facilitating cost–benefit analyses, the DALY metric accomplishes an economization of life itself by disaggregating lifetimes into component units of life-as-time and reassembling life as revenue stream to be maximized through practices of self- investment in one’s own health, configured here as human capital. Death, on the other hand, results from a failure to self-invest appropriately; it is not a disease outcome but rather a decision outcome. Death, on the logic of the DALY metric, results from the unsuccessful entrepreneurial management of the self, the ultimate failure of neoliberal homo oeconomicus. Conclusion The World Bank’s World Development Report 1993: Investing in Health, is frequently identified as a key moment in the transition from international to global health. In this article, I located the epistemological origins of this historical shift in a less-known aspect of the Investing in Health report: its introduction of the DALY metric. But to engage with the epistemological side of this history is not to eschew its material effects: the introduction of the DALY metric has profoundly shaped the terrain of global health over the past 25 years. For example, it was upon reading the World Development Report 1993: Investing in Health that Bill Gates decided to invest his philanthropic billions in the cause of global health (Norheim, 2014). And it was according to the logic of DALY calculations that the Gates Foundation has prioritized its own global health spending. Upon her election to the post of Director General of the WHO in 1998, Dr Gro Harlem Brundtland adopted Investing in Health as her ‘roadmap’ to reforming the WHO in order to reassert its central place within the new neoliberal global health landscape (Chorev, 2012). The priorities of the WHO in the intervening period have been shaped by the global burden of disease, calculated in DALYs, as well as the availability of cost–effective interventions. Examples include the creation of the WHO’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, the world’s first legally binding public health treaty, and increased attention to the burden of non-communicable diseases more generally (Kenny, forthcoming). The DALY metric was initially conceived as a new summary measure of population health that could incorporate both mortality and morbidity into a single unit of analysis and facilitate cost–benefit analyses for the purposes of designing health systems according to a logic of economic maximization. But, as I have argued here, the DALY metric accomplishes an economization of life by disaggregating lifetimes into component units of time and reassembling life as a revenue stream to be maximized through practices of self-investment in one’s own health – configured here as human capital. Life is reimagined as time and the individual as a neoliberal homo oeconomicus, as an entrepreneur of the self. Death is recast from a disease outcome to a decision outcome and represents the personal failure of a neoliberal homo oeconomicus. In contrast to its seemingly objective simple presentation, I have argue that the DALY metric is best conceived as a biopolitical technology of power that underpins the contemporary neoliberal global health regime.