Social security is an extension of neoliberal control that renders its participants in a state of bare life where they are merely a unit of labour to be used by the government
Garrett ‘18
(Paul Michael Garrett, Senior Lecturer Dept. of Pol. Science & Soc. Galway University Affiliation, 9-17-2018, "Revisiting ‘The Birth of Biopolitics’: Foucault's Account of Neoliberalism and the Remaking of Social Policy," Cambridge Core, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-social-policy/article/abs/revisiting-the-birth-of-biopolitics-foucaults-account-of-neoliberalism-and-the-remaking-of-social-policy/7DF99E21282AA855D0541D470A02B46D, accessed 7-12-2023) //OC
This form of neoliberalism was not – as some were subsequently to argue – a project aiming to ‘roll back the state’ leaving people entirely to the whims of an unregulated market (Garrett, 2009). Neoliberal ‘governmental intervention is no less dense, frequent, active, and continuous than in any other system’ (p. 145). What occurs, however, is a reconstitution or remaking of the state, which becomes more vigilant and active in promoting the market economy. Neoliberalism departs not only from the classical liberalism of the nineteenth century but is also at odds with what Foucault terms ‘contemporary American anarcho-capitalism’ (p. 133). As advocated by its West German and Austrian proponents, neoliberalism is a ‘positive’ and ‘intervening liberalism’ (p. 133): an evolving form in which ‘economic processes and institutional framework call on each other, modify and shape each other in ceaseless reciprocity’ (p. 164). The transformations willed by these neoliberals are associated with a novel ‘governmental style’ (p. 133) entailing different kinds of regulatory and ‘organizing’ actions (p. 138). Setting themselves firmly against Keynesianism, the promulgators of this new form of liberalism argued that there are instances where the state should emphatically not intervene: namely, there should be no substantial state intervention to respond to, and alleviate hardships prompted by, unemployment. Within this perspective, an unemployed person should never be perceived as a ‘social victim’ (p. 139). Foreshadowing the later lexicon on so-called ‘jobseekers’, the unemployed person was better understood as merely a ‘worker in transit . . . in transit between an unprofitable activity and more profitable activity’ (p. 139; see also GOV.UK, 2014). Relatedly, social policy should not ‘function like a compensatory mechanism for absorbing or nullifying the possible destructive effects of the market’ (p. 160). Rather, the role of social policy should be one of facilitating market processes. As Foucault remarks: there must be those who work and those who don’t, there must be big salaries and small salaries, and also prices must rise and fall. Consequently, a social policy with the objective of even relative equalization, even a relative evening out, can only be anti-economic. Social policy cannot have equality as its objective. On the contrary, it must let inequality function (p. 143). Social transfers – social security benefits – should be available, but only to provide a very basic ‘minimum’ for those who are not ‘able to ensure their own existence’ (p. 143). Central here is the ‘idea that the economy is a game’ with the state merely aspiring to safeguard ‘players from being excluded from the game’ (p. 202). Above this threshold, ‘everyone will have to be an enterprise for himself and his family’ (p. 206). More pervasively, this will be a society ‘formalized on the model’ of ‘competitive enterprise’ (p. 206). Echoing Marxist analysis, Foucault asserts, however, that there will continue to exist a ‘kind of infra- and supraliminal floating population, a liminal population which, for an economy that has abandoned the objective of full employment, will be a constant reserve of manpower which can be drawn on if need be, but which can also be returned to its assisted status if necessary’ (p. 206); see also Marx (1990 [1867]): 794). This ‘floating population’ will be enabled ‘to live, after a fashion, and to live in such a way’ that it can ‘always be available for possible work, if market conditions require it’ (p. 207): an articulation, which describes the predicament of those now often referred to as the ‘precariat’ (Gill and Pratt, 2008). Governments must not, therefore, ‘form a counterpoint or a screen . . . between society and economic processes’ (p. 145). Neither must they seek to ‘correct the destructive effects of the market on society’ (p.145). The core function of governments, according to this radical neoliberal analysis, is ‘to intervene on society so that competitive mechanisms can play a regulatory role at every moment and every point in society’ thus ensuring ‘a general regulation of society by the market’ (p. 145). As the quintessential anti-Beveridge blueprint, neoliberal society is unencumbered from the responsibility of ‘guarantee[ing] individuals against risks, whether these are individual risks, like illness or accidents, or collective risks, like damage, for example’ (p. 144). The only task for the ‘society, or rather the economy’, will be to maintain the rule of law and to ensure that every ‘individual has sufficient income to be able, either directly or as an individual, or through the collective means of mutual benefit organizations, to insure himself against existing risks, or the risks of life, the inevitability of old age and death, on the basis of his private reserves’ (p. 144, emphasis added).